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ABSTRACT

MOVEMENT AND THE SEMANTIC TYPE OF TRACES

SEPTEMBER 2017
ETHAN POOLE
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Rajesh Bhatt and Professor Kyle Johnson

This dissertation argues that there are only two possible semantic representations of movement:
(i) a λ-bound variable, i.e. trace, ranging over an individual semantic type, such as entities and
degrees, or (ii) reconstruction back into the launching site of movement. Even though natural
language has expressions over higher types, these expressions cannot be represented as traces,
which only range over individual types. I call this constraint the Trace Interpretation Constraint.
The novel empirical motivation for this constraint comes from a detailed investigation of movement
targeting DPs that denote properties, a kind of higher-type expression. I observe that such movement obligatorily reconstructs and argue that the absence of nonreconstructed readings entails that
movement cannot map onto traces ranging over properties. This investigation is complemented by
existing and novel arguments against traces ranging over generalized quantifiers, another kind of
higher-type expression.
A second core claim of this dissertation is that the Trace Interpretation Constraint cannot
be circumvented by type shifting an individual-type trace into a higher type, which I call the
Trace Rigidity Principle. I show that there is a class of expressions that cannot be type shifted
into property denotations, namely anaphoric definite descriptions, and argue that this class of
expressions properly includes traces under Trace Conversion, thereby providing independent

ix

support for the Trace Rigidity Principle. According to the Trace Interpretation Constraint and the
Trace Rigidity Principle, movement is tightly restricted in how it can be semantically interpreted.
This dissertation also explores the dichotomy between the two representations permitted by
the Trace Interpretation Constraint: leaving an individual-type trace and reconstruction. I develop
a syntax and semantics of movement under which this choice is not free, but deterministic and
does not require special LF interpretation rules. Therefore, a given movement derivation maps
onto one and only one semantic representation. I argue that a deterministic system of movement
requires multidominant representations. I demonstrate that this system of movement accounts for
a number of disparate reconstruction phenomena without further ado.
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chapter 1
introduction
Movement has played an integral role in the development of linguistic theory. One of the pivotal
discoveries about movement is that when an expression moves, it leaves behind something in
its launching site. Chomsky (1973) proposed that what is left behind is a trace; since Chomsky
(1993, 1995b), it has been standardly assumed that the launching site is instead occupied by a copy.
The shift to copy-theoretic conceptions of movement gives rise to an immediate semantic puzzle:
a structure that contains two copies of a moved expression cannot be straightforwardly composed
semantically. There are two available and readily employed options, either (i) interpret both copies
by converting the lower copy into a λ-bound variable (1a)—or something richer, like a bound
definite description (e.g. Engdahl 1980, 1986; Fox 2002)—or (ii) interpret only the lower copy (1b). 1
Let us refer to the first option in (1a) as leaving a trace, where the λ-bound variable is the trace,
and the second option in (1b) as reconstruction.
(1)

[ Which book ] did Nina read [ which book ]?
a.

Leaving a trace
[ Which book ] [ λx [ did Nina read x ] ]?

b. Reconstruction
[ which book ] did Nina read [ which book ]?
This dissertation investigates in detail two questions about the semantics of movement: (i) What
semantic types can traces range over? (ii) What regulates the choice between leaving a trace (1a)
and reconstructing (1b)? In a nutshell, I motivate the highly restrictive constraint that traces can
only range over individual semantic types, like entities (e) but not properties (⟨e, t⟩), and develop a

1

Note that the choice between (1a) and (1b) does not necessarily depend on the Copy Theory of Movement.

1

system in which the choice between (1a) and (1b) is deterministic and reduces to the internal makeup
of a movement chain. The next two sections 1.1 and 1.2 of this introduction chapter elaborate on
these proposals in somewhat greater detail, while section 1.3 outlines how the argumentation
proceeds in the dissertation.

1.1

(Im)possible traces

The main claim of this dissertation is that traces only range over individual semantic types, such
as entities (e) and degrees (d). Even though natural language has expressions over higher types,
like properties (⟨e, t⟩) and generalized quantifiers (⟨et, t⟩), these expressions cannot be represented
as traces. I call this constraint the Trace Interpretation Constraint, given in (2) (see also
Chierchia 1984; Landman 2006).
(2)

Trace Interpretation Constraint
*[ DP1 λf σ . . . [ . . . [ f σ ]1 . . . ] ], where σ is not an individual type

A second core claim of this dissertation is that the Trace Interpretation Constraint cannot be
circumvented in the semantics by type shifting an individual-type trace into a higher type. I call
this constraint the Trace Rigidity Principle, given in (3) (see also Landman 2004).
(3)

Trace Rigidity Principle
Traces cannot be type shifted.

These constraints together conspire to force movement either to map onto a trace ranging over an
individual type (4) or to reconstruct by putting the moved expression back in its launching site (5).
All other representations are ill-formed.

(4) [ DP1 λx e . . . [ . . . [ x e ]1 . . . ] ]

(5) [

1

. . . [ . . . [ DP ]1 . . . ] ]
reconstruct

The crucial motivation for these proposals comes from a series of original observations about
what I call Π-positions. These are syntactic environments where a DP denotes a property,
i.e. type ⟨e, t⟩ (or intensional ⟨s, ⟨e, t⟩⟩). The four Π-positions that form the empirical base of
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the investigation are the pivot of an existential construction (6a), the color term of a change-ofcolor verb (6b), the name argument of a naming verb (6c), and predicate nominals (6d). Despite
their surface heterogeneity, what these four environments have in common is that they require a
property-type DP.
(6) Π -positions
a.

Existential constructions
There is [ a potato ]⟨e,t ⟩ in the pantry.

b. Change-of-color verbs
Megan painted the house [ magenta ]⟨e,t ⟩ .
c.

Naming verbs
Irene called the cat [ Snowflake ]⟨e,t ⟩ .

d. Predicate nominals
Erika became [ a teacher ]⟨e,t ⟩ .
What is crucial about Π-positions is that they can be targeted by movement. Thus, they provide
a testing ground for the hypothesis that only (4) and (5) are possible semantic representations
of movement: Π-positions are type-incompatible with entity traces and thus the only mode of
interpretation for them should be to reconstruct. As I will show, Π-positions can be targeted
by movement, but only if that movement does not shift scope. This general claim manifests in
two ways. First, movement types that obligatorily shift scope cannot target Π-positions. Second,
movement types that otherwise optionally shift scope can target Π-positions, but only if they
do not shift scope. For example, it can be shown that topicalization obligatorily shifts scope
and accordingly it cannot target Π-positions (7a). On the other hand, wh-movement shifts scope
optionally, but when it targets a Π-position, the moved wh-phrase must take scope in the launching
site of movement (7b). This derives a movement asymmetry first observed in Postal (1994), but goes
beyond it to show that it crosscuts movement types.
(7) Π -positions and movement
a.

Topicalization
* Magenta1 , Megan painted the house

1.

*how many ≫ should; 3should ≫ how many

b. Wh-movement

[ How many colors ]1 should Megan paint the house

3

1?

Π-positions reveal that the semantic representation of scope-shifting movement is incompatible
with property positions. Under my proposal, movement can be interpreted in one of two ways.
Leaving a type-e trace (as in (4)) would shift scope, but such a trace does not furnish the property
meaning required by Π-positions, yielding ungrammaticality. Reconstruction (as in (5)) obviates
this problem by placing the moved expression back in the launching site of movement at LF. Thus,
if a DP would not ordinarily violate the property requirement of Π-positions, then it will not do so
under reconstruction either. What this incompatibility between Π-positions and scope-shifting
movement entails is that movement cannot map onto a property trace ranging over type ⟨e, t⟩,
as schematized in (8). If such a representation were available, it would salvage scope-shifting
movement and at the same time be compatible with Π-positions. The fact that such meanings are
unavailable tells us that such a representation is ungrammatical. Therefore, (4) and (5) are the only
possible representations of movement.
(8) No property traces
* [ DP1 λf ⟨e,t ⟩ . . . [ . . . [ f ⟨e,t ⟩ ]1 . . . ] ]

I supplement this argument against property traces with independent evidence that even apparent
quantification over properties must take scope in situ and thus cannot undergo QR.
The reason why Π-positions are important to understanding the semantics of movement
is that they provide the missing puzzle piece to the Trace Interpretation Constraint. It is wellknown that DPs come in three semantic guises: entities (e), properties (⟨e, t⟩), and generalized
quantifiers (⟨et, t⟩) (Partee 1986). Previous research on possible traces, in particular Romero (1998)
and Fox (1999), focused on the division between entity and generalized-quantifier traces, the two
unmarked argument types. The conclusion reached there was that movement cannot leave a
generalized-quantifier trace (9).
(9) No generalized-quantifier traces
*[ DP1 λf ⟨et,t ⟩ . . . [ . . . [ f ⟨et,t ⟩ ]1 . . . ] ]

4

Π-positions complete the “triangle”, providing the evidence that property traces are also ungrammatical and thus supplying the crucial final piece of the argument that the constraint on possible
traces is against any higher-type trace—i.e. the Trace Interpretation Constraint.
Π-positions also provide the empirical motivation for the Trace Rigidity Principle, according
to which traces cannot be type shifted. I observe that while some seemingly type-e expressions
can occur in Π-positions, anaphoric definite descriptions are prohibited in Π-positions. This is
illustrated in (10b), where a definite description in a Π-position, here a change-of-color verb, is
unable to covary with an indefinite in a quantificational sentence, a configuration known to require
an anaphoric definite. The sentence is infelicitous because the simple uniqueness condition on
nonanaphoric definites is not satisfied in the context. Examples like (10b) reveal that definite
descriptions in Π-positions cannot be anaphoric.
(10) No anaphoric definites in Π -positions
Every time Irene picks out a color for the bathroom, . . .
a.

3

Helen complains that the color/shade is too bright.

b. # Helen has to paint the room [ the color/shade ]Π-pos .
I draw a connection between this generalization and the independently-motivated hypothesis of
Trace Conversion, wherein the lower copies of a movement chain are interpreted at LF by converting
them into definite descriptions with a variable (Engdahl 1980, 1986; Sauerland 1998, 2004; Fox 1999,
2002, 2003). Under Trace Conversion, “traces” are thus anaphoric definite descriptions. I propose
that while expressions can in principle achieve the property denotation required for Π-positions
via type shifting, anaphoric definite descriptions—and hence traces—do not have licit property
denotations under type shifting. I then develop a syntactic analysis of this incompatibility wherein
type shifters are in complementary distribution syntactically with the strong definite determiner (in
the sense of Schwarz 2009), the pivotal piece required to construct an anaphoric definite description.
Consequently, a derivation can use either a strong-definite determiner with a DP or a type shifter
on that DP, but never both; this derives the Trace Rigidity Principle.

5

1.2

Traces vs. reconstruction

According to the Trace Interpretation Constraint and the Trace Rigidity Principle, movement may
either map onto a trace ranging over an individual semantic type (11) or reconstruct by putting the
moved expression back in its launching site at LF (12).

(11) [ DP1 λx e . . . [ . . . [ x e ]1 . . . ] ]

(12) [

. . . [ . . . [ DP ]1 . . . ] ]

1

reconstruct

I argue that the choice between (11) and (12) is not free, but deterministic. Thus, a given movement
derivation maps onto one and only semantic representation. I then develop a system in which the
semantic behavior of a movement step depends entirely on the identity of the moving element:
moving a DP versus moving a QP (question-particle phrase; in the sense of Cable 2007, 2010).
Moving a DP results in a trace over type e (13). DP-movement is interpreted via Trace Conversion,
wherein the lower copies of a movement chain are converted into anaphoric definite descriptions
(Engdahl 1980, 1986; Sauerland 1998, 2004; Fox 1999, 2002, 2003).
(13) Movement of a DP
[ DP1 . . . [ . . . DP1 . . . ] ] ↝LF [ [DP D NP ]1 λx e . . . [ . . . [DP the [λy . y = x] NP ]1 . . . ] ]
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¸ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¶
Trace Conversion

By contrast, moving a QP results in reconstruction of everything except the Q head (14). The
interpretation of QP-movement follows from the Q head being unable to semantically compose
with its complement, forcing the two to disassociate at LF.
(14) Movement of a QP
[ [QP Q XP ]1 . . . [ . . . [QP Q XP ]1 . . . ] ] ↝LF [ [QP Q XP ]1 . . . [ . . . [QP Q XP ]1 . . . ] ]
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¸¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¶
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹¸ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¶
Interpret Q

Interpet XP

Therefore, movement that shifts scope is movement of a DP and movement that reconstructs
is movement of a QP. The interesting outcomes of this proposal materialize when individual
steps of QP-movement and DP-movement are chained together. I will show that it is possible for
QP-movement to follow DP-movement (15a), but not vice versa (15b).

6

(15) a.

QP-movement following DP-movement
Build QP

QP-mvt
3

[ [QP Q DP1 ]2 . . . [ [QP Q DP1 ]2 . . . [ . . . DP1 . . . ] ] ]
DP-mvt

b. DP-movement following QP-movement
DP-mvt

* [ DP1 . . . [ [QP Q DP1 ]2 . . . [ . . . [QP Q DP1 ]2 . . . ] ] ]
QP-mvt

Under this proposal, whether a movement chain shifts scope reduces to whether it contains an
initial step of DP-movement. This allows different movement types to be stated in terms of
different sequences of DP-movement and QP-movement, which I will show, given the possibility of
DP-movement preceding QP-movement, reduces to whether the movement targets DPs or QPs.
This DP/QP-movement system is implemented in a multidominant syntax, building on Johnson
(2012, 2014), which I argue is necessary to build structures like (15a) without resorting to countercyclicity. The upshot of this system is that there are no special rules at LF for interpreting movement,
such as Trace Conversion—thus, (13) will also be revised. The structure built for movement in the
narrow syntax serves the needs of the PF and LF interfaces without further interface-level modification. Presented along the way are many arguments in favor of this multidominant conception of
movement from the perspective of how movement is interpreted.
I then apply the DP/QP-movement system to four disparate reconstruction phenomena: the
Π-position asymmetry, Late Merge effects, focus intervention, and VP/AP movement. These
phenomena divide into two classes: reconstruction-forcing conditions and reconstruction-blocking
conditions. Reconstruction-forcing conditions are environments that are incompatible with the
semantic output of DP-movement, namely a definite description, which is type e. They disallow
any movement that shifts scope, i.e. is not QP-movement (16).
(16) Reconstruction-forcing condition
* [ [DP D NP ] . . . [ . . . [ [DP the NP ] ] . . . ] ]
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¸¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¶
Incompatible with type e
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Reconstruction-blocking conditions, on the other hand, require that the moving expression or some
subpart of it be outside the scope of another element in the structure. They target DPs and hence
achieve this scope-shifting with DP-movement, which by definition does not reconstruct. This is
schematized in (17), where α must be outside the scope of β.
(17) Reconstruction-blocking condition
[ [DP D NP α ] . . . [ β . . . [ . . . [DP the NP ] . . . ] ] ]

DP, α ≫ β

The ease with which the DP/QP-movement system accounts for these reconstruction phenomena
provides independent support for the DP/QP-movement system and its account of the dichotomy
between traces and reconstruction. The result is a restrictive theory of movement and its semantics.

1.3

Roadmap

• Chapter 2 “Movement of properties” carries out a comprehensive investigation of Π-positions and
their interactions with movement. The conclusion reached is that movement cannot map onto a
property trace. I show the analysis proposed here is superior to previous analyses of Π-positions.
• Chapter 3 “Properties of movement” argues that the ban on property traces is part of a more
general constraint on movement: the Trace Interpretation Constraint. The chapter then develops
a syntax and semantics of movement that integrates the Trace Interpretation Constraint and
the possibility of reconstruction, providing a means of analyzing different movement types and
reconstruction phenomena like Π-positions.
• Chapter 4 “Moving and shifting” motivates the Trace Rigidity Principle based on the behavior of
definite descriptions in Π-positions and develops an analysis of nominal type shifting to account
for the Trace Rigidity Principle.
• Chapter 5 “Nature of the Trace Interpretation Constraint and its consequences” discusses the
nature of the Trace Interpretation Constraint. I present two hypotheses about why the Trace
Interpretation Constraint holds: one in terms of economy and another in terms of the syntax and
semantics of DPs. I conclude by discussing some open questions that emerge from the proposals
developed in this dissertation.
8

chapter 2
movement of properties
2.1

Introduction

This chapter investigates movement that targets DPs with property denotations, i.e. DPs of semantic
type ⟨e, t⟩. 1 I show that a given movement step cannot target a property-type DP if that movement
shifts scope. Thus, movement that targets a property-type DP must reconstruct. A consequence of
this restriction is that some movement types are categorically precluded from targeting propertytype DPs because they obligatorily shift scope and cannot reconstruct. I argue that this restriction
on moving property-type DPs follows from the unavailability of traces ranging over properties (18),
so that reconstructing is the only way of avoiding a semantic-type mismatch. The investigation
carried out in this chapter provides the empirical foundation for the rest of the dissertation.
(18) *[ DP1 λf ⟨e,t ⟩ . . . [ . . . [ f ⟨e,t ⟩ ]1 . . . ] ]

The point of departure will be an A-movement asymmetry in English discovered by Postal
(1994), which has received little systematic attention in the literature. Postal makes the rather
striking observation that there are syntactic environments in English that can be targeted by some
types of A-movement, but not others. For example, in an existential construction, wh-movement
can target the postverbal position (19b), but topicalization cannot (19c).
(19) a.

There is a potato in the pantry.

b. 3 What1 is there

1

in the pantry?

c. * [ A potato ]1 , there is

1

Baseline

1

Wh-movement

in the pantry.

Topicalization

For the sake of simplicity, I treat properties in purely extensional terms, which reduces them to sets of entities. This
treatment is overly simplistic, but it will suffice for most of this dissertation. I discuss the issue of representing
properties in natural language in section 4.5 of chapter 4.
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The asymmetry illustrated in (19) comprises a diverse set of syntactic environments, e.g. existential
constructions, change-of-color verbs, naming verbs, and predicate nominals. I will refer to these
environments as Π-positions. The asymmetry also extends to other types of A-movement,
such as relative-clause formation and tough-constructions. An analysis of Π-positions is tasked
with answering the following two questions: (i) Why are Π-positions the syntactic environments
to exhibit the movement asymmetry? (ii) What characterizes the movement-type division that
Π-positions distinguish?
Postal (1994) develops an analysis of Π-positions based on the observation that Π-positions are
unable to host weak pronouns like it and she (20a), a property that he labels antipronominality.
He proposes that wh-movement and topicalization differ in what they leave behind in the launching
site of movement: wh-movement leaves a trace (20b), while topicalization leaves a covert resumptive
pronoun (20c). Therefore, topicalization cannot target Π-positions because what it leaves behind,
viz. a pronoun, violates antipronominality.
(20) Postal’s (1994) analysis of Π -positions
a.

Antipronominality
* There is it in the pantry.

b. Wh-movement leaves a trace
3

What1 is there t 1 in the pantry?
wh

c.

Topicalization leaves a covert resumptive pronoun
* [ A potato ]1 , there is it1 in the pantry.
topic

Under Postal’s analysis, there is no explanation for why Π-positions are antipronominal, which in
turn calls into question accounting for the distinction between wh-movement and topicalization in
terms of pronouns when antipronominality itself lacks an explanation. For Postal, the environments
and the movement types are arbitrary and amount to little more than two lists. The root cause of
the Π-position asymmetry has hitherto remained unaccounted for. 2

2

Stanton (2016) analyzes a similar set of facts in terms of antipronominality. Because her data differs somewhat from
Postal’s data, I will hold off on discussing her data and analysis until section 2.6.2. However, note that the analysis
that I develop in this chapter will be able to extend to her data as well.
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I will argue that the Π-position asymmetry has nothing to do with pronouns. I will advance
two novel generalizations, one concerning the Π-positions themselves and another concerning the
movement-type division, thereby addressing the two questions raised above. First, the apparently
heterogeneous syntactic environments that exhibit the asymmetry are environments where the
DP denotes a property, i.e. semantic type ⟨e, t⟩ (21a). To support this characterization, I will
appeal to independent arguments in the literature that these positions host property-type DPs.
I will also show that this generalization encompasses antipronominality because weak pronouns
do not have property denotations. Second, movement that targets a Π-position must reconstruct;
or, more precisely, movement cannot target a Π-position if that movement shifts scope (21b). The
movement types that cannot target Π-positions, e.g. topicalization, can be shown to obligatorily
shift scope, while the movement types that can target Π-positions, e.g. wh-movement, can be shown
to only optionally shift scope. Crucially, I will show that the latter movement types can only target
Π-positions when they do not shift scope, i.e. when they reconstruct. These generalizations are
summarized in (21). 3
(21)

Π-position Generalizations
a.

Property generalization
DPs in Π-positions must denote properties (semantic type ⟨e, t⟩).

b. Scope generalization
Movement that shifts scope cannot target Π-positions.
From these two generalizations, what Π-positions reveal is that the semantic representation of scopeshifting movement is incompatible with property positions. Under standard semantic assumptions
(e.g. Heim and Kratzer 1998), in order to shift scope, movement must leave a variable of semantic
type e in the launching site of movement and insert a λ-abstraction binding that variable below
the landing site. This type-e variable, or trace, is incompatible with Π-positions, which require a
property (⟨e, t⟩). This semantic-type mismatch yields ungrammaticality, thereby preventing scopeshifting movement from targeting Π-positions (22). Movement that does not shift scope instead
3

The generalizations in (21) might seem reminiscent of “predicate” movement of VPs and APs, which obligatorily
reconstructs (Huang 1993; Takano 1995; Heycock 1995). However, even though VPs and APs are called “predicates”,
under modern standard assumptions, they are in fact semantically propositions, not properties. Thus, Π-positions
cannot obviously be subsumed under predicate movement, despite their superficial similarities; DPs with property
meanings are distinct objects from VPs and APs. See section 3.4.4 of chapter 3 for additional discussion.
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reconstructs syntactically. Thus, if a DP would not ordinarily violate the property requirement of a
Π-position, then it will not do so under reconstruction either (23).
(22) Scope shifting ⇏ Π -positions

(23) Reconstruction ⇒ Π -positions

* [ DP1 λx e . . . [ . . . [ x e ]Π-pos . . . ] ]

3

[

1

. . . [ . . . [ DP1 ]Π-pos . . . ] ]
reconstruct

type e trace

I will argue that the incompatibility between Π-positions and scope-shifting movement further
entails that movement cannot map onto a property trace ranging over type ⟨e, t⟩, as schematized
above in (18). If such a representation were available, it would salvage scope-shifting movement
and at the same time be compatible with Π-positions. The fact that such meanings are unavailable
tells us that such a representation is ungrammatical. This prohibition against property traces will
set the stage for the subsequent chapters of this dissertation.
Against this backdrop, Π-positions are an instance where movement must reconstruct in order
to avoid a semantic-type mismatch that would occur if the moved DP were not interpreted in its
base-generated position. Some movement types, e.g. topicalization, are unable to target Π-positions
because they cannot reconstruct. This analysis thus derives the movement asymmetry that Postal
(1994) observed, but it also derives the more nuanced empirical picture encapsulated in the scope
generalization. An important consequence of this enriched empirical picture is that it shifts the
discussion away from Postal’s (1994) characterization of the Π-position asymmetry as a division
between movement types. I discover that rather, what is at stake in the Π-position asymmetry is
scope, namely whether a movement step reconstructs. This criterion crucially crosscuts movement
types. I will show that the existing analyses of Π-positions, Postal (1994) and Stanton (2016), are
unable to account for the full range of facts about the Π-position asymmetry uncovered in this
chapter precisely because they rest on a categorical distinction between movement types—a problem
that my analysis does not face.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 presents the core facts: the apparent division of
A-movement into two types and the syntactic environments (“Π-positions”) that diagnose this
division. In section 2.3, I argue that what characterizes Π-positions is that the DPs in these positions
denote properties. In section 2.4, I show that the division of A-movement revealed by Π-positions
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is coextensive with whether the movement shifts scope. Section 2.5 argues that the Π-position
asymmetry results from the type-e trace required for movement to shift scope being incompatible
with the property-type requirement of Π-positions, thereby yielding a semantic-type mismatch and
ungrammaticality. Section 2.6 compares the analysis developed here to the two previous analyses
of Π-positions: Postal (1994) and Stanton (2016).

2.2

Π-positions

Postal (1994) observes that A-movement types in English divide into two classes based on the
possible launching sites of such movement. 4 This division only manifests itself in a set of special
syntactic environments, e.g. existential constructions, wherein one movement class can target the
special environments and the other movement class cannot. This section introduces Postal’s chief
observations about this A-movement asymmetry, interleaved with some novel observations of
my own. Moving forward, it will be helpful to have some descriptive terminology for the moving
pieces making up this phenomenon. Let us adopt the terminology in (24). 5
(24) a.

Π-position
A syntactic position exhibiting Postal’s A-movement asymmetry.

b.

W-movement
Movement type that can target Π-positions, e.g. wh-movement.

c.

T-movement
Movement type that cannot target Π-positions, e.g. topicalization.

Note that W-movement and T-movement are descriptive terms and will not bear any significance
in the analysis. I will also use the term “Π-position” interchangeably to refer to the actual syntactic
position exhibiting the asymmetry and to the construction containing that position, disambiguating
when necessary.

4

Postal (1994) is also reprinted with minor modifications in Postal (1998). I only cite the 1994 paper in what follows.

5

Postal (1994) refers to the environments as antipronominal contexts and the two movement classes as A-type
and B-type extractions. Stanton (2016) also adopts this terminology. I have elected to use the more neutral term
of Π-position, where the “Π” is intended to allude to “property”. For the movement classes, I have changed the
terminology to avoid confusion between, in his terminology, A-type A-extractions and A-movement, instead opting
for something more mnemonic.
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Section 2.2.1 starts out by discussing some of the precautions that must be taken when working
with topicalization in English. Then, the subsequent sections introduce the four Π-positions: existential constructions (§2.2.2), change-of-color verbs (§2.2.3), naming verbs (§2.2.4), and predicate
nominals (§2.2.5). 6 We will consider two W/T-movement pairings discovered by Postal (1994):
wh-movement compared to topicalization and restrictive relative clauses (RCs) compared to appositive RCs. While wh-movement and restrictive-RC formation are W-movements, topicalization and
appositive-RC formation are T-movements. 7
In addition to the two W/T-movement pairings from Postal (1994), we will consider two other
T-movements. The first one is the formation of tough-constructions, which Chomsky (1977) shows to
invoke A-movement (of a null operator) in the embedded clause. I will contrast tough-constructions
with their corresponding nonmovement expletive counterparts. Postal mentions in passing that
tough-constructions, and other constructions that were thought to involve “object deletion” (Lasnik
and Fiengo 1974), appear to pattern as T-movements. I will show that this pattern indeed extends to
all the Π-positions. 8 The second new T-movement is Quantifier Raising (QR), which I will diagnose
via inverse scope over the subject and negation. For existential constructions, it is well-known from
Williams (1984) that the pivot cannot be targeted by QR. I will show that the impossibility of QR
generalizes to the other Π-positions as well. As a disclaimer, I will distinguish QR for scope shifting
and QR for interpreting quantifiers. Although these two functions of QR ordinarily coalesce (in
English), we will see that this does not hold for Π-positions: quantificational DPs can occur in
Π-positions, but they do not enjoy the scopal mobility that QR would afford. As such, we are
interested in only the scope-shifting function of QR; how quantificational DPs are interpreted in
Π-positions is discussed in section 2.5.4. QR being a T-movement will be important in drawing the
scope generalization in section 2.4 and developing the analysis in section 2.5.

6

Postal (1994) does not provide complete paradigms, so the Π-position paradigms that I present are my own.

7

Postal (1994) discusses other environments that exhibit the A-movement asymmetry, which I do not discuss here. As
far as I can tell, the generalizations reached based on the four Π-positions in this chapter extend to the other cases.

8

A contentious question in the tough-construction literature is what exactly is moving in a tough-construction: the
matrix subject itself (the long-movement analysis) or a null operator that establishes a proxy link with the matrix
subject (the base-generation analysis). I will show that the embedded gap in a tough-construction cannot correspond
to a Π-position. We know that something is moving from this position (Chomsky 1977). This will suffice for present
purposes to show that whatever movement underlies the formation of a tough-construction, it is a T-movement.
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2.2.1

Controlling for topicalization

Before proceeding to the data, it is worth briefly addressing some challenges presented by topicalization in English. First, topicalization is a rather marked structure in English, which makes it difficult
for many speakers to judge whether an instance of topicalization is ungrammatical or merely
infelicitous. Second, the linear order achieved by topicalization is usually string-compatible with
two other information-structure movements: focus movement (25) and Y(iddish)-movement (26).
Focus movement has a fairly limited distribution. 9 Y-movement is dialectal, which I indicate
with ‘%’, but some uses have entered mainstream American English. 10 , 11
(25) Focus movement
[ Macadamia nuts ]1 they’re called

1.

[Prince 1981:249]

(26) Y-movement
a. % [ Egg creams ]1 you want

1,

b. % [ A finger ]1 I wouldn’t lift
c.

1

bananas2 you’ll get

2.

for him!

[Ross 1967:483]
[Prince 1981:249]

A: How’s your son?
B: %Don’t ask! [ A sportscar ]1 he wants

1!

[Prince 1981:260]

I control for these complications by using question–answer scenarios that license topicalization
exclusively, and neither focus movement nor Y-movement. These contexts utilize the question–
answer congruence conditions on contrastive topics (Constant 2014, and references therein).
A contrastive topic (CT) denotes what the question-under-discussion is about and implies that there
are other questions about different topics; in other words, a CT denotes a topic and implies a familyof-questions. In English, a CT prosodically bears a rising accent and is followed by a low-rising
pause. In the control contexts that we will be interested in, the CT is paired with an exhaustive

9

My impression is that younger English speakers do not productively have focus movement.

10 Y-movement presents an interesting comparison to topicalization because, unlike topicalization, it is purported to
reconstruct. Consider the sentence in (i).
(i)

[ Many girlfriends ]1 , Sally doesn’t have

1.

Under Y-movement, many in (i) can take scope below negation because the moved DP many girlfriends can reconstruct,
but under topicalization, it cannot. Thus, a DP fronted from a Π-position may be compatible with a Y-movement
parse, but not a topicalization parse (see in particular fn. 23 and fn. 39). This makes it all the more important to
control for the difference between Y-movement and topicalization.

11 Thanks to Barbara Partee for bringing Y-movement to my attention.
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focus, a phrase that denotes the answer to the question and prosodically bears a high accent.
Constant (2014) observes that the topicalization position in English readily hosts a CT (27), but
not an ordinary exhaustive focus (28). Small caps represent prosodic prominence, and an ellipsis
represents a long, low-rising pause.
(27) Topicalization can host a contrastive topic
A: What about the beans and the salad?
Who brought those?
B: [ The beans ]CT . . . [ Fred ]Exh brought.
L+H* L+H%

H*

[Constant 2014:83]

L-L%

(28) Topicalization cannot host an exhaustive focus
A: What did Fred bring?
B: # [ The beans ]Exh , Fred brought.

[Constant 2014:84]

These control contexts are prosodically and semantically incompatible with focus movement and
Y-movement. First, the CT must appear with an exhaustive focus. Therefore, there are always
two prosodically prominent constituents if the CT is being used felicitously—in fact, having two
prosodic prominences is often considered to be definitional of English topicalization (Gundel 1974;
Prince 1981; Constant 2014). This prosodic contour is incompatible with focus movement and
Y-movement, whose prosody mappings only contain a clause-initial prosodic prominence (Prince
1981). Second, a CT can never appear in a thoroughly exhaustive answer to the entire issue at hand
(Constant 2014). Thus, the answer in (27) might exhaustively answer what Fred brought, but it does
not resolve who brought the salad, and hence it does not resolve the entire issue at hand. If CT
prosody were applied to the beans in (28), it would be felicitous only if the speaker were unsure
whether Fred brought other things. This partial-answer interpretation is incompatible with focus
movement and Y-movement (Prince 1981).
Furthermore, to alleviate the difficulty of topicalization judgements, after giving each Π-position
paradigm, I will include a comparison between the ungrammatical target sentence with topicalization from a Π-position and a minimally different, yet grammatical sentence with topicalization
from one of the other argument positions in the structure. These minimal pairs will help us to
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more convincingly see that the syntactic environments identified in Postal (1994) indeed cannot be
targeted by topicalization.

2.2.2

Existential constructions

W-movements can target the postverbal position in an existential construction—called the pivot—,
but T-movements cannot (29). 12
(29) a.

Baseline
There is a potato in the pantry.

b. Wh-movement
3

c.

What1 is there

1

in the pantry?

Topicalization
*[ A potato ]1 , there is

1

in the pantry.

d. Restrictive RC
3

e.

Gloria saw the potatoes1 [RC that there were

in the pantry ].

Appositive RC
* Gloria saw the potatoes1 , [RC which there were

f.

1

1

in the pantry ].

Tough-construction
i. * [ A potato ]1 was impossible [ for there to be

1

in the pantry ].

3

ii. It was impossible [ for there to be a potato in the pantry ].
QR cannot target the pivot of an existential construction. Consequently, the pivot must take
in situ scope below other scope-bearing elements, such as modals (30) and negation (31). 13 Williams
(1984) was the first to observe this incompatibility between QR and existential constructions. In
particular, he observed that the pivot must scope below modals, which crucially have immobile

12 Note that which can be used with both restrictive and appositive RCs, while that can only be used with restrictive
RCs. I reserve which for RCs interpreted and pronounced prosodically as appositives.

13 A possible exception to this generalization are summative readings of existential constructions where the pivot
intuitively appears to scope above the modal (i). For example, (i.a) has a reading where three outcomes are possible in
the relevant elections, not that the relevant elections could end up having three outcomes instead of one. Summative
readings are possible only with relational nouns.
(i)

a.

There could be three outcomes to these elections.

b.

There can be three winners at this point in the race.

[Francez 2007:32–33]

No existing theory of existential constructions can explain these readings, including Francez (2007) who first observed
them. See Francez (2015) for more discussion of summative existentials.
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scope (30a). This incompatibility contrasts with the subject of the corresponding copula construction, which can freely scope above or below a modal (30b), presumably because A-movement to
subject position, [Spec, TP], can reconstruct.
(30) No QR over modals
a.

[Williams 1984:152]

There must be someone in his house.

3

must ≫ someone; *someone ≫ must

3

must ≫ someone; 3someone ≫ must

b. Someone must be in his house.

The same pattern holds for negation: the pivot cannot take inverse scope over negation via QR (31a),
which is otherwise generally available (31b). A context is provided in (31c) in which the wide-scope
reading of two tractors is true and the narrow-scope reading is false, thereby testing exclusively
for the wide-scope reading achievable via QR. In this context, (31a) is false and (31b) is true, which
crucially shows that the pivot of an existential construction cannot QR over negation.
(31) No QR over negation
a.

There aren’t two tractors in the barn.

not ≫ two; *two ≫ not

3

not ≫ two; 3two ≫ not

b. I didn’t see two tractors in the barn.
c.

3

Wide-scope context
There are four tractors. Tractors #1 and #2 are in the barn, while tractors #3 and #4 are
still out in the field. I look into the barn.

Turning to topicalization, even in a question–answer context that licenses topicalization,
topicalizing the pivot is ungrammatical (32). However, as shown in (33), it is possible to topicalize
the post-pivot material—called the coda—in an equivalent context.
(32) Topicalization cannot target the pivot
Context: Gloria is making a salad for lunch at her friend’s house, but does not know where
everything is located in the kitchen.
A: What about a knife and a cutting board?
Where can I find those?
B: * [ A cutting board ]CT . . . there is [ on the table ]Exh .
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(33) Topicalization can target the coda
Context: Gloria is helping her friend reorganize their kitchen. Before entering the messy
kitchen, she wants to start by taking an inventory of what is on all of the surfaces.
A: What about on the table and on the counter?
What is there on those?
B: 3 [ On the table ]CT . . . there is [ a cutting board ]Exh .
Given the semantic similarity between an existential construction and its corresponding copula
construction (e.g. There is a potato in the pantry and A potato is in the pantry), one might expect the
subject position of a copula construction to be a Π-position. 14 However, the prohibition against
being targeted by T-movements does not hold for a copula construction corresponding to an expletive construction. The subject position of a copula construction can be targeted by W-movements
and T-movements alike (34). 15 Note that the sentences in (34) use nonlocal environments to avoid
string-vacuous movement.
(34) Copula constructions are not Π -positions
a.

Baseline
Gloria said (that) a potato was in the pantry.

b. Wh-movement
3

c.

What1 did Gloria say

1

was in the pantry?

Topicalization
3

[ A potato ]1 , Gloria said

1

was in the pantry.

d. Restrictive RC
3

e.

Gloria saw the potatoes1 [RC that

1

were in the pantry ].

Appositive RC
3

Gloria saw the potatoes1 , [RC which

1

were in the pantry ].

14 This point is not to imply that existential constructions are equivalent to copula constructions or that all existential
constructions even have copula equivalents, as the pairs in (i) and (ii) demonstrate. (ii) is from Barbara Partee, who
attributes it to one of her graduate classes at MIT.
(i)

a. 3There was space in the room.
b. ??Space was in the room.

(ii)

a.

3

[McNally 2011:1836]

There was nothing to do.

b. *Nothing was to do.

15 Tough-constructions are not given in (34) because, independently, a tough-construction cannot be formed on the
subject position, e.g. *John1 is tough to

1

please Mary.

19

2.2.3

Change-of-color verbs

W-movements can target the color term of a change-of-color verb, e.g. paint, turn, and dye, but
T-movements cannot (35).
(35) a.

Baseline
Megan painted the house magenta.

b. Wh-movement
3

c.

1?

[ What color ]1 did Megan paint the house
Topicalization

*Magenta1 , Megan painted the house

1.

d. Restrictive RC
3

e.

Jyoti liked the color1 [RC that Megan had painted the house

1

Appositive RC
* Jyoti liked that color1 , [RC which Megan had painted the house

f.

].

1

].

Tough-construction
i. * Magenta1 was fun [ (for Megan) to paint the house

1

].

3

ii. It was fun [ (for Megan) to paint the house magenta ].
There is no general prohibition against T-movements targeting color terms. A color term can
be topicalized (36) or head an appositive RC (37) if it does not occur with a change-of-color verb.
The prohibition on T-movements targeting color terms applies exclusively to those color terms
that are arguments of change-of-color verbs.
(36) Color terms can otherwise be topicalized
{ Green / that color }1 , he never discussed

1

with me.

[Postal 1994:164]

(37) Color terms can otherwise head appositive RCs
He never discussed { green / that color }1 with me, [RC which

1

is his favorite color ].

The ungrammaticality of topicalizing the color term of a change-of-color verb becomes starker
when it is contrasted with topicalizing the object instead. Compare (38) and (39), which utilize the
question–answer contexts that license topicalization. (38) provides the baseline that topicalizing
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the object is perfectly acceptable and natural in context. In comparison, (39) topicalizes the color
term, but this yields a drop in acceptability, which I analyze as ungrammaticality. 16
(38) Topicalization can target the object
Context: The neighborhood is having all twenty of the houses painted by a talented artist
named Megan. Each house will be painted a unique color. There are twenty choices of color
in total, so one for each house.
A: What about the Nelsons’ and Connors’ houses?
Which color did Megan paint those (houses)?
B: 3 [ The Nelsons’ house ]CT . . . Megan painted [ magenta ]Exh .
(39) Topicalization cannot target the color term
Context: The neighborhood is having all twenty of the houses painted by a talented artist
named Megan. Each house will be painted a unique color. There are twenty choices of color
in total, so one for each house.
A: What about magenta and cerulean?
Whose house did Megan paint those (colors)?
B: * [ Magenta ]CT . . . Megan painted [ the Nelsons’ house ]Exh .
QR cannot target the color term of a change-of-color verb. As shown in (40a), it is impossible
for a quantified color term to QR over the subject. 17 Here, I include the adjective different in order
to bias towards the inverse-scope reading in which there is a different contractor for each color.
I use the #-mark to indicate that different is infelicitous if the sentence were uttered out-of-theblue—because it lacks the distributed reading that QR could achieve. Of course, there is a felicitous
reading of different in (40a) in which different is interpreted as different with respect to something

16 Some speakers who I have consulted accept topicalizing the color term of a change-of-color verb, yet still do not
allow an appositive RC to be formed on one. For these speakers (35c) and (39) are both grammatical, while (35e)
remains ungrammatical. These same speakers find the contrast between wh-movement and topicalization for all the
other Π-positions. Against the generalization developed in section 2.3, one possible explanation for this discrepancy
is that these speakers might be coercing color terms into kinds, in the sense of Chierchia (1998), or treating them as
adverbials, as Kratzer (2005) proposes for some German (pseudo-)resultatives.

17 (40a) can describe multiple events of painting, e.g. one painting for each color. One might have the impression
that this must involve QR of the quantified color term over the existentially-quantified event variable. However,
we can argue that this hypothesis is wrong. The multiple-event reading follows from standard assumptions about
cumulativity and plural verbs, without any need to invoke QR (Kratzer 2008; Krifka 1986, 1992). For example, a
multiple-event reading is possible with simple conjunction of color terms (i), which is what one would expect given
the cumulativity of natural-language predicates.
(i)

Megan painted the house magenta and chartreuse.
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previously mentioned in the discourse, e.g. another contractor, but this reading is irrelevant for our
purposes because it is not an inverse-scope reading. As shown in (40b), the object can nevertheless
QR over the subject.
(40) No QR over the subject
A (#different) contractor painted the house every color.

3

b. A (different) contractor painted every house that ugly green.

3

a.

a ≫ every; *every ≫ a

a ≫ every; 3every ≫ a

Even though the color term cannot QR over the subject, which fixes their scope relationship, the
color term can scope either above the object (41a) or below the object (41b).
(41) Scope of the color term and the object
a.

Megan painted [ a (different) house ] [ every color ].

b. Megan painted [ every house ] [ a (different) color ].

Color ≫ Object
Object ≫ Color

To maintain the generalization that QR is a T-movement, I propose that by default, the color
term scopes above the object. The two form a small clause and hence stand in a siblinghood
relationship. 18 Thus, the object is not an argument of the verb, but rather an argument of the color
term. Accordingly, (41a) is the default scope relationship without any QR having occurred (42a).
When the object scopes over the color term, as in (41b), the object has undergone QR to some
higher position above the color term (42b). Therefore, the variation in scope between the color
term and the object in (41) is derived without QRing the color term.
(42) a.

Color term ≫ Object
[ paint [ [ a house ] every color ] ]

(=41a)

b. Object ≫ Color term
[ every house1 [ paint [ [
qr

1

] a color ] ] ]

(=41b)

18 Strictly speaking, a small-clause structure is not the only way for the color term to scope over the object by default.
There could be silent material between the color term and the object, though we might consider such a structure a
small clause of sorts. The color term could also be above the VP, which would contain the verb and the object. The
propertyhood of the color term that I will argue for in section 2.3 is more suggestive of a small-clause structure.
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The proposal in (42) receives independent support from the fact that the object can QR over the
subject (40b), but the color term cannot (40a). Under this analysis, the reason that the color term
cannot QR over the subject is because it cannot QR at all. 19
Thus far, (40)–(42) have shown that the color term cannot QR over the other arguments of a
change-of-color verb. In addition, the color term cannot QR over other scope-bearing elements,
which (43) illustrates with negation. The only possible interpretation of (43) is where the color
term only two colors takes narrow scope with respect to negation, which is paraphrased in (43a).
Missing is the wide-scope reading paraphrased in (43b). For comparison, the object can QR over
negation, and thus both the narrow-scope and wide-scope readings are available (44).
(43) Color term cannot QR over negation
Megan didn’t paint the house only two colors.
a.

3

not ≫ only two

Narrow-scope reading

It is not the case that there are two colors x and y such that Megan painted the house x
and y and no other color.
b. * Wide-scope reading

only two ≫ not

There are two colors x and y such that Megan did not paint the house x and y, but she
painted the house all other colors.
(44) Object can QR over negation
Megan didn’t paint only two houses that ugly green.
a.

3

not ≫ only two

Narrow-scope reading

It is not the case that there are two houses x and y such that Megan painted x and y,
and no other house, that ugly green.
b. 3 Wide-scope reading

only two ≫ not

There are two houses x and y such that Megan did not paint x and y that ugly green,
but she painted all the other houses that ugly green.
The judgements for (43) are delicate because of the temptation to incorrectly equate the contrast
between the narrow-scope and wide-scope readings with the specificity of the color term. Impor-

19 Another conceivable analysis of the discrepancy between (40) and (41) is that there are two QR-positions: one
position above the subject and another position above the object, but below the subject. The color term would only
have access to the lower QR-position such that it can scope above the object, but not the subject. I do not see any
independent motivation for such an analysis, and it has the undesirable consequence of forcing a bifurcation in the
otherwise simple generalization that QR is a T-movement.

23

tantly, the truth conditions of the narrow-scope reading are verifiable under models both where
the two colors are known (e.g. red and blue) and where they are unknown (e.g. any two colors).
Part of this superficial complication is rooted in the set of colors being infinite. However, we can
construct a scenario with a finite set of colors, which allows us to verify that the wide-scope reading
is absent in (43). Consider such a scenario in (45), where there are only four possible colors.
(45) The painting
Megan was hired to paint a house in her neighbourhood. She was provided with four colors
of paint: barn-red, colonial-blue, oatmeal, and cream.
In this scenario, the narrow-scope reading is true iff Megan uses at least three colors, thereby
leaving at most one color unused. The wide-scope reading is true iff Megan leaves exactly two
colors unused, thereby using exactly two colors to paint the house. The crucial ingredient in (45)
is the even number of colors because it forces the narrow-scope reading to be true only when the
wide-scope reading is false, and vice versa. Now consider the two contexts in (46) prefaced with the
scenario in (45). These contexts instantiate the narrow-scope and wide-scope readings respectively.
(46) a.

Narrow-scope context
Megan painted the house colonial-blue, oatmeal, and cream. She didn’t use the barn-red
paint.

b. Wide-scope context
Megan painted the house barn-red and cream. She didn’t use the colonial-blue and
oatmeal paints.
While (43) can felicitously describe the narrow-scope context in (46a), it cannot felicitously describe
the wide-scope context in (46b). Its infelicity in (46b) confirms that (43) indeed lacks the wide-scope
reading, where the color term would have needed to QR over negation. This is further support that
QR cannot target the color term and thus is a T-movement.
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2.2.4

Naming verbs

W-movements can target the name argument of a naming verb, e.g. name, call, and baptize, but
T-movements cannot (47).
(47) a.

Baseline
Irene called the cat Snowflake.

b. Wh-movement
3

c.

[ What name ]1 did Irene call the cat

1?

Topicalization
* Snowflake1 , Irene called the cat

1.

d. Restrictive RC
3

e.

Helen disliked the nickname1 [RC that Irene always called the cat

].

Appositive RC
* Helen disliked that nickname1 , [RC which Irene always called the cat

f.

1

1

].

Tough-construction
i. * Snowflake1 was fun [ (for Irene) to call the cat

1

].

3

ii. It was fun [ (for Irene) to call the cat Snowflake ].
The name argument behaves analogously to the color term of a change-of-color verb. Here,
I only briefly review the facts; see section 2.2.3 for a more detailed discussion of the equivalent
data with change-of-color verbs. As with color terms, there is no general prohibition against
T-movements targeting names (48)–(49). This prohibition only applies to names occurring with
naming verbs.
(48) Names can otherwise be topicalized
Raphael1 , we never discussed

1

as a possible name for him.

[Postal 1994:164]

(49) Names can otherwise head appositive RCs
We never discussed Raphael1 as a possible name for him,
[RC which

1

is my favorite name ].

Additionally, the topicalization asymmetry found with change-of-color verbs between the color
term, i.e. the Π-position, and the object generalizes to naming verbs as well. While topicalizing the
name argument is ungrammatical (50), it is nevertheless possible to topicalize the object (51).
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(50) Topicalization cannot target the name argument
Context: Rodica really likes Harry Potter and cats. She has named all of her many cats after
a main character in Harry Potter.
A: What about Dumbledore and Minerva?
Which cats did Rodica name those?
B: * [ Minerva ]CT . . . Rodica named [ the orange tabby ]Exh .
(51) Topicalization can target the object
Context: Rodica really likes Harry Potter and cats. She has named all of her many cats after
a main character in Harry Potter.
A: What about the black cat and the orange tabby?
What character names did Rodica name those?
B: 3 [ The orange tabby ]CT . . . Rodica named [ Minerva ]Exh .
QR cannot target the name argument of a naming verb. Parallel to the color term of a changeof-color verb, the name argument cannot QR over the subject (52) or negation (53), but it can scope
either above or below the object (54). 20
(52) No QR over the subject
a.

3

A (#different) child called the cat every nickname.

a ≫ every; *every ≫ a

3

a ≫ every; 3every ≫ a

b. A (different) child called every cat Garfield.
(53) No QR over negation
a.

Irene didn’t call the cat only two nicknames.

b. Irene didn’t call only two cats Garfield.

3

not ≫ only two; *only two ≫ not

3

not ≫ only two; 3only two ≫ not

(54) Scope of the name and the object
a.

Irene called a (different) cat every nickname.

b. Irene called every cat a (different) nickname.

Name ≫ Object
Object ≫ Name

20 Here is a context for (53) in which the wide-scope reading of only two nicknames is true, but the narrow scope-reading
is false: “Irene likes four nicknames for her cat: Kätzchen, Gatita, Kitty, and Nekochan. She can’t decide on exactly
one nickname, so she calls her cat both Kitty and Nekochan for short.” (53) cannot be used felicitously in this context,
which shows that the name argument cannot QR over negation.
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The analysis proposed for the scope variation with change-of-color verbs in section 2.2.3 applies to
naming verbs as well: the name argument and the object form a small clause. 21 By default, the
name argument takes scope over the object without any QR having occurred (55a). When the
object scopes over the name argument, the object has undergone QR to some higher position above
the name argument (55b).
(55) a.

Name ≫ Object
[ call [ [ a cat ] every nickname ] ]

(=54a)

b. Object ≫ Name
[ every cat 1 [ call [ [
qr

1

(=54b)

] a nickname ] ] ]

Therefore, the variation in scope between the name argument and the object in (54) is derived
without QRing the name argument. Accordingly, the reason that the name argument cannot QR
over the subject is because it cannot QR at all.

2.2.5

Predicate nominals

W-movements can target predicate nominals, but T-movements cannot (56). 22 There are a
number of constructions with predicate nominals, but I focus on become X , shown below in (56),
and make X out of Y .
(56) a.

Baseline
Erika became a teacher.

b. Wh-movement
3

c.

[ What (kind of teacher) ]1 did Erika become

1?

Topicalization
*[ A math teacher ]1 , Erika became

1.

d. Restrictive RC
3

e.

Georgia liked the kind of teacher1 [RC that Erika had become

1

].

Appositive RC
* Georgia liked that kind of teacher1 , [RC which Erika had become

1

].

21 As we will see in section 2.3.3, Matushansky (2008) independently proposes a small-clause analysis of naming verbs.
22 The ungrammaticality of forming an appositive RC on a predicate nominal was first noted in Klein (1976) for Dutch.
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f.

Tough-construction
i. * [ A teacher ]1 was tough [ (for Erika) to become

1

].

3

ii. It was tough [ (for Erika) to become a teacher ].
Turning our attention to the construction make X out of Y , where there is an additional argument to
contrast with the predicate nominal—which I call the object for the sake of simplicity—, topicalizing
the predicate nominal is ungrammatical (57), but it is possible to topicalize the object argument (58). 23
(57) Topicalization cannot target the predicate nominal
Context: Every year Erika is responsible for training a math teacher, an English teacher, and
a biology teacher for Amherst’s local middle school. The student selection is very slim, so
the job is challenging.
A: What about a math teacher and an English teacher?
Who did Erika make those out of?
B: * [ A math teacher ]CT . . . Erika made out of [ Alex ]Exh .
(58) Topicalization can target the object
Context: Every year Erika is responsible for training a math teacher, an English teacher, and
a biology teacher for Amherst’s local middle school. The student selection is very slim, so
the job is challenging.
A: What about Alex and Pat?
What did Erika make out of them?
B: 3 [ Alex ]CT . . . Erika made [ a math teacher ]Exh out of.
QR cannot target a predicate nominal. For a predicate nominal to be quantificational, it must
occur with a kind-nominal, e.g. kind, sort, and type, which roughly denote second-order properties
(i.e. properties of properties). Kind-nominals will be discussed in section 2.5.4; until then, I will
set aside this issue and focus on the scope facts. By now, the QR pattern should be familiar: The
predicate nominal (PN) cannot QR over the subject (59) or negation (60), but it can scope either
above or below the object (61).

23 A few people have asked me about examples like (i), where a predicate nominal is fronted in a contrastive context:
(i) %Erika may be a talented professor, but [ a good administrator ]1 , she is not

1.

I suspect that these examples are Y-movement, as they have a similar prosody, but they would constitute a use that is
more widely accepted amongst mainstream English speakers. These examples are nevertheless puzzling and warrant
more research in the future. For some cursory discussion of these cases, see Postal (1994:165-166).
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(59) No QR over the subject
a.

3

A (#different) student became every kind of teacher.

b. i.

a ≫ every; *every ≫ a

A (#different) instructor made every kind of teacher out of Erika.
3

a ≫ every; *every ≫ a

ii. A (different) instructor made a talented teacher out of every student.
3

a ≫ every; 3every ≫ a

(60) No QR over negation
a.

3

not ≫ only one; *only one ≫ not

Erika didn’t become only one kind of teacher.

b. i.

Erika didn’t make only one kind of teacher out of Alex.
3

not ≫ only one; *only one ≫ not

ii. Erika didn’t make a talented teacher out of only one student.
3

not ≫ only one; 3only one ≫ not

(61) Scope of the predicate nominal and the object
a.

Erika made every kind of teacher out of a different student.

b. Erika made a different kind of teacher out of every student.

PN ≫ Object
Object ≫ PN

The analysis proposed for the variation in scope with change-of-color verbs in section 2.2.3 applies
to predicate-nominal constructions with multiple arguments as well. 24 By default, the predicate
nominal takes scope over the object without any QR having occurred (62a). When the object
scopes over the predicate nominal, the object has undergone QR to some higher position above the
predicate nominal (62b).
(62) a.

Predicate nominal ≫ Object
[ make [ every kind of teacher [ out of a student ] ] ]

(=61a)

b. Object ≫ Predicate nominal
[ every student 1 [ make [ a kind of teacher [ out of
qr

1

]]]]

(=61b)

24 Barbara Partee (p.c.) points out to me that the small-clause analysis in (62) may not capture Bach’s (1980) observation
about the different argument structures of predicate-nominal verbs like strike as and consider, e.g. John strikes me as
an idiot vs. I consider John an idiot. Bach observes that only the latter group can form a passive. He accounts for
this contrast (roughly) in terms of the order in which the verb combines with its arguments. My claim here is that
a small-clause structure captures the scope variation with make X out of Y in (61)—and also the analogous scope
facts with change-of-color verbs and naming verbs. Nothing precludes different structures containing predicate
nominals, or Π-positions more broadly. While they do not occur in the limited dataset that I consider here, I expect
such different structures to emerge in future research into Π-positions.
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Therefore, the scope variation between the predicate nominal and the object in (61) is derived
without QRing the predicate nominal. Accordingly, the reason that the predicate nominal cannot
QR over the subject is because it cannot QR at all.

2.2.6

Section summary

This section has introduced the four Π-positions: existential constructions, change-of-color verbs,
naming verbs, and predicate nominals. We discovered that W-movements, such as wh-movement,
can target these syntactic positions, but T-movements, such as topicalization and QR, cannot. These
findings are summarized in (63).
(63) Π -position summary
Existentials

Color verbs

Naming verbs

Predicate nominals

Wh-movement

3

3

3

3

Restrictive RCs

3

3

3

3

Topicalization

7

7

7

7

Appositive RCs

7

7

7

7

Tough-constructions

7

7

7

7

QR

7

7

7

7

Postal (1994) observes that one common property of Π-positions—other than exhibiting the
asymmetry between W-movements and T-movements—is that they are antipronominal, i.e. they
reject pronouns like it and she (64). As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, antipronominality is not itself an explanation of the Π-position asymmetry unless there is some independent
explanation for why Π-positions are antipronominal. Although I will defer a comprehensive
discussion of Postal’s analysis until section 2.6.1, antipronominality as an empirical observation
constitutes a further piece of the puzzle that any analysis of Π-positions must explain. To this
effect, it is also important to draw attention to the fact that antipronominality does not extend to
strong pronouns like that. As shown in (64), that can occur in Π-positions—excluding existential
constructions, which are independently incompatible with all pronouns due to the Definiteness
Restriction. Thus, antipronominality is not as simple as a ban on pronouns.
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(64) Π -positions are antipronominal
a.

Existential constructions
Gloria bought a potato, and there is { *it / *that } in the pantry.

b. Change-of-color verbs
Megan liked the color magenta, and she painted the house { *it / 3that }
c.

Naming verbs
Irene liked the name Snowflake, and she called the cat { *it / 3that }.

d. Predicate nominals
Erika wanted to become a teacher, and she became { *it / 3that }.
The following two sections address the most pertinent questions: what characterizes Π-positions (§2.3) and what characterizes movement that cannot target a Π-position (§2.4). I will argue
that Π-positions host property-type DPs and movement cannot target Π-positions if it shifts scope.
The combination of these two generalizations will lead to the analysis in section 2.5 that Π-positions cannot be targeted by scope-shifting movement because the type-e trace necessary to shift
scope is incompatible with the property requirement of Π-positions. This analysis will derive
antipronominality for free because weak pronouns do not have property denotations and thus
violate the property requirement of Π-positions.

2.3

Property generalization

This section argues that the common denominator unifying Π-positions is that they host DPs that
denote properties, i.e. DPs with denotations of semantic type ⟨e, t⟩, as summarized in (65).
(65) Property generalization
DPs in Π-positions must denote properties (semantic type ⟨e, t⟩).
The arguments for this characterization of Π-positions come from the respective literatures on each
of the Π-positions introduced in section 2.2—though I take the liberty of assuming that predicate
nominals denote properties, as this is the well-accepted and standard analysis (e.g. Williams 1983;
Partee 1986). The arguments for the property generalization (65) are therefore independent from the
Π-position asymmetry. In other words, we can go beyond characterizing Π-positions in terms of
their inaccessibility to T-movements. Under this characterization, what makes Π-positions special
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is that they host DPs with a “nonstandard” denotation, under the assumption that the standard
denotations of DPs are entity-type (e) and generalized-quantifier-type (⟨et, t⟩).
It is worth making explicit what this section is and what it is not. The goal of this section is
to argue that propertyhood plays an important role in the semantics of constructions containing
a Π-position and that this propertyhood is what characterizes being a Π-position. Thus, I do not
provide complete analyses of each Π-position, as such would take us too far afield. Rather, I adopt
cursory analyses that give us something concrete to work with and capture the bare essentials.
There are aspects of each analysis that could be implemented differently, but as far as I can tell,
these alternatives would not have a bearing on the propertyhood of Π-positions. The reason that
I have included this disclaimer is so that the reader does not dwell on the details and lose sight of
the broader picture: the property generalization in (65).
Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, I treat properties in purely extensional terms, which reduces
them to sets of entities. This treatment of properties is overly simplistic, but it will suffice for most
of this dissertation, in particular to build the property generalization in (65). I revisit in section 4.5
of chapter 4 the issue of representing properties in natural language.

2.3.1

Existential constructions

Existential constructions are famously subject to the Definiteness Restriction (DR), sometimes
called the Definiteness Effect, which prohibits certain types of DPs from being the pivot (Milsark
1974, 1977). The DPs that can be the pivot are, roughly speaking, the indefinites (66a). The DR
prohibits the pivot from being “necessarily quantificational” DPs (66b) and definite descriptions (66c),
which include demonstratives, pronouns, and proper names—excluding some special cases that we
will see below shortly.
(66) Definiteness Restriction
a.

Acceptable pivots
There is/are { a / two / many / no } potato(es) in the pantry.

b. No quantificational DPs
* There is/are { each / every / most / both } potato(es) in the pantry.
c.

No definite descriptions
* There is { the potato / that potato / it / Mr. Potato Head } in the pantry.
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Milsark (1974, 1977) introduces the labels weak and strong to refer to the DPs that, respectively,
can and cannot occur as the pivot of an existential construction. Most of the work on existential
constructions has been to expound on the weak–strong distinction, and it is generally considered
that the underlying semantics of existential constructions rests in part on whatever drives the DR.
2.3.1.1

Definiteness Restriction is not only about determiner semantics

The standard approach to the DR is to attribute the weak–strong distinction to some semantic
property of determiners. According to this approach, the reason that every potato is not a possible
pivot of an existential construction is due to some property of the determiner every. Prominent
analyses that fall under this umbrella include Barwise and Cooper (1981) and Keenan (1987). To
illustrate, let us consider Keenan’s (1987) analysis. He proposes that only the determiners that are
existential, as defined in (67), can occur in an existential construction. 25
(67) A determiner D is existential iff for every model M, where E is the domain of entities in
M, and for every A, B ⊆ E, B ∈ D(A) iff “universal property” ∈ D(A ∩ B).
According to the definition in (67), some is an existential determiner (68a), but every and the are
not (68b, c). Therefore, only the former can occur as the pivot of an existential construction.
(68) Testing for existential determiners
a.

Some potatoes are in the pantry. ⇔ Some potatoes which are in the pantry exist.

b. Every potato is in the pantry. ⇎ Every potato which is in the pantry exists.
c.

The two potatoes are in the pantry. ⇎ The two potatoes which are in the pantry exist.

The problem for the standard approach is that there are well-documented counterexamples to
an analysis of the DR exclusively in terms of determiner semantics. These arguments come from
McNally’s (1992, 1997, 1998) work, which I briefly review here. First, a necessarily quantificational

25 A few relevant points about Keenan’s analysis: First, the universal property is the property that every entity has,
e.g. [λx . x = x]; it is sometimes called “Mercy”. Second, under Keenan’s (1987) analysis, the ability to be the pivot
of an existential construction extends to determiners formed from the basic existential determiners by Boolean
combinations. Third, Keenan (2003) shows that existential determiners can be reduced to those determiners that are
conservative on both their first and second arguments.
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DP headed by a strong determiner can be the pivot if it quantifies over nonparticulars, as
shown in (69b) and (69d).
(69) Pivots quantifying over nonparticulars
a. * There was every doctor at the convention.
b. 3 There was every kind of doctor at the convention.
c. * There were most books in the library.
d. 3 There were most sorts of books in the library.

[McNally 1998:358]

Second, a definite description can occur as the pivot if the DP is an indefinite possessive (70)
or the sentence is a list existential (71). 26
(70) Indefinite possessives as the pivot
a.

There was someone’s book lying on the desk.

b. There was the mother of a student waiting outside.

[McNally 1998:373]

(71) List existentials
a.

A: Who showed up?
B: Well, there was Alex.

[McNally 2011:1834]

b. A: What shall we dig up this year?
B: Well, there are the peonies.

[McNally 1998:366]

Any analysis of the DR that outright bans determiners like every and the from heading the pivot—
as do the analyses based on determiner semantics like Barwise and Cooper (1981) and Keenan
(1987)—undergenerates in (69)–(71). These analyses incorrectly predict that (69b), (69d), (70),
and (71) should all be ungrammatical. What these first two arguments bring to light is that there
are exceptions to both the quantificational DPs and the definite descriptions that are ordinarily
ruled out by the DR. These exceptions alone discredit reducing the DR to determiner semantics.

26 For list existentials, see Milsark (1974, 1977), Rando and Napoli (1978), and McNally (1992, 1997). Similar contexts to
list existentials, where definite descriptions are allowed to be the pivot, are reminder contexts (i) (Lumsden 1988;
Ward and Birner 1995) and presentational superlatives (ii) (Holmback 1984). All of these usages do not preserve under
negation or in polar questions (Keenan 2003).
(i)

Well, yes, there’s always Canada.

(ii)

Yikes, there’s the fattest cat I’ve ever seen.
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Third, crosslinguistically, there are languages that in fact allow the pivot to be a definite
description, but nevertheless prohibit it from being a necessarily quantificational DP. One such
language is Catalan: definite descriptions can be the pivot (72a), but necessarily quantificational
DPs cannot (72b), unless they quantify over nonparticulars (72c). Thus, Catalan parallels English
with respect to necessarily quantificational DPs, though the two differ on definite descriptions.
(72) Catalan
a.
3

Definite description
Hi
havia la Joana a la

festa.

there was the Joan to the party
‘There was Joan at the party’
b. Quantificational DP
* Hi
havia cada cotxe a la
there was
c.
3

each car

cursa.

at the race

Quantificational DP over nonparticulars
Hi
havia tota classe de cotxes a la

cursa.

there was every class of cars
at the race
‘There were all kinds of cars in the race’

[McNally 1998:367]

The crosslinguistic variation in the reach of the DR is tightly constrained: a language either behaves
like Catalan or it behaves like English. (McNally 1992, 1997, 1998). 27 We crucially do not find
languages where necessarily quantificational DPs can be the pivot. The only point of crosslinguistic
variation is whether or not the pivot can be a definite description. This typology is summarized
in (73).
(73) Typology of the Definiteness Restriction
+Definites

−Definites

+Quant. DPs

7

7

−Quant. DPs

Catalan

English

27 This is not to suggest that there are not other points of crosslinguistic variation in existential construction. Here,
I am only considering the pivot, but languages differ with respect to the expletive, copula, and coda as well.
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The discrepancy between languages like English and languages like Catalan suggests that the
restriction on necessarily quantificational DPs is independent from the restriction on definite
descriptions, wherein the latter restriction is operative in English, but not in Catalan. Moreover,
the fact that all languages seem to disallow the pivot from being a quantificational DP suggests
that this restriction is more deeply ingrained in the semantics of existential constructions than is
the restriction on definite descriptions. It is precisely these intuitions that McNally’s (1992, 1997,
1998) analysis of existential constructions captures.
2.3.1.2

McNally’s proposal

McNally (1992, 1997, 1998) proposes that the DR is part semantic and part pragmatic. The semantic
part is that the pivot denotes a property and hence must have a licit property denotation. An
existential construction then means that the property denoted by the pivot is instantiated (74). 28
For the sake of simplicity, I only present the extensional rendition in her 1998 paper.
(74) Semantics of an existential construction
For all models M, ⟦NP⟧M,д ∈ ⟦There be⟧M,д iff ⟦NP⟧M,д is nonempty.

[McNally 1998:376]

The property denotation required by the semantics in (74) is achieved via nominal type shifting
of the pivot. Because not every DP has a licit property denotation, the property-type requirement
has the effect of restricting the kinds of DPs that can occur as the pivot, in particular the kinds
of quantificational DPs. Type shifting to achieve a property denotation will be discussed at length
in section 4.2 of chapter 4. For now, I focus on the outcome of type shifting and its ramifications
for the DR, which is schematized in (75). Under type shifting, weak determiners like some can
head the pivot and strong determiners like every cannot, because some NP has a valid property

28 Francez (2007) argues against McNally’s instantiation analysis of existential constructions based on examples like
the following where the meaning does not require or even precludes instantiation in some space and time:
(i)

a.

There is a three personed God in Christianity.

b.

There was a disaster prevented.

[Francez 2007:34]

As I see it, in these examples, the coda invokes modality, i.e. the instantiation is in some space, time, and world.
Therefore, (i.a) means something like: in all the worlds compatible with the tenets of Christianity, a three personed
God is instantiated. I ignore the role of the coda in the main text for the sake of simplicity, but examples like (i) show
that a full semantics of existential constructions must take into account the coda as well.
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denotation (75a), but every NP does not (75b). Crucially, the property-type requirement does not
ban definite descriptions, which also have licit property denotations under type shifting (75c).
(75) a.

some NP ⇒shift 3property denotation ⇒(74) 3pivot

b. every NP ⇏shift 7 property denotation ⇏(74) 7 pivot
c.

the NP

⇒shift 3property denotation ⇒(74) 3pivot

The mechanics in (75) are reminiscent of Heim’s (1987) proposal that the DR is the result of the
constraint in (76) against individual variables in the pivot position. 29 Strong DPs require QR, which
would leave an individual variable thereby violating (76), while weak DPs can be interpreted in situ
without QR because they (can) denote properties.
(76) * There be x, where x is an individual variable.

[Heim 1987:23]

Because the property-type requirement does not block definite descriptions, there must be some
additional constraint for these DPs. This is where the pragmatic part of the DR enters the picture.
McNally proposes that the prohibition on definite descriptions is the result of the pragmatic
requirement that the pivot introduce a new discourse referent (77).
(77) Pragmatics of an existential construction
The use of There be is felicitous in a context C only if the NP α serving as its argument carries
the condition that any discourse referents it licenses be novel.

[McNally 1998:385]

Because a definite description is generally felicitous only in a discourse where its referent is given, a
definite description would violate (77) and hence cannot be the pivot of an existential construction. 30
Part of the motivation behind the pragmatic restriction, McNally argues, is that it is reasonable
that a pragmatic restriction (i) could be relaxed under special circumstances and (ii) could vary
across languages. The first of these explains list existentials in English, and the second explains the

29 In the syntactic literature, a similar idea lives in Williams’ (1994) proposal that in an existential construction, the
expletive there is the subject and the pivot is the predicate.

30 There are more elaborate theories of the pragmatics of existential constructions and the DR, which one could adopt
in place of the simple constraint in (77). One family of analyses attributes the DR to the discourse referent status
of the pivot, as does (77) (e.g. Abbott 1993; Ward and Birner 1995; Zucchi 1995). Another family of analyses instead
attributes the DR to the nontopical nature of the pivot and the unconventional information structure associated with
existential constructions (e.g. Borschev and Partee 2002; Mikkelsen 2002; Francez 2007; Hu and Pan 2007; Partee
and Borschev 2007).
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difference between English and Catalan. Let us take each in turn. First, according to McNally’s
analysis, the special discourse factors in a list existential obviate (77), thereby allowing a definite
description to be the pivot. Such an explanation is possible because nothing semantically bars
a definite description from being the pivot. Second, the crosslinguistic variation follows from
the pragmatic restriction in (77) being operative in English, but not in Catalan. Therefore, the
bifurcation of the DR into a semantic requirement and a pragmatic requirement allows us to account
for the differences between English and Catalan, while maintaining that the semantics of existential
constructions is uniform across languages. Analyses of the DR that outright prohibit definite
descriptions offer no obvious explanation of list existentials and the crosslinguistic variation.
Recall examples like (69b), repeated below in (78a), where the pivot can be headed by a strong
determiner iff it quantifies over nonparticulars. McNally argues that such pivots quantify over
properties and are interpreted via QR, as schematized in (78b). Because (78b) involves quantification
over properties, and not entities, the pivot position still contains a property.
(78) McNally’s proposal for quantificational pivots
a.

There was every kind of doctor at the convention.

(=69b)

qr
b. [ every kind of doctor ]⟨⟨et,t ⟩,t ⟩ λf ⟨e,t ⟩ [ there be f ⟨e,t ⟩ at the convention ]

In the LF in (78b), the pivot takes scope over the existential quantification. This matches the
intuition that (78a) means something like every doctor-kind was instantiated at the convention.
However, this analysis predicts that pivots quantifying over properties/nonparticulars should also
be able to take scope over other scope-bearing elements in the sentence. This prediction is not borne
out, as shown in (79a), where every kind of doctor still cannot scope over negation. (79b) shows
that both scopes are available in the corresponding copula construction. (79c) and (79d) show the
same contrast for only one kind of doctor.
(79) Quantificational pivots cannot QR over negation
a.

There wasn’t every kind of doctor at the convention.

b. Every kind of doctor wasn’t at the convention.
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3

not ≫ every; *every ≫ not

3

not ≫ every; 3every ≫ not

c.

There wasn’t only one kind of doctor at the convention.
3

not ≫ only one; *only one ≫ not

d. Only one kind of doctor wasn’t at the convention.
3

not ≫ only one; 3only one ≫ not

If pivots that quantify over properties are interpreted via QR, the wide-scope reading of every kind
of doctor should be available in (79a), contrary to fact. Thus, what (79) entails is that even when
the pivot appears to be quantificational, it still cannot undergo QR, contra McNally. Consequently,
we need some other mechanism for interpreting quantificational pivots that does not involve QR
(or minimally does not shift scope). For now, I set this issue aside and will return to it in section 2.5.4.

2.3.2

Change-of-color verbs

Change-of-color verbs are textbook cases of resultatives. A resultative is a complex predicate
comprising a verb and an adjective. The adjective denotes the resultant state achieved by the event,
and it may be predicated only of the immediately postverbal NP (e.g. Levin and Rappaport Hovav
1995). For example, in (80a), the metal became flat as the result of Nancy’s hammering; in (80b), the
teapot became empty as the result of Amanda’s drinking; and in (80c), with a change-of-color verb,
the house became magenta as the result of Megan’s painting.
(80) a.

Nancy hammered the metal flat.

b. Amanda drank the teapot empty.
c.

Megan painted the house magenta.

Adjectives standardly denote properties, so there is already reason to believe that the color term of
a change-of-color verb denotes a property. What makes change-of-color verbs atypical resultatives
stems from the dual life of color terms as adjectives and nouns. For instance, the color term magenta
can serve both as an adjective in, e.g., the magenta house and as a noun in, e.g., Megan’s favorite color
is magenta, without any obvious morphosyntactic differences. This behavior is unlike ordinary
adjectives, such as flat and empty. The difference between color terms and other adjectives also
manifests itself in constituent questions, as illustrated in the contrast between (81a) and (81b).
In (81a), what can be used to ask about the resultant state of Megan’s painting, i.e. the color that she
painted the house. However, the same does not apply in (81b), where what cannot as easily refer to
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the resultant state of Amanda’s drinking. To the extent that (81b) is acceptable at all, it requires a
context that delineates the resultant states over which what ranges, e.g. empty and half-empty.
(81) a.

What1 did Megan paint the house

1?

b.?? What1 did Amanda drink the teapot

1?

Moreover, the color term of a change-of-color verb can unambiguously be a noun, as illustrated
in (82), where the color term occurs with a determiner and, in the case of (82b), a relative clause.
(82) a.

Megan painted the house a very bright shade of purple.

b. Megan painted the house a purple that complemented the shutters.
Despite the resultant state being a noun, (82a) and (82b) still have the semantics of a resultative.
In (82a), the house became a very bright shade of purple as the result of Megan’s painting. In (82b),
the house became a purple that complemented the shutters as the result of Megan’s painting.
Therefore, even though the color term of a change-of-color verb is (or can be) a nominal syntactically,
it retains a meaning akin to that of an adjective, viz. a property. Achieving a property meaning
from a nominal will be addressed in section 4.2 of chapter 4 in the context of nominal type shifting.
According to virtually any analysis of resultatives, the resultant state denotes a property,
so there is no need to adopt a particular analysis for our purposes here. Consequently, beyond
identifying that change-of-color verbs are resultatives, there is nothing else to say in support of
the property generalization in (65). 31

31 Postal’s (1994) claim is only that change-of-color verbs are Π-positions. However, if the common denominator
unifying Π-positions is that they host property-type DPs and change-of-color verbs fit into this generalization
because they are resultatives, then the resultant state in a resultative should be a Π-position more generally. Testing
this prediction is complicated by the fact that nominal resultant states are generally less acceptable than color terms
are with change-of-color verbs. Nevertheless, of the speakers who I have consulted, the speakers who accept the
baseline in (ia) find the expected contrasts between W-movements and T-movements in the rest of the paradigm
in (i) as well.
(i)

a.
b.
c.
d.

Baseline
Nancy hammered the metal the required flatness.
3

Wh-movement
[ How flat ]1 did Nancy hammer the metal

1?

Topicalization
* [ The required flatness ]1 , Nancy hammered the metal
3

1.

Restrictive RC
Laura inspected the flatness1 [RC that Nancy had hammered the metal

40

1

].

2.3.3

Naming verbs

In most semantic theories, proper names are either rigid designators (e.g. Kripke 1980) or definite
descriptions (e.g. Frege 1952; Russell 1911; Burge 1973; Bach 1981; Geurts 1997; Elbourne 2005). 32 , 33
Although there has been a substantial amount of work investigating proper names, the empirical
scope has been predominately limited to proper names in argument positions. However, proper
names behave differently when they occur as the name argument of a naming verb, such as those
in (83) (Matushansky 2008).
(83) a.

Irene called the cat Snowball.

b. Helen nicknamed the dog Odie.
c.

The priest baptized the child Brigid.

d. I am named Ethan.
The italicized proper names in (83) do not refer to individuals with those names, but rather to the
names themselves. This fact can be observed independently with wh-movement: while what can
refer to a name position, who cannot (84). Since who can only refer to an individual, (84) shows
that the name position cannot denote an individual.
(84) { What / *Who }1 did the priest baptize the child

1?

To refer to a name is to refer to the sequence of sounds that make up the name (or possibly to
the name’s orthography). For example, in (83b), the denotation of Odie involves reference to the
phonological string [owdij]. In this respect, proper names in the name position are metalinguistic.

e.
f.

Appositive RC
*Laura inspected the flatness1 , [RC which Nancy had hammered the metal
QR
Nancy wants to hammer the metal the flattest.

1

].

3

want ≫ -est; *-est ≫ want

For the sake of simplicity, I will continue to focus only on change-of-color verbs, rather than resultatives more
generally, because the judgements are more widely shared for the former. In addition, the status of resultatives as
Π-positions does not have a large bearing on the core proposals of this dissertation. I leave a more careful exploration
of the facts in (i) for future research.

32 For a review of the previous literature and additional references about proper names, see Matushansky (2008). The
focus here in this section is only on naming verbs.

33 Though Montague treats proper names as generalized quantifiers, this treatment is internally motivated for technical
reasons. The first meaning postulate in Montague (1973) effectively makes them rigid designators.
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Nevertheless, it is not possible to reduce them to pure, unanalyzable quotation. One convincing
piece of evidence against such an analysis is the incompatibility of the name argument with explicit
indications of quotation (Matushansky 2008). Consider the contrast between (85a) and (85b). The
italicized expression four in (85a) is simple mention of a proper name; its metalinguistic status
is confirmed by the fact that it can be preceded by the word, an explicit indication of quotation.
However, as shown in (85b), the name argument is incompatible with such indicators. This fact
suggests that proper names with naming verbs cannot be reduced to quotation.
(85) a.

(The word) four has four letters.

b. Irene nicknamed the dog (*the name) Odie.
The status of the name argument raises the possibility that naming verbs are ditransitives (86a).
However, Matushansky (2008) argues that the name argument in fact denotes a property and thus
naming verbs project a small-clause structure (86b) and are not ditransitives.
(86) a.

Ditransitive analysis of naming verbs
[vP v [ [ the dog ] [VP name Odie ] ] ]

b. Small-clause analysis of naming verbs
[vP v [VP name [SC [ the dog ] Odie ] ] ]

I review some of Matushansky’s (2008) arguments below, many of which are based on the syntactic
profile of naming verbs crosslinguistically. Note that I only present a small subset of her data, and
I have simplified glosses in some instances.
2.3.3.1

Names with definite articles

First, in languages where proper names in argument positions can appear with a definite article,
they cannot do so with naming verbs. This fact is shown in (87) for German (for many dialects)
and in (88) for Pima (Uto-Aztecan). In (87a) and (88a), the proper name appears with a definite
article in an argument position. However, in (87b) and (88b), the definite article disappears when
the proper name occurs in the name position of a naming verb.
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(87) German (dialectal)
a.

Ich habe den Karl gesehen.
I have the Karl seen
‘I have seen Karl’

b. Ich habe ihn (*den) Karl genannt.
I have him the
‘I called him Karl’

Karl called
[Matushansky 2008:580]

(88) Pima
a.

John 'o

ñeid heg Mary.

John aux.ipfv see det Mary
‘John sees Mary’
b. Hegam Pimas gamhu

ha'ab 'ab 'e-

'a'aga 'oob.

those Pimas over.there side dx ana say Apache
‘Those Pimas on the other side [of the border] call themselves Apache’
[Matushansky 2008:580]

2.3.3.2

Predicate marking

Second, in some languages, the name argument is overtly marked as a predicate. For example,
in Welsh, predicates must appear with the special predicative particle yn (89a, b). In a naming
construction, the name argument appears with yn as well (89c).
(89) Welsh
a.

Mae Siôn *(yn) ddedwydd.
is
Siôn prt happy
‘Siôn is happy’

b. Y

mae Siôn yn feddyg.

prt is
Siôn prt doctor
‘Siôn is a doctor’
c.

Enwyd

ef yn Siôn arôl ei dad.

name.pass he prt Siôn after his father
‘He is named Siôn after his father’

[Matushansky 2008:582]

Moreover, in Korean, the name argument appears with the actual copula -i (90).
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(90) Korean
ku-nun caki-uy

ttal-lul

Miran-i-la-ko

pwull-ess-ta.

he-top self-gen daughter-acc Miran-be-assert-qot call-past-decl
‘He called his daughter Miran’
[Matushansky 2008:582]
2.3.3.3

Predicative case

Third, in languages where predicates consistently bear a certain morphological case, the name
argument in a naming construction must bear this case as well. One such language is Finnish,
where change-of-state predicates bear translative case (91a). In a naming construction, the proper
name must also bear translative case (91b).
(91) Finnish
a.

Me maalasi-mme seinä-n

keltaise-ksi.

we painted-1pl wall-acc yellow-trans
‘We painted a/the wall yellow’
b. Me kutsu-mme William Gatesi-a

Billi-ksi.

we call-1pl
William Gates-ptv Billy-trans
‘We call William Gates Billy’

[Matushansky 2008:584]

Similarly, in Russian, predicates bear instrumental case (92a). In a naming construction, the proper
name can also bear instrumental case (92b). 34
(92) Russian
a.

Ja sčitaju

ee lingvistkoj.

I consider her linguist.instr
‘I consider her a linguist’
b. Ee okrestili

Annoj.

her baptized.pl Anna.instr
‘They baptized her Anna’

[Matushansky 2008:585]

34 In Russian, the name argument can also bear nominative case; see Matushansky (2008) for discussion.
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2.3.3.4

Matushansky’s proposal

Based on this evidence, Matushansky (2008) concludes that the name argument of a naming verb
denotes a property. She proposes that proper names are two-place functions whose arguments
are an individual x and a naming convention R (93). Thus, a proper name denotes the set of
individuals who bear that name according to some naming convention.
(93) ⟦Odie⟧ = λx e λR⟨e,⟨n,t ⟩⟩ . R(x)([owdij])
(where n is a sort of semantic type e; a phonological string)

With a naming verb, the naming convention is supplied by the naming verb itself. For example,
baptize provides the naming convention of baptism, and nickname provides the naming convention
of nicknaming. To illustrate, the derivation of the naming verb in (83b) with nickname is given
in (94). The semantic derivation proceeds straightforwardly via Function Application.
(94) Derivation of a naming verb
Helen nicknamed the dog Odie.

(=83b)

VP
V
nickname

SC
DP
the dog

a.

Odie

⟦nickname⟧ = λf ⟨⟨e,⟨n,t ⟩⟩,t ⟩ λw . ∃R[nickname(w)(R) ∧ f (R)]

b. ⟦SC⟧ = ⟦Odie⟧ (⟦the dog⟧) = λR⟨e,⟨n,t ⟩⟩ . R(the dog)([owdij])
c.

⟦VP⟧ = ⟦nickname⟧ (⟦SC⟧)
= λw . ∃R[nickname(w)(R) ∧ R(the dog)([owdij])]
Paraphrase: There exists a relation R such that R is a nicknaming convention and R
holds between the dog and the phonological string [owdij].

Matushansky takes her analysis one step further. She argues that proper names always enter
the derivation as properties and that the alternative individual-type and generalized-quantifier-type
denotations of proper names in argument positions are derived. Outside of naming verbs, the
naming convention is supplied contextually. Variations of this view have been advanced by Burge
(1973), Bach (1981), and Geurts (1997), amongst many others. For our purposes, it is only important
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that proper names denote properties in the name position of a naming verb. Therefore, it is not
necessary for our purposes to adopt the stronger stance that proper names always start out as
properties, though I find such a prospect promising.

2.3.4

Section summary

The generalization to emerge about Π-positions from the literatures on existential constructions,
change-of-color verbs, and naming verbs is given in (95). 35
(95) Property generalization
DPs in Π-positions must denote properties (semantic type ⟨e, t⟩).
The property generalization in (95) answers two questions about Π-positions: First, it answers
what characterizes Π-positions, a question left unanswered in Postal (1994); see section 2.6.1 for
discussion. To an extent, it also explains the surface heterogeneity of Π-positions and why a unified
characterization remained elusive. Even though Π-positions all involve propertyhood, this fact is
not evident until one delves deeper into the semantics of constructions containing a Π-position, as
I have done in this section. Second, it gives us a handle on why Π-positions are antipronominal:
weak pronouns like it cannot denote a property, while strong pronouns like that can. This fact
can be observed independently using the verb consider, whose second argument must denote a
property (96). This account of antipronominality will be discussed more in section 2.5.
(96) Weak pronouns cannot denote a property
Donald thinks that he is a success, but no one else considers him { 3that / *it }.
One question that the property generalization raises is whether all positions hosting propertytype DPs are Π-positions. There are a number of proposals in the literature involving property-type
DPs: opaque objects of intensional verbs (Zimmermann 1993; van Geenhoven and McNally 2005),
incorporated nominals (van Geenhoven 1998), Russian small nominals (Pereltsvaig 2006), and

35 For the sake of simplicity, I group name positions with the other Π-positions as denoting a property of type ⟨e, t⟩,

even though they denote functions of type ⟨e, ⟨⟨e, nt⟩, t⟩⟩ (functions mapping entities to sets of naming conventions).
This difference has no significant effect on the analysis, but it does foreshadow the Trace Interpretation Constraint
in chapter 3 that movement can only map onto traces over individual types. Accordingly, the reason that Π-positions
are special is not as much that they host property-type DPs, but that they host DPs that are not type e.
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Russian genitive of negation (Partee and Borschev 2004; Kagan 2007, 2013; Partee et al. 2011, 2012).
The prediction is that they should behave like Π-positions, though if the purported property-type
DPs do not behave like Π-positions, one might interpret that as a call for an alternative analysis of
them. In this sense, the Π-position asymmetry can also be employed as a diagnostic of propertytype DPs. However, I have not carried out this empirical work, so it remains an area for future
research. As such, the property generalization in (95) is narrowly formulated to only encompass
the syntactic positions discovered by Postal (1994).

2.4

Scope generalization

This section argues that a movement step cannot target a Π-position if that movement shifts the
scope of the moved DP, as summarized in (97). In other words, movement that targets a Π-position
must reconstruct.
(97) Scope generalization
Movement that shifts scope cannot target Π-positions.
For movement to shift scope means that at LF, the moved DP takes scope in the position achieved
by movement, which, for all overt forms of movement, is the DP’s surface syntactic position. If
movement does not shift scope, the scope of the moved DP at LF mismatches its surface position
in that it takes scope in its position prior to movement, viz. its base-generated position. This
dichotomy is schematized in (98) where the check mark represents the moved DP’s position at LF.
(98) a.

Movement that shifts scope
[ 3 1 ... [ ...
1 . . . ] ] ↝ Cannot target Π-positions

b. Movement that does not shift scope
3 1 . . . ] ] ↝ Can target Π-positions
[
1 ... [ ...

According to the scope generalization (97), the difference between W-movements and T-movements
reduces to scope: T-movements obligatorily shift scope, but W-movements do so only optionally. I make the novel observation that W-movements can only target Π-positions when they do
not shift scope. This observation crucially reveals that the Π-position asymmetry is not about
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movement types, but rather about scope, a criterion that crosscuts movement types. As will be
discussed in section 2.6, this recharacterization is problematic for the two existing analyses of the
Π-position asymmetry, Postal (1994) and Stanton (2016), which both rest on a categorical distinction
between W-movements and T-movements, a kind of analysis that cannot draw a distinction within
W-movements.
The section proceeds by showing that the scope generalization (97) holds for the movement
types discussed in section 2.2: topicalization (§2.4.1), wh-movement (§2.4.2), relative clauses (§2.4.3),
and tough-constructions (§2.4.4). As QR shifts scope by definition, nothing additional needs to
be said to incorporate it into (97). For relative clauses and tough-constructions, it may not be the
case that the overt element corresponding to the gap position is actually the element undergoing
movement. Rather, the dependency might be mediated via some other (null) element that undergoes
movement. However, there is still some kind of dependency involving movement between these
two elements, so the question is whether or not whatever forms this dependency allows taking
scope in the gap position, abstracting away from specifics.

2.4.1

Topicalization

Topicalization in English obligatorily shifts the scope of the moved DP. 36 This behavior is notably distinct from other movement types called “topicalization” in other languages, e.g. German
V2-fronting, which are indeed able to reconstruct. The same disclaimers from section 2.2.1 apply
here: (i) topicalization is a movement type and (ii) there are other movement types (for some
English speakers) that achieve the same linear order, but have different prosody and pragmatics.
I control for the latter complication using the question–answer scenario in (102), which is modelled
after the ones used to probe topicalization and Π-positions in section 2.2.
To illustrate the crucial scope behavior in English, consider the possible interpretations of the
baseline sentence in (99). When some student takes scope in situ below every teacher, then (99) is
true iff for each teacher, there is some student who that teacher likes (99a). These truth conditions
are satisfied both in a scenario where the student is the same student for each teacher and, crucially,
in a scenario where the student is a different student for each teacher. On the other hand, when

36 This fact about English must have been long observed, but I have not been able to track down a reference.
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some student scopes above every teacher, then (99) is true iff there is a single student who every
teacher likes (99b); it is not true in a scenario where the student is different for each teacher.
(99) Every teacher likes some student in the first week.
a.

every ≫ some

Narrow-scope reading
For every teacher x, there is some student y such that x likes y.

b. Wide-scope reading

some ≫ every

There is some student y such that for every teacher x, x likes y.
Topicalizing some student, as in (100), bleeds the narrow-scope reading in (99a). The only possible
interpretation of (100) is the wide-scope reading, where some student takes scope in the landing
site of topicalization, above every teacher. Consequently, (100) is true iff there is a single student
that every teacher likes.
*every ≫ some; 3some ≫ every

(100) Topicalization obligatorily shifts scope
[ Some student ]1 , every teacher likes

1

in the first week.

Because topicalization obligatorily shifts scope, it can even force a reading that would otherwise be
marginal to be the only available reading. In (101a), the most natural interpretation is where every
dessert scopes below no one. This reading is true in a scenario where for every person x at the
party, x ate some (or none) of the desserts, but no one person ate all of them. The other logically
possible reading, where every dessert scopes above no one, is marginal at best. 37 This reading would
only be true in a scenario where no dessert was touched at all. When every dessert is topicalized
over no one, as in (101b), the only reading to survive is the stronger reading, where no dessert was
touched at all. Thus, topicalization bleeds the more natural narrow-scope reading in (101), forcing
the moved DP to take scope in the landing site of movement.

37 It is claimed that QR cannot cross a negative quantifier. However, there is an entailment relationship, at least in (101a),
that makes such a claim impossible to test. In (101a), any scenario where the inverse-scope reading is true is also a
scenario where the surface-scope reading is true. In other words, if every dessert is such that no one touched it, it
is also the case that there is no person who touched every dessert. To test for the availability of the inverse-scope
reading, we would need a scenario where the inverse-scope reading is true and the surface-scope reading is false,
but no such scenario exists. Nevertheless, the fact that this strong reading is the only reading in (101b) is thus all the
more surprising.
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(101) a.

No one touched every dessert at the party.

b. [ Every dessert ]1 , no one touched

1

at the party.

3

no ≫ every; ?every ≫ no

*no ≫ every; 3every ≫ no

(Paraphrase: No dessert was touched at the party.)
The same kind of question–answer scenario employed to examine topicalization and Π-positions
in section 2.2 can be applied to these scope cases as well; see section 2.2.1 for an explanation of
these contexts. Consider the question–answer scenario in (102). The baseline response in (102B)
shows that sans movement, at least two book reports can scope below and thus covary with every
student to produce the intended reading where every student does her or his own book reports.
Topicalizing at least two book reports in (102C) forces it to take scope in the landing site of movement.
Consequently, it cannot covary with every student and lacks the intended reading available in (102B).
The only possible reading of (102C) is one in which all the students somehow do the same book
reports—a nonsensical reading. Crucially, there is nothing illformed about topicalizing at least two
book reports in (102). (102D) shows that topicalization is perfectly acceptable when the wide-scope
reading of the topicalized DP produces a felicitous response, which follows in (102D) because at
least two book reports does not need to be in the scope of any particular quantificational expression
for the intended reading. 38 Therefore, the answer in (102C) is bad only because the topicalized
DP must take scope in the landing site of topicalization, thereby bleeding the intended covarying
reading.
(102) Context: During the school year, students have to do some science projects and some book
reports to advance to the next grade.
A: What about science projects and book reports?
When do students have to do those?
B: 3 Every student has to do [ at least two book reports ] in [ the fall semester ].
C: # [ At least two book reports ] . . . every student has to do in [ the fall semester ].
D: 3 [ At least two book reports ] . . . the class does together in [ the fall semester ].

38 For instance, in my elementary school, each class would do a book report together as a class that involved decorating
the classroom door and performing a skit. (102D) would be a felicitous response in this case.
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Moreover, a well-known fact about topicalization is that an NPI cannot be topicalized (103). This
fact follows from topicalization obligatorily shifting scope, thereby forcing the NPI to be outside
the scope of its licensor. 39
(103) NPIs cannot be topicalized
a.

3

Sophia did not eat any pizza.

b. * [ Any pizza ]1 , Sophia did not eat

1.

In sum, topicalization, a T-movement, obligatorily shifts scope. According to the scope generalization, this is the reason why it cannot target a Π-position (104). 40
(104) Topicalization
[TopicP 3 1 Topic [ . . . [ . . . *

1

. . . ] ] ] ↝ Cannot target Π-positions

topic

(105) Topicalization cannot target a Π -position
a.

Existential constructions
*[ A potato ]1 , there is

1

in the pantry.

(=29c)

b. Change-of-color verbs
1.

*Magenta1 , Megan painted the house
c.

(=35c)

Naming verbs
*Snowflake1 , Irene called the cat

1.

(=47c)

d. Predicate nominals
*[ A math teacher ]1 , Erika became

1.

(=56c)

39 In general, A-movement cannot target NPIs in English (the situation is more complex with A-movement; see UribeEtxebarria 1994), which might provide an independent explanation of (103b). However, (103) illustrates an interesting
contrast between topicalization and Y-movement: Y-movement can in fact target NPIs. Thus, for speakers with
Y-movement, there is a grammatical parse of the string in (103b) as Y-movement; the prosody will differ accordingly.
For other English speakers, such as myself, there is no way to rescue (103b).

40 A possibly related fact is that topicalization freezes the scope of the moved element such that further covert scope
shifting is not possible (Lasnik and Uriagereka 1988). For example, the speakers who accept inverse scope of every
problem in (i.a) conversely do not accept inverse scope in (i.b), where every problem has been topicalized. If part
of the function of topicalization is to give an element a particular scope, it is reasonable to expect that covertly
changing that scope would be prohibited, though the specifics warrant further consideration.
(i)

a.
b.

3

Someone thinks that Mary solved every problem.
Someone thinks that every problem1 , Mary solved
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some ≫ every; %every ≫ some

1.

3

some ≫ every; *every ≫ some

2.4.2

Wh-movement

Wh-movement in constituent questions optionally shifts the scope of the moved DP. In order to
probe scope in constituent questions, we will use how many-questions because, in addition to
the wh-meaning component, how many independently carries its own existential quantification
that can vary in scope (Kroch 1989; Cinque 1990; Cresti 1995; Rullmann 1995; Frampton 1999).
To illustrate, consider the how many-question in (106), which has both wide-scope and narrowscope readings relative to the modal should. Under the wide-scope, de re reading (106a), it is
assumed that there is a certain set of books that Nina should read; the speaker is asking how many
such books there are. A possible answer to the wide-scope reading is: ‘Three books, namely Aspects,
Lectures on Government and Binding, and The Minimalist Program’. Under the narrow-scope, de dicto
reading (106b), there is no assumption that there are any specific books that Nina should read.
Rather, it is assumed that she should read a certain number of books, without having any particular
books in mind. A possible answer to the narrow-scope reading is: ‘Three books, any three’. 41 , 42
(106) Wh-movement optionally shifts scope
[ How many books ]1 should Nina read
a.

this summer?
how many ≫ should

Wide-scope reading
i.

1

For what number n: There are n-many particular books x such that Nina should

read x this summer.
∗
ii. ⟦(106)⟧ (w 0 ) = {p ∶ ∃n ∈ N[p = λw . ∃X[bookw
(X) ∧ #X = n ∧
∗
shouldw (λw ′ . readw
′ (X)(Nina))]]}

b. Narrow-scope reading
i.

should ≫ how many

For what number n: It is necessary for there to be n-many books x such that Nina

reads x this summer.
∗
ii. ⟦(106)⟧ (w 0 ) = {p ∶ ∃n ∈ N[p = λw . shouldw (λw ′ . ∃X[bookw
′ (X) ∧ #X = n ∧
∗
readw
′ (X)(Nina)])]}

The wide-scope and narrow-scope readings of (106) can be paraphrased as the questions in (107a)
and (107b) respectively.
41 In the readings that I have labelled ‘wide-scope’ and ‘narrow-scope’, the number n is interpreted de re. There is
another reading where the number is interpreted de dicto, e.g. How many books should Nina read this summer? As
many as you do. For the sake of simplicity, I do not discuss this reading.

42 For the sake of readability, I abbreviate modal denotations, e.g. shouldw (p) ⇔ ∀w ′ [w ′ ∈ f (w) → p(w ′ )], where
f projects a modal domain.
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(107) a.

Wide-scope paraphrase of (106)
How many books are there that Nina should read this summer?

b. Narrow-scope paraphrase of (106)
What is the number such that Nina should read that many books this summer?
The scope ambiguity in (106) is the result of the fact that wh-movement only optionally shifts scope,
as opposed to obligatorily shifting scope like topicalization does. Thus, when the wh-phrase how
many books in (106) undergoes wh-movement, the resulting structure maps onto one of two LFs,
which differ in the scope of how many’s existential quantification; these LFs are sketched in (108).
I assume that the wh-meaning component comes from the question operator—depicted throughout
this chapter as Q—and hence does not reflect the scope of how many; see section 3.3.4 of chapter 3
for discussion and a full implementation in terms of Q(uestion)-particles. In the first LF (108a), how
many books takes scope in the landing site of movement, thereby yielding the wide-scope reading
in (106a). In the second LF (108b), how many books takes scope in the launching site of movement,
thereby yielding the narrow-scope reading in (106b).
(108) a.

Wide-scope LF of (106)
[ Qn [ ∃ n-many books ]1 [ should [ Nina read

this summer ] ] ]

(=106a)

[ should [ Nina read [ ∃ n-many books ]1 this summer ] ] ]

(=106b)

1

wh

b. Narrow-scope LF of (106)
[ Qn

1

wh

Even though wh-movement can ordinarily shift scope, when it targets a Π-position, scope
shifting is rendered impossible. A wh-phrase in a Π-position must take scope in its base position,
i.e. the Π-position, and cannot take scope in the landing site of wh-movement. This is illustrated in
the set of examples in (109), where the wide-scope reading of how many relative to the modal should
is absent. They can only ask about a general amount without having a particular set in mind.
(109) Wh-movement from a Π -position cannot shift scope
a.

*how many ≫ should; 3should ≫ how many

Existential constructions

[ How many questions ]1 should there be

1

on the exam?

*how many ≫ should; 3should ≫ how many

b. Change-of-color verbs

[ How many colors ]1 should Nina paint the house
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1?

c.

*how many ≫ should; 3should ≫ how many

Naming verbs

[ How many nicknames ]1 should Nina call the cat

1?

*how many ≫ should; 3should ≫ how many

d. Predicate nominals

[ How many kinds of teacher ]1 should Nina become

1?

To appreciate the absence of the wide-scope reading in (109), let us take a closer look at existential
constructions and change-of-color verbs specifically; the discussion will generalize to naming
verbs and predicate nominals. Starting with existential constructions, compare the existential
construction in (109a) with its corresponding copula construction in (110), where how many is able
to scope above or below should. Paraphrases of the (hypothetical) wide-scope and narrow-scope
readings of (109a) and (110) are given in (111).
3

how many ≫ should; 3should ≫ how many

(110) Copula equivalent of (109a)
[ How many questions ]1 should
(111) a.

1

be on the exam?
3

existential (109a); 3copula (110)

Narrow-scope paraphrase

What is the number such that it is necessary that that many questions be on the exam?
*existential (109a); 3copula (110)

b. Wide-scope paraphrase

How many questions are there such that it is necessary that they be on the exam?
Consider the appropriateness of (109a) and (110) in two different scenarios where I am a TA and
the professor is preparing the final exam. In the first scenario, she wants to know the number of
questions that I think the exam should have so that the grading is manageable on my end; the
identity of the questions does not matter at this point. Both (109a) and (110) are appropriate in this
context because they both have a narrow-scope reading, as paraphrased in (111a). In the second
scenario, the professor has asked me to pick out from a workbook the questions that I think should
be on the exam. She wants to know the number of questions that I have selected so that she can
gauge the amount of time that the exam room should be reserved for. Thus, she is asking about the
cardinality of a set that exists in the actual world, the set of questions that I have picked. While the
copula construction in (110) is appropriate in this context, the existential construction in (109a) is
not. This contrast reflects that (110) but not (109a) has a wide-scope reading where how many scopes
above should, as paraphrased in (111b). Therefore, the existential construction in (109a) only has a
narrow-scope reading of how many, while the copula construction in (110) is ambiguous in scope, as
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are ordinary how many-questions. This difference follows from the fact that wh-movement cannot
shift scope when it targets a Π-position, thereby forcing a narrow-scope reading of how many.
The same pattern can be observed for change-of-color verbs. (113) provides paraphrases of
what the narrow-scope and wide-scope readings would be of the question in (109b), repeated below
in (112). Only the narrow-scope reading in (113a) is a possible interpretation of the question.
*how many ≫ should; 3should ≫ how many

(112) Change-of-color verbs

[ How many colors ]1 should Nina paint the house
(113) a.

1?

(=109b)

Narrow-scope paraphrase of (112)
3

What is the number such that it is necessary that Nina paint the house that many colors?

b. Wide-scope paraphrase of (112)
*How many colors are there such that it is necessary that Nina paint the house those
colors?
The judgements in (113) are somewhat delicate. Nevertheless, the same pattern of judgements can
be observed—perhaps more convincingly—using an attitude predicate like want. Consider the pair
of sentences in (114) against the context in (115), which distinguishes the de re (wide-scope) and
de dicto (narrow-scope) construals of how many colors.
(114) a.

Π -position

*how many ≫ want; 3want ≫ how many

[ How many colors ]1 does Nina want [ to paint the wall

1

]?

3

how many ≫ want; 3want ≫ how many

b. Non-Π -position

[ How many colors ]1 does Nina want [ to use

1

for painting the wall ]?

(115) Nina has the desire to use two colors of paint on her wall in order to make it striped. Nina is
also colorblind. She goes to the store and buys two cans of paint, which she believes to be
different colors. However, unbeknownst to her, they are in fact the same color. She wants to
use the paints that she bought at the store to paint the wall.
a.

3

(114a); 3(114b)

De dicto construal: Two colors

*(114a); 3(114b)

b. De re construal: One color

It is felicitous to answer both (114a) and (114b) with the de dicto answer ‘two colors’, where Nina has
the de dicto desire to paint the wall with two colors. Thus, in both sentences, how many can take
scope in its base position below want. However, the de re answer ‘one color’ is a possible answer
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only to (114b), and not to (114a). The absence of a de re construal of how many colors in (114a) shows
that wh-movement is unable to shift scope when it targets a Π-position.
The absence of a wide-scope reading when wh-movement targets a Π-position is corroborated
by the ungrammaticality of wh-movement from a Π-position across a wh-island boundary, a fact
observed by Postal (1994). 43 Wh-islands have the special property that they force elements extracted
out of them to take wide scope, as schematized in (116) (Longobardi 1987; Kroch 1989; Cinque 1990;
Rullmann 1995; Cresti 1995).
(116) Wh-islands force wide scope
[ 3 1 . . . [ whether . . . *

1

... ]]

wh

This property is illustrated in (117), where how many books is extracted out of a wh-island headed
by whether. Unlike ordinary how many-questions, (117) is not ambiguous in scope. It only has a
wide-scope reading where the speaker is asking how many books there are of which it is true that
you wonder whether Nina read them. It cannot be used to ask for the number n such that you
wonder whether Nina read n-many books. 44
(117) Wh-islands force wide scope
[ How many books ]1 do you wonder [ whether Nina read
a.

1

this summer ]?
how many ≫ wonder

Wide-scope reading

For what number n: There are n-many particular books x such that you wonder whether
Nina read x this summer.
b. Narrow-scope reading

wonder ≫ how many

* For what number n: You wonder whether Nina read n-many books this summer.
I do not seek to explain this property of wh-islands, merely to exploit it as a diagnostic. The logic is
as follows: Since Π-positions force narrow scope and wh-islands force wide scope, the two should
be mutually exclusive, i.e. wh-movement from a Π-position embedded inside a wh-island should

43 To my knowledge, Frampton (1999), originally distributed in 1990, was the first to observe that wh-movement cannot
target the pivot of an existential construction across a wh-island.

44 The wh-movement out of the wh-island in (117) also loses the superintensional reading mentioned in fn. 41 (Rullmann
1995). Thus, it cannot be answered with ‘as many as you do’.
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be ungrammatical. This prediction is borne out, as shown in (118), where it is contrasted with
wh-movement of another constituent in the same construction, which is indeed possible.
(118) Wh-movement cannot target a Π -position in a wh-island
a.

Existential constructions
i. * [ How many books ]1 do you wonder [ whether there are

1

on the table ]?

ii. ? [ Which table ]1 do you wonder [ whether there are books on

1

]?

b. Change-of-color verbs
i. * [ Which color ]1 do you wonder [ whether Nina painted the house
ii. ? [ Which house ]1 do you wonder [ whether Nina painted
c.

1

1

]?

that ugly green ]?

Naming verbs
i. * [ Which nickname ]1 do you wonder [ whether Nina calls the cat
ii. ? [ Which cat ]1 do you wonder [ whether Nina calls

1

1

]?

Garfield ]?

d. Predicate nominals
i. * [ Which kind of teacher ]1 do you wonder
[ whether Nina made

1

out of Mary ]?

ii. ? [ Which student ]1 do you wonder
[ whether Nina made a math teacher out of

1

]?

A similar pattern of ungrammaticality can be observed with negative islands. Negative islands
force how many to take wide scope above negation, as schematized in (119) (Kroch 1989; Cinque
1990; Rullmann 1995). 45
(119) Negative islands force wide scope of how many
[ 3 1 . . . [ not . . . * 1 . . . ] ]
wh

This property of negative islands is illustrated in (120), where how many books is extracted over
negation. Missing is the (ill-defined) narrow-scope reading in (120b).

45 Where wh-islands and negative islands differ is that wh-islands block all forms of reconstruction, whereas negative
islands do not. This is illustrated in (i) with Condition A (and perhaps variable binding).
(i)

a. *[ Which picture of herself2 ]1 did John wonder [ whether every/no woman2 likes
b.

3

[ Which picture of herself2 ]1 does no woman2 like
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1?

1

]?

(120) Negative islands force wide scope of how many
[ How many books ]1 did Nina not read
a.

1?

how many ≫ not

Wide-scope reading

For what number n: There are n-many particular books x such that Nina did not read x.
b. Narrow-scope reading

not ≫ how many

* For what number n: It is not the case that Nina read n-many books.
The explanation of this property of negative islands is unimportant for our purposes here, but
Rullmann (1995) provides a relatively straightforward explanation: the question asks for a maximal
degree and this maximality would be undefined under negation, thereby forcing wide scope. The
logic of using negative islands as a diagnostic is analogous to that of wh-islands: Since negative
islands force how many to take wide scope and Π-positions force how many to take narrow scope,
the two should be mutually exclusive. This prediction is borne out, as shown in (121), where it is
contrasted with wh-movement of another constituent in the same construction across negation,
which is indeed possible. Note that, with a special prosody, simple clausal negation leaves a kind of
emphatic reading in the existential construction in (121a.i); this generalizes to the other Π-positions
as well (not shown). Although this reading is not a genuine negation reading, and therefore not
relevant to the task at hand, I use no one in the other examples to avoid it outright.
(121) Wh-movement cannot target a Π -position in a negative island
a.

Existential constructions
i. * [ How many books ]1 aren’t there

on the table?

1

3

ii. [ How many tables ]1 aren’t there books on

1?

iii. * [ How many books ]1 did no one want there to be

on the table?

1

3

iv. [ How many tables ]1 did no one want there to be books on

1?

b. Change-of-color verbs
i. * [ How many colors ]1 did no one paint their house
3

ii. [ How many houses ]1 did no one paint
c.

1

1?

lime green?

Naming verbs
i. * [ How many nicknames ]1 did no one call their cat
3

ii. [ How many cats ]1 did no one call

1

1?

Garfield?

d. Predicate nominals
i. * [ How many kinds of teacher ]1 did no one make
3

1

out of a student?

ii. [ How many students ]1 did no one make a math teacher out of
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1?

In sum, wh-movement can successfully target a Π-position only when it does not shift the
scope of the moved DP (122a). When wh-movement does shift scope, it patterns as a T-movement
in that such extraction from a Π-position is ungrammatical (122b).
(122) Wh-movement
a.

[Q

1

. . . [ . . . 3 1 . . . ] ] ↝ Can target Π-positions
wh

b. [ Q 3 1 . . . [ . . .

1

. . . ] ] ↝ Cannot target Π-positions

wh

2.4.3

Relative clauses

The scope-shifting contrast between topicalization and wh-movement is paralleled in relative
clauses (RCs) as well: restrictive RCs allow the relativized element to take scope in the embedded
gap position, while appositive RCs do not. Abstracting away from the specific details, I will assume
that the relativized element moves from the embedded gap position to the edge of the RC, from where
it establishes some kind of syntactic dependency with the external head, e.g. matching followed
by deletion (Sauerland 1998) or projecting movement into NP (Bhatt 2002). This dependency
creates a λ-abstraction that binds a variable inside the relativized element, thereby creating a
predicate that can semantically compose with the NP. 46 The relativized element is a full DP lacking
quantificational force that is headed by a (potentially null) relative pronoun (Kayne 1994; Bianchi
1999; Bhatt 2002). This structure is schematized in (123). I will be concerned with whether the
movement step inside the RC, which I call the “formation” step for short, allows the relativized
element can take narrow scope in the embedded gap position.
matching→deletion or projecting movement

(123) [DP NP λ1 [CP DP1 . . . [ . . . DP1 . . . ] ] ]
movement to clause edge

46 There are several possible explanations of where this λ-abstraction comes from: the relative complementizer; the
relative pronoun; or, as Bhatt (2002) proposes, the byproduct of projecting movement of the NP. Either way, the
result allows us to assume a relatively standard semantics of RCs while also accounting for reconstruction of the
nominal head.
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In a restrictive RC, the relativized element can take scope in the embedded gap position. For
example, in (124), modelled after an Italian example in Bianchi (1999), the relativized element two
patients can take scope in the embedded gap position, below every doctor. Thus, (124) has a reading
where for every doctor, two separate patients were telephoned.
3

two ≫ every; 3every ≫ two

(124) Restrictive-RC formation does not have to shift scope

I telephoned the two patients1 [RC that every doctor will examine

1

].

While (124) shows that the relativized element can take scope in the embedded gap position, it does
not allow us to determine whether the relativized element can also take wide scope relative to every
doctor, i.e. whether restrictive-RC formation can ever shift scope. Although (124) in principle has a
reading where two patients scopes over every doctor, such that only two patients were telephoned
in total, this wide-scope reading entails the narrow-scope reading. Thus, there is no scenario in
which the wide-scope reading of (124) is true and the narrow-scope reading of (124) is false.
To see that restrictive-RC formation can scope, it is necessary to look at slightly more complicated examples with scope-bearing adjectival modifiers. Bhatt (2002) observes that adjectival
modifiers like first and only inside the nominal head create distinct ‘low’ readings (125a, 126a) and
‘high’ readings (125b, 126b). These two readings correspond to the scope of the relativized element.
The low reading corresponds to the relativized element taking scope in the embedded gap position,
while the high reading corresponds to it taking scope at the edge of the RC. 47
(125) Low and high readings with ‘first’
the first book1 [RC that John said Tolstoy had written
a.

]
say ≫ first

Low reading
i.

1

the x such that John said that the first book that Tolstoy had written was x

ii. Scenario: John said that the first book that Tolstoy had written was War and Peace.
Hence, the NP is War and Peace. (i.e. order of writing matters, order of saying is
irrelevant)

47 Deriving the low readings in (125)–(128) is nontrivial. I follow Bhatt (2002) in assuming that the nominal head is
simply not interpreted in its high position, so that the composes directly with the RC, but this is not entirely obvious.
This problem is independent of Π-positions and thus does not change the scope generalization, but Π-positions
might provide some insight into the correct solution. I leave this issue for future research.
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b. High reading
i.

first ≫ say

the first book about which John said that Tolstoy had written it

ii. Scenario: In 1990, John said that Tolstoy had written Anna Karenina; in 1991, John
said that Tolstoy had written War and Peace. Hence, the NP is Anna Karenina.
(i.e. order of saying matters, order of writing is irrelevant)

[Bhatt 2002:57]

(126) Low and high readings with ‘only’
the only book1 [RC that John said that Tolstoy had written
a.

1

]
say ≫ only

Low reading
the x such that John said that ‘x is the only book that Tolstoy wrote’

b. High reading

only ≫ say

the only book about which John said that Tolstoy had written it

[Bhatt 2002:57]

Bhatt (2002) also shows that NPI licensing can disambiguate between the two readings. As shown
in (127a), the adjectival modifiers first and only can license NPIs in RCs. Putting an NPI in the
embedded clause forces the adjectival modifier to have a low reading (127b, c), whereas putting an
NPI in the higher clause forces the high reading (127d, e). Thus, there are syntactic locality effects
with NPI licensing in RCs when the licensor is in the nominal head, roughly clausematehood, which
we can exploit to tease apart the low and high readings.
(127) Disambiguation with NPI licensing
a.

This is the only/first book1 [RC that I have ever read

1

].

b. the only book1 [RC that John said that Tolstoy had ever written

1

]

*high, 3low

c.

1

]

*high, 3low

the first book1 [RC that John said that Tolstoy had ever written

d. the only book1 [RC that John ever said that Tolstoy wrote

1

]

3

e.

1

]

3

the first book1 [RC that John ever said that Tolstoy wrote

high, *low

high, *low

[Bhatt 2002:60]

Therefore, (125)–(127) show that restrictive RCs optionally shift the scope of the relativized element,
as evidenced by the possibility of distinct low and high readings. Unlike (124), the low and high
readings that adjectival modifiers create do not stand in an entailment relationship.
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Crucially, when restrictive-RC formation targets a Π-position, only the low reading of an
adjectival modifier survives (128). 48 The ‘*’ in (128) indicates that the reading is unavailable.
(128) Π -positions only permit the low reading
a.

Existential constructions
the only books1 [RC that John said (that) there were
i.

1

on the table ]
say ≫ only

Low reading
3

the x such that John said that ‘x are the only books that there are on the table’

ii. High reading

only ≫ say

* the only books about which John said that there (them) were on the table
b. Change-of-color verbs
the first color1 [RC that John said (that) Mary had painted the house
i.

]
say ≫ first

Low reading
3

1

the x such that John said that ‘x is the first color that Mary had painted the house’

ii. High reading

first ≫ say

* the first color about which John said that Mary had painted the house (that)
c.

Naming verbs
the first name1 [RC that John said (that) Mary had nicknamed the cat

1

i.

say ≫ first

Low reading
3

]

the x such that John said that ‘x is the first name that Mary had nicknamed the cat’

ii. High reading

first ≫ say

* the first name about which John said that Mary had nicknamed the cat (that)
d. Predicate nominals
the first kind of teacher1 [RC that John said (that) Mary had become

1

i.

say ≫ first

Low reading
3

]

the x such that John said that ‘x is the first kind of teacher that Mary had become’

ii. High reading

first ≫ say

* the first kind of teacher about which John said that Mary had become (that)
The judgements in (128) are delicate and complicated. 49 To help with this, the context in (129)
differentiates the low and high readings of first with a change-of-color verb: the first color said is
blue, while the first color that Mary painted the house is actually green. (129a) is unacceptable in
this context, which indicates that it lacks the high reading, which would be true.

48 I find that the acceptability in (128) improves when there is no that heading the lowermost clause.
49 Only one person I have spoken with about these judgements disagrees with them. That said, I have not conducted a
comprehensive judgement survey.
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(129) Context: On Tuesday, John said that Mary painted the house blue, and then on Wednesday,
he said that Mary painted the house green. Mary first painted the house green.
a.?? The first color1 [RC that John said Mary had painted the house

1

] was blue.

The unavailability of the high reading in (128) can further be confirmed using NPI licensing. As
shown in (130), an NPI in the higher clause of the RC is ungrammatical when the embedded gap
corresponds to a Π-position. This fact follows if the high reading is absent, thereby preventing the
adjectival modifier from being clausemates with the NPI to license it.
(130) NPI licensing confirms the absence of the high reading
a.

Existential constructions
i.

3

the only books1 [RC that John said that there ever were

1

on the table ]

ii. * the only books1 [RC that John ever said that there were

1

on the table ]

b. Change-of-color verbs
i.

c.

3

the first color1 [RC that John said that Mary had ever painted the house

1

]

ii. * the first color1 [RC that John ever said that Mary had painted the house

1

]

Naming verbs
i.

3

the first name1 [RC that John said that Mary had ever nicknamed the cat

1

]

ii. * the first name1 [RC that John ever said that Mary had nicknamed the cat

1

]

the first kind of teacher1 [RC that John said that Mary had ever become

1

]

ii. * the first kind of teacher1 [RC that John ever said that Mary had become

1

]

d. Predicate nominals
i.

3
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Therefore, analogous to wh-movement, a restrictive RC can successfully be formed on a Π-position
only when the movement step inside the RC does not shift scope. When it does shift scope, it
patterns as a T-movement in that such extraction from a Π-position is ungrammatical. 50
Turning to appositive RCs, the relativized element cannot take scope in the embedded gap
position. For example, in (131), two patients cannot take scope below every doctor, unlike its
restrictive RC counterpart in (124). Consequently, (131) is only true in a situation where exactly two
patients were telephoned.
(131) I telephoned the two patients1 , [RC who/which every doctor will examine

1

].

3

two ≫ every; *every ≫ two

Moreover, scope-bearing adjectival modifiers cannot take scope inside the RC at all. For example,
in (132), first cannot refer to the first saying or the first writing; rather, it must refer to the first of
something in the matrix clause or the context.
(132) the first book1 , [RC which John said Tolstoy had written

1

]

Facts like (131) and (132), in concert with other facts not discussed here, are taken in the literature
to indicate that, despite their surface similarities, restrictive and appositive RCs bear a substantially
different relationship with their host than one another (starting with Ross 1967; Rodman 1972, 1976;
Emonds 1979; Jackendoff 1977; and continued by many others). While restrictive RCs attach to NP,
appositive RCs attach to DP (or potentially elsewhere; though see de Vries 2002, 2006). Thus, in

50 An unresolved question is whether or not restrictive-RC formation across a wh-island boundary is possible with
Π-positions. The example in (i) shows that a wh-island blocks the low reading of an adjectival modifier.

(i)

a.
b.

the first book1 [RC that John wondered [ whether Tolstoy had written
the only book1 [RC that John wondered [ whether Tolstoy had written

1
1

]]

3

]]

3

high; *low
high; *low

The prediction is that because wh-islands force wide scope and Π-positions force narrow scope, the two should be
mutually exclusive. The judgements are, however, not very clear (ii). Most of my consultants, myself included, find
them degraded, but not completely unacceptable. I do not have anything to say about this, but it highlights the need
for a more comprehensive judgement survey of RCs and Π-positions in the future.
(ii)

a. ??the books1 [RC that John wondered [ whether there were

1

on the table ] ]

b. ?the color1 [RC that John wondered [ whether Mary had painted the house

1

]]

c. ?the name1 [RC that John wondered [ whether Mary had nicknamed the cat

1

]]

d. ?the kind of teacher1 [RC that John wondered [ whether Mary had become

1

]]
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an appositive RC, what appears to be the “nominal head” is in fact not, which explains why two
patients in (131) and first book in (132) cannot take scope inside the RC.
There are a variety of other asymmetries between restrictive and appositive RCs that have been
documented in the literature in support of an appositive RC having a null head. I show two more
below, but the reader is referred to de Vries (2002:ch. 6) for a thorough list. First, a restrictive RC
allows the antecedent to receive an idiomatic interpretation that would only be licensed in the
embedded gap (133a), while an appositive RC blocks such interpretations (133b) (Vergnaud 1974;
Bianchi 1999).
(133) Only restrictive RCs allow idiomatic interpretations
a.

[Vergnaud 1974]

Restrictive RCs
3

The horrible face1 [RC that Harry made

1

at Peter ] scared him.

b. Appositive RCs
* The horrible face1 , [RC which Harry made

1

at Peter ], scared him.

Second, an anaphor in the antecedent can be bound by an R-expression inside the RC in a restrictive RC (134a), but not in an appositive RC (134b). 51 Italics indicate coreference.
(134) Only restrictive RCs allow anaphor binding
a.

[de Vries 2002:194]

Restrictive RCs
3

The picture of himself 1 [RC that John likes

1

] is on the wall.

b. Appositive RCs
* That portrait of himself 1 , [RC which John painted

1

last year ], is expensive.

Important for our purposes, however, is not what happens external to the RC, but what happens
internal to the RC, crucially at the embedded gap position. Following de Vries (2002, 2006), I assume
that appositive RCs are DPs headed by a null NP; this DP is then attached to the host DP. 52 The
relativized element moves from the embedded gap to the edge of the RC and then the null NP raises

51 A logophoric reading might be possible in (134b), but this would require a sufficient context to license such an
interpretation. Out of the blue, (134b) is ungrammatical.

52 De Vries (2002, 2006) proposes that the attachment is a special kind of coordination, thus making the appositive RC
and its host a syntactic constituent. However, the structure in (135) is compatible with more articulated semantic
theories of appositive RCs and their attachment in Potts (2005) or Schlenker (2010, 2013), which are not dependent
on the internal structure of the RC.
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to form the null nominal head, as schematized in (135). Under this proposal, the internal syntax of
restrictive and appositive RCs is the same, which would explain, e.g., why they always share the
same clause type within a language.
(135) Structure of appositive RCs
[DP ∅NP λ1 [CP [ which ∅NP ] . . . [ . . . [ which ∅NP ] . . . ] ] ]

In the process of forming an appositive RC, it is the movement step to the edge of the RC that
“shifts scope”. At this point in the exposition, it may not be clear what it means for something null
to shift scope. This will become more explicit in the next section: it leaves a type e variable.
In summary, restrictive and appositive RCs mirror the asymmetry between wh-movement and
topicalization: Restrictive-RC formation optionally shifts scope, but when it targets a Π-position,
scope shifting is blocked (136). Appositive-RC formation obligatorily shifts scope, thereby rendering
Π-positions completely inaccessible targets (137).
(136) Restrictive relative clauses
a.

[DP NP λ1 [CP

1

. . . [ . . . 3 1 . . . ] ] ] ↝ Can target Π-positions

b. [DP NP λ1 [CP 3 1 . . . [ . . .

(137) Appositive relative clauses
[DP NP λ1 [CP 3 1 . . . [ . . . *

1

1

. . . ] ] ] ↝ Cannot target Π-positions

. . . ] ] ] ↝ Cannot target Π-positions

2.4.4 Tough-constructions
In a tough-construction, the surface subject of the tough-predicate, i.e. the tough-subject, cannot
reconstruct for scope into the corresponding embedded gap position (e.g. Postal 1974; Epstein
1989; Fleisher 2013; Poole et al. 2017). I will review three arguments for this conclusion below.
I will sidestep the issue of whether the tough-subject is directly linked to the embedded gap via
movement or whether it is indirectly linked via a null operator that undergoes movement to the
edge of the embedded infinitival clause. Chomsky (1977) shows that the dependency schematized
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in (138) invokes at least a step of A-movement within the embedded clause. Thus, we can ask, in a
theory-neutral sense, whether this (movement) dependency allows scope reconstruction—and it
does not. 53
(138)

Alex1 is tough [ to please

1

].

tough-dependency

First, it is well-known that an indefinite tough-subject cannot take scope below the toughpredicate, unlike canonical A-raising, as shown in (139) (Postal 1974; Epstein 1989).
(139) No reconstruction for scope of indefinites
a.

A-raising
Someone1 seems to be sick

3

some ≫ seems; 3seems ≫ some

1.

b. Tough-constructions
Someone1 was difficult to please

1.

3

some ≫ difficult; *difficult ≫ some

Second, the tough-subject cannot be interpreted opaquely with respect to the tough-predicate (140a),
i.e. it lacks a de dicto reading (Poole et al. 2017). For comparison, a de dicto reading is available
in the corresponding expletive construction (140b), and other types of A-movement allow for
reconstruction of world-variable binding (140c).
(140) No reconstruction for world-variable binding
a.

Tough-constructions
[ A unicornw 0,∗w 1 ]2 was easyw 1 for Alex to ride

3transparent; *opaque

2.

b. Expletive constructions
3transparent; 3opaque

It was easyw 1 for Alex to ride a unicornw 0,w 1 .
c.

Wh-movement
[ Which unicornw 0,w 1 ]2 did Alex wantw 1 Sue to ride

2?

3transparent; 3opaque

Third, in a how many-question, if the quantity expression is the tough-subject, it cannot take
embedded scope below the tough-predicate (141) (Fleisher 2013; Poole et al. 2017).

53 The arguments showing that the tough-subject cannot reconstruct are often taken as arguments for the basegeneration analysis of tough-constructions. The logic is straightforward: if there is no movement chain linking the
embedded gap to the tough-subject, there is no means for the tough-subject to reconstruct into the embedded gap
position. Though I am partial to such arguments (see Keine and Poole to appear), the tough-subject not being able to
reconstruct is a fact, which is independent of the correct analysis of tough-constructions.
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(141) No reconstruction for scope of how many
a.

3

how many ≫ easy; *easy ≫ how many

Tough-constructions

[ How many books ]1 are easy for the company to publish

1?

3

how many ≫ easy; 3easy ≫ how many

b. Expletive constructions

[ How many books ]1 is it easy for the company to publish

1?

In sum, (139)–(141) show that the tough-subject cannot reconstruct into the embedded gap position of
a tough-construction. Thus, like topicalization, this pattern can be described as tough-construction
formation “obligatorily shifting scope” (142).
(142) Tough-constructions
[ 3 1 is tough [ . . . *

1

. . . ] ] ↝ Cannot target Π-positions

tough-dependency

(143) Tough-construction formation cannot target a Π -position
a.

Existential constructions
* [ A potato ]1 was impossible [ for there to be

1

in the pantry ].

(=29f)

b. Change-of-color verbs
* Magenta1 was fun [ (for Megan) to paint the house
c.

1

].

(=35f)

Naming verbs
* Snowflake1 was fun [ (for Irene) to call the cat

1

].

(=47f)

d. Predicate nominals
* [ A teacher ]1 was tough [ (for Erika) to become

2.4.5

1

].

(=56f)

Section summary

This section has shown that T-movements shift scope obligatorily, while W-movements shift scope
only optionally. Crucially, W-movements cannot shift scope when they target Π-positions. This
generalization is summarized in (144).
(144) Scope generalization
Movement that shifts scope cannot target Π-positions.
The scope generalization makes an important advance from Postal (1994): the distinction between
W-movements and T-movements is not an absolute distinction. It is not the case, as assumed in
Postal (1994), that W-movements can invariably target Π-positions. Rather, they can only target
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Π-positions when they do not shift the scope of the moved element. This crucially changes the empirical puzzle from how Postal characterizes it (in addition to Stanton 2016). Instead of being about
an arbitrary distinction between types of movement—i.e. some types can target Π-positions and
others cannot—the Π-position asymmetry is about individual steps of movement, namely whether
that movement step reconstructs. Because T-movements always shift scope and cannot reconstruct,
no instance of a T-movement can ever target Π-positions. On the other hand, W-movements shift
scope only optionally. Only when an instance of a W-movement reconstructs and does not shift
scope, can it target a Π-position. Although whether a given movement type can reconstruct is
not yet explained, (144) nevertheless allows us to describe W-movements and T-movements in
terms independent from the Π-position asymmetry itself. More importantly, (144) shows us that the
correct analysis of the Π-position asymmetry does not rest on a categorical distinction between
W-movements and T-movements because such an analysis is unable to draw a distinction within
W-movements. As will be discussed in section 2.6, this is problematic for the existing analyses
in Postal (1994) and Stanton (2016) because they are based on the premise that the Π-position
asymmetry diagnoses a distinction between movement types.

2.5

Analysis of the Π-position asymmetry

Against the backdrop of the two novel generalizations advanced in sections 2.3 and 2.4, we are now
in a position to account for the Π-position asymmetry. The two generalizations will serve as the
foundation of the analysis. The property generalization provides an independent characterization
of what makes an environment a Π-position (145a). The scope generalization answers what
characterizes movement that cannot target Π-positions, which encompasses the distinction between
W-movements and T-movements (145b).
(145)

Π-position Generalizations
a.

Property generalization
DPs in Π-positions must denote properties (semantic type ⟨e, t⟩).

b. Scope generalization
Movement that shifts scope cannot target Π-positions.
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The section proceeds as follows: Section 2.5.1 lays out the proposal. In section 2.5.2, I walk through
some derivations to explicitly illustrate how the proposal accounts for the Π-position asymmetry.
Section 2.5.3 argues that the Π-position asymmetry reveals that movement cannot map onto traces
ranging over properties. Section 2.5.4 discusses interpreting quantificational DPs in Π-positions.

2.5.1

Proposal

To begin developing the proposal, let us first consider the interpretation of movement. The standard
semantic mechanism for interpreting movement is to replace the launching site with a variable
and insert a λ-abstraction binding this variable immediately below the landing site, as schematized
in (146) (e.g. Beck 1996; Heim and Kratzer 1998; Sauerland 1998).

(146) [ every book [ λx e [ some student read x e ] ] ]

every ≫ some

The λ-abstraction will force the moving element to take scope in the landing site. Moreover, because
the variable left behind by movement is semantic type e, if the moving element is a generalized
quantifier, the λ-abstraction binding the type-e variable will force the quantification to have scope
in the landing site of movement. Thus, for example, in (146), every book takes scope above some
student because movement lands above some student.
What about movement that does not shift scope? Movement that does not shift scope instead
reconstructs. Reconstruction means that the moved element behaves as if that movement has
been undone at LF. There are a handful of theories about how reconstruction obtains. I will assume
the copy-theoretic approach to reconstruction wherein reconstruction means that the lower copy
but not the higher copy is interpreted at LF (Chomsky 1993, 1995b); see section 3.2.1 of chapter 3.
Under the Copy Theory of Movement, movement creates copies in both the launching and landing
sites of movement. The scope-shifted meaning comes about by interpreting the higher copy using
the λ-abstraction–variable relation discussed above (147a), while the reconstructed meaning comes
about by interpreting only the lower copy and ignoring the higher copy (147b). 54

54 The example in (147) is overly simplistic, but serves for illustration. More will need to be said about replacing the
lower copy with a variable and about interpreting quantificational DPs that reconstruct; see chapter 3.
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(147) Copy Theory of Movement
[ [ every book ] [ some student read [ every book ] ] ]
a.

Interpret higher copy ⇒ Scope-shifted meaning
[ every book [ λx e [ some student read x e ] ] ]

every ≫ some

b. Interpret lower copy ⇒ Reconstructed meaning
[ every book [ some student read every book ] ]

some ≫ every

Turning to Π-positions, the type-e trace required for scope-shifting movement is incompatible
with Π-positions because it does not provide the property meaning (⟨e, t⟩) that is expected by
Π-positions. This semantic-type mismatch in turn yields ungrammaticality, thereby preventing
scope-shifting movement from targeting Π-positions (148). On the other hand, because movement
that does not shift scope reconstructs, if a DP would not ordinarily violate the property requirement
of Π-positions, then it will not do so under reconstruction either (149).
(148) Scope shifting ⇏ Π -positions

(149) Reconstruction ⇒ Π -positions

*[ DP1 λx e . . . [ . . . [ x e ]Π-pos . . . ] ]

3

[

1

. . . [ . . . [ DP1 ]Π-pos . . . ] ]
reconstruct

type e trace

According to this analysis, Π-positions are an instance where movement must reconstruct in order
to avoid a semantic-type mismatch that would occur if the moved DP were not interpreted in its
base-generated position. T-movements are thus unable to target a Π-position at all, as sketched
in (150), because they cannot reconstruct. 55
(150) T-movements
a.

Topicalization
*[TopicP DP1 λx e [ Topic . . . [ . . . [ x e ]Π-pos . . . ] ] ]

b. Appositive relative clauses
*[DP NP λ1 [CP DP1 λx e . . . [ . . . [ x e ]Π-pos . . . ] ] ]

55 In (150b) and (151b), the λ-abstraction created external to the RC binds the relativized element that itself saturates a

λ-abstraction that binds the lowermost copy; this is the standard procedure of interpreting cyclic movement. Moreover, following the discussion in section 2.4.4, (150c) abstracts over the underlying derivation of tough-constructions.
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c.

Tough-constructions
*[ DP1 λx e [ is tough [ . . . [ x e ]Π-pos . . . ] ] ]

W-movements, on the other hand, can target a Π-position, but to do so, they must reconstruct into
that Π-position, as sketched in (151).
(151) W-movements
a.

Wh-movement
i.

3

[Q

1

. . . [ . . . [ DP1 ]Π-pos . . . ] ]
reconstruct

ii. * [ Q DP1 λx e . . . [ . . . [ x e ]Π-pos . . . ] ]
b. Restrictive relative clauses
reconstruct

i.

3

[DP NP λ1 [CP

1

. . . [ . . . [ DP1 ]Π-pos . . . ] ] ]

ii. * [DP NP λ1 [CP DP1 λx e . . . [ . . . [ x e ]Π-pos . . . ] ] ]

Unlike Postal’s (1994) analysis of Π-positions, this analysis does not appeal to separate primitive
movement operations. Rather, the Π-position asymmetry follows from the property-type requirement of Π-positions being incompatible with the type-e variable that a step of scope-shifting
movement leaves in the Π-position at LF. Thus, the syntactic uniformity of A-movement is preserved. Of course, whether a given movement type can reconstruct is still unexplained. Though
any analysis of movement types will have to stipulate this fact irrespective of Π-positions, more
importantly, as shown in section 2.4, reconstruction crosscuts movement types. Assigning separate
primitive operations to T-movements and W-movements cannot capture this pattern, in particular
that W-movements cannot target Π-positions when they do not reconstruct.
The property and scope generalizations are in fact interconnected: It is precisely because
Π-positions host property-type DPs that they cannot be targeted by scope-shifting movement.
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That is, the property generalization implies the scope generalization. Therefore, the restriction on
Π-positions can be stated more generally as the constraint in (152). 56
(152)

Π-position Restriction
*[ x ]Π-pos , where x is an element of type e

(152) has the advantage of being more general than a constraint on movement itself. Thus, in addition
to accounting for the movement asymmetry, it captures why Π-positions are antipronominal: weak
pronouns like it cannot denote a property and hence violate the constraint in (152). Strong pronouns
like that, on the other hand, face no such problem because they can denote a property. As mentioned
in section 2.3.4, this fact can be observed independently using the verb consider, whose second
argument must denote a property. While a weak pronoun is ungrammatical with consider, a strong
pronoun is not (153).
(153) Weak pronouns cannot denote a property

(=96)
3

Donald thinks that he is a success, but no one else considers him { that / *it }.
Despite the fact that we can observe this fact independently of Π-positions, there still needs to
be some kind of explanation for why strong but not weak pronouns can have property meanings.
This question will be taken up in chapter 4. Nevertheless, an important point that I wish to draw
attention to here is that once we establish that Π-positions denote properties, we in fact expect
the movement asymmetry discovered by Postal (1994) to manifest in exactly the way that it does
because the semantics of scope-shifting movement violates the Π-position Restriction in (152),
i.e. the semantics of propertyhood and the semantics of scope-shifting movement are inherently
incompatible.
An interesting question that arises from this analysis is why DPs that would appear to be
semantic type e, e.g. definite descriptions, can occur in Π-positions, as they should violate the
Π-position Restriction. This problem is illustrated in (154) with a list existential, which, unlike
ordinary, run-of-the-mill existential constructions, allows definite descriptions to be the pivot
(Milsark 1974, 1977; McNally 1992, 1997).

56 The Π-position Restriction in (152) bears a strong resemblance to Heim’s (1987) formulation of the Definiteness
Restriction. Thus, (152) can be seen as a superset of her generalization.
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(154) Definite descriptions in Π -positions
A: What food is left in the pantry?
B: Well, there is the potato.
This puzzle will be discussed in chapter 4, where it serves as the point of departure for motivating
the Trace Rigidity Principle, according to which traces cannot be type shifted. The short answer is
that these DPs are not type e, but actually type ⟨e, t⟩, a denotation that they achieve via nominal
type shifting (in the sense of Partee 1986). I will argue that while most DPs can be type shifted into
the property meaning required by Π-positions, a certain class of DPs cannot, and this class of DPs
crucially includes traces.

2.5.2

Illustrating the proposal

This section illustrates how the proposal from section 2.5.1 accounts for the Π-position asymmetry
by looking at derivations of examples that instantiate the ungrammatical schema in (148) and the
grammatical schema in (149). Before proceeding, however, I briefly walk through how leaving a trace
of type e forces a moved DP to take scope in the landing site of movement, while reconstruction
forces it to take scope in the launching site of movement. This will be familiar to many readers;
they may skip directly to the derivations involving Π-positions.
Let us start by considering the how many-question in (155), the example used in section 2.4.2 to
illustrate that wh-movement optionally shifts scope. (155) has both a wide-scope and a narrow-scope
reading. In the wide-scope reading, how many books takes scope over the modal should (155a); this
is the scope-shifted reading. In the narrow-scope reading, how many books takes scope in its base
position, below should (155b); this is the reconstructed, non-scope-shifted reading.
(155) [ How many books ]1 should Nina read
a.

1

this summer?

(=106)
how many ≫ should

Wide-scope reading

For what number n: There are n-many particular books x such that Nina should read x
this summer.
b. Narrow-scope reading

should ≫ how many

For what number n: It is necessary for there to be n-many books x such that Nina reads
x this summer.
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For the purposes of illustration, let us adopt a simple choice-function semantics for constituent
questions and how many. First, the wh-phrase introduces a choice function, which is a function that,
when applied to a nonempty set, returns a member of that set (Reinhart 1997). Because, for a given
set, there are at least as many choice functions over that set as there are elements in it, the resulting
question meaning is equivalent to the standard Hamblin/Karttunen question semantics wherein
questions denote sets of propositions that are possible answers to that question (Hamblin 1973;
Karttunen 1977). Existential closure applies to the choice function introduced by the wh-phrase.
Therefore, the constituent question in (156a) has the denotation in (156b). The set of answers will
be functions that return a cat from the set of all cats. 57
(156) Choice-function semantics for constituent questions
1?

a.

[ Which cat ]1 did Mary adopt

b.

λw 0 λp⟨s,t ⟩ . ∃f cf [p = λw . Mary adopted f (cat) in w]
Paraphrase: What is the (choice) function f such that the following proposition is true:
Mary adopted the x picked out by f from the set of cats.

A syntacticized version of the choice-function semantics is given in (157), where the question
operator Q handles the existential closure and the question formation (the p = q part). For the sake
of simplicity, I will assume that Q is inserted at the top of the structure and has a means of ensuring
that it targets the choice function introduced by the wh-phrase; see section 3.3.4 of chapter 3 for a
more thorough implementation in terms of Cable’s (2007, 2010) Q-particle.
(157) Syntacticized choice-function semantics
a.

⟦which NP⟧ = λw . f (⟦NP⟧ (w))

b. ⟦Q⟧ = λq ⟨s,t ⟩ λw 0 λp⟨s,t ⟩ . ∃f cf [p = q]
Second, following Hackl (2001), many is an existential quantifier with an extra argument for a
degree, where the degrees being measured are cardinalities (158a). Let us assume that how ranges
over degrees (158b) and serves as the argument to many (158c).

57 Semantic types: e for entities, s for situations/worlds, d for degrees, and t for truth values. I assume the following

notational conventions: w and s are of type s, w 0 is reserved for the world of evaluation, f cf is a choice function f ,
and στ abbreviates ⟨σ, τ⟩. I mark predicates taking plural arguments with the ∗ -operator. For readability, I abbreviate
modal denotations, e.g. shouldw (p) ⇔ ∀w ′ [w ′ ∈ f (w) → p(w ′ )], where f projects a modal domain.
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(158) Semantics of ‘how many’ questions
a.

⟦many⟧ = λnd λP⟨e,st ⟩ λQ⟨e,st ⟩ λw . ∃x[#x = n ∧ P(x)(w) ∧ Q(x)(w)]

b. ⟦how⟧ = f (Dd )
c.

(where Dd is the domain of degrees)

⟦how many⟧ = ⟦many⟧ (⟦how⟧)
= λP⟨e,st ⟩ λQ⟨e,st ⟩ λw . ∃x[#x = f (Dd ) ∧ P(x)(w) ∧ Q(x)(w)]

Let us start with the reconstructed reading. (159) shows the reconstructed derivation of (155b),
where how many books takes narrow scope in the launching site of wh-movement, which is also
its base-generated position. Note that because (155) involves modality, generalized quantifiers
are treated as type ⟨⟨e, st⟩, st⟩. I have also glossed over two details unimportant for the present
purposes: the semantic composition of read and how many 58 and the subject-related A-movement
of Nina from [Spec, vP] to [Spec, TP].
(159) Reconstructed derivation of (155)

should ≫ how many

CP
Q

CP

DP
how many books

TP
vP

T
should

vP

DP
Nina
v

VP
V
read

DP
D
NP
how many books

a.

∗
⟦how many books⟧ = λQ⟨e,st ⟩ λw . ∃x[#x = f (Dd ) ∧ bookw
(x) ∧ Q(x)(w)]

∗
∗
b. ⟦vP⟧ = λw . ∃x[#x = f (Dd ) ∧ bookw
(x) ∧ readw
(x)(Nina)]

c.

∗
∗
⟦TP⟧ = λw . shouldw (λw ′ . ∃x[#x = f (Dd ) ∧ bookw
′ (x) ∧ readw ′ (x)(Nina)])

58 It may be the case that how many books has to move to an intermediate position to be interpreted, e.g. [Spec, vP]
or that read must be lifted to a higher type to combine with a generalized quantifier.
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∗
d. ⟦CP⟧ = λw 0 λp⟨s,t ⟩ . ∃f cf [p = λw . shouldw (λw ′ . ∃x[#x = f (Dd ) ∧ bookw
′ (x) ∧
∗
readw
′ (x)(Nina)])]

Paraphrase: What is the choice function f such that the following proposition is true:
In every modal alternative where what should happen does, there are n-many books x,
where n is a degree picked out by f , such that Nina reads x.
In (159), how many books undergoes wh-movement to [Spec, CP], where it is eventually pronounced
at PF. At LF, however, the higher copy is not interpreted, only the lower copy; hence, how many
books reconstructs. The semantic derivation in (159) proceeds as follows: First, how many books
introduces a choice function ranging over degrees that serve as cardinalities (159a). Second, how
many books composes with read and Nina to yield the proposition “There are n-many books x such
that Nina reads x” (159b). Third, should takes this proposition as its argument (159c). Fourth, the
question operator Q applies existential closure over the choice function f and forms the question
nucleus using the proposition denoted by TP (159d). In the end result, how many scopes below
should, thereby deriving the reconstructed reading.
(160) shows the scope-shifted derivation of (155a), where how many books takes wide scope
with respect to the modal should, in the landing site of wh-movement in [Spec, CP]. The important
difference to pay attention to between (159) and (160) is that (160) invokes a λ-abstraction–variable
relation (i.e. a trace) between the launching and landing sites of movement. This in turn requires
that we consider the assignment function д. The relation between Q and the wh-phrase remains
identical to as before in (159), except now the wh-phrase is interpreted in the landing site of
movement.
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(160) Scope-shifted derivation of (155)

how many ≫ should

CP
Q

1

DP
how many books

2
λ1

TP
vP

T
should

vP

DP
Nina
v

VP
V
read

a.

t1

⟦t 1 ⟧д = д(1)

∗
(д(1))(Nina)
b. ⟦vP⟧д = λw . readw

c.

∗
⟦TP⟧д = λw . shouldw (λw ′ . readw
′ (д(1))(Nina))
д

∗
d. ⟦ 2 ⟧ = λx e λw . shouldw (λw ′ . readw
′ (x)(Nina))

e.

∗
(x) ∧ Q(x)(w)]
⟦how many books⟧ = λQ⟨e,st ⟩ λw . ∃x[#x = f (Dd ) ∧ bookw

f.

∗
∗
⟦ 1 ⟧ = λw . ∃x[#x = f (Dd ) ∧ bookw
(x) ∧ shouldw (λw ′ . readw
′ (x)(Nina))]

д

∗
(x) ∧
g. ⟦CP⟧д = λw 0 λp⟨s,t ⟩ . ∃f cf [p = λw . ∃x[#x = f (Dd ) ∧ bookw
∗
shouldw (λw ′ . readw
′ (x)(Nina))]]

Paraphrase: What is the choice function f such that the following proposition is true:
There are n-many books x, where n is a degree picked out by f , such that in every
modal alternative where what should happen does, Nina reads x.
In (160), how many books undergoes wh-movement to [Spec, CP], just as it did in the narrow-scope
derivation. However, at LF, it is the higher copy that is interpreted, instead of the lower copy. This
involves interpreting the lower copy as a variable that is bound by a λ-abstraction inserted directly
below the landing site of movement. The semantic derivation in (160) thus proceeds as follows:
First, the lower copy of how many books is interpreted as an assignment-dependent variable (160a).
Second, the trace composes with read and Nina to yield the assignment-dependent proposition
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“Nina read д(1)”, where д(1) is what the assignment returns for the index 1 (160b). Third, should
takes this proposition as its argument (160c). Fourth, the λ-abstraction created by movement maps
the index 1 to the λ-bound variable x (160d). Fifth, how many books takes 2 as its argument (160f).
Last, the question operator Q applies existential closure over the choice function f and forms the
question nucleus using the proposition denoted by 1 (160g). In the end result, how many scopes
above should, thereby deriving the shifted-scope reading.
Now that we have seen how a trace (i.e. λ-abstraction–variable relation) and reconstruction
respectively yield the scope-shifted and non-scope-shifted readings, let us turn to Π-positions.
Recall from section 2.4.2 that, even though how many-questions in principle have both narrowscope and wide-scope readings, only the narrow-scope reading survives when how many originates
in a Π-position, i.e. reconstruction is obligatory. Consider the existential construction in (161) in
which how many books only has a narrow-scope reading.
(161) [ How many books ]1 should there be

1

on the table?
*how many ≫ should; 3should ≫ how many

Before looking at the two logically possible derivations of (161), we need to make one simplifying
assumption, namely that how many books has the property denotation in (162a), in addition to its
ordinary generalized-quantifier denotation in (162b). In chapter 4, I will argue that the property
denotation is derived from the generalized-quantifier denotation via nominal type shifting (in the
sense of Partee 1986), but we will take it as an assumption for now. Again, as we dealing with
modality, I treat properties as type ⟨e, st⟩ to simplify the derivation.
(162) a.

Property denotation (via type shifting)
∗
⟦how many books⟧ = λx e λw . #x = f (Dd ) ∧ bookw
(x)

b. Generalized-quantifier denotation
∗
⟦how many books⟧ = λQ⟨e,st ⟩ λw . ∃x[#x = f (Dd ) ∧ bookw
(x) ∧ Q(x)(w)]

(163) shows the reconstructed derivation of (161)—the only grammatical derivation—where
how many books takes narrow scope in the launching site of wh-movement, i.e. the Π-position. 59

59 (163) places the expletive there in [Spec, vP] and essentially treats it as a scope marker (see Williams 1983). Nothing
critical hinges on this choice, it is purely for expository purposes; though, see Deal (2009) for arguments that there is
in fact generated low.
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Therefore, although the wh-phrase moves to [Spec, CP] and is eventually pronounced there, only
the lower copy is interpreted at LF, thereby yielding reconstruction.
(163) Reconstructed derivation of (161)
CP
Q

CP

DP
how many books

TP
vP

T
should

vP

DP
there
v

VP
V
be

1
DP

PP
on the table

D
NP
how many books
a.

∗
(x)
⟦on the table⟧ = λx e λw . on-the-tablew

∗
∗
(x)
b. ⟦ 1 ⟧ = λx e λw . #x = f (Dd ) ∧ bookw
(x) ∧ on-the-tablew

c.

∗
∗
(x)]
(x) ∧ on-the-tablew
⟦vP⟧ = λw . ∃x[#x = f (Dd ) ∧ bookw

∗
∗
d. ⟦TP⟧ = λw . shouldw (λw ′ . ∃x[#x = f (Dd ) ∧ bookw
′ (x) ∧ on-the-tablew ′ (x)])

e.

∗
⟦CP⟧ = λw 0 λp⟨s,t ⟩ . ∃f cf [p = λw . shouldw (λw ′ . ∃x[#x = f (Dd ) ∧ bookw
′ (x) ∧
∗
on-the-tablew
′ (x)])]

Paraphrase: What is the choice function f such that the following proposition is true:
In every modal alternative where what should happen does, there are n-many books on
the table, where n is a degree picked out by f .
The semantic derivation in (163) proceeds as follows: First, how many books composes with on
the table via predicate conjunction, as both are type ⟨e, st⟩ (163b). Second, the property denoted
by 1 feeds the existential semantics, which I have treated as simple existential closure for the
sake of illustration (163c). Third, the resulting proposition serves as the argument of should (163d).
Last, the question operator Q applies existential closure over the choice function f and forms the
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question nucleus (163e). In the end result, how many scopes below should, thereby deriving the
reconstructed reading.
(164) shows the scope-shifted derivation of (161), where how many books takes wide scope in the
landing site of wh-movement, above the modal should. At LF, the higher copy is fully interpreted,
while the lower copy is interpreted as a variable bound by a λ-abstraction inserted immediately
below the landing site. This variable is semantic type e and therefore cannot feed into the semantics
of existential constructions, which requires a property; see section 2.3.1. In the case of (164), when
the type e variable combines with the PP on the table, the result is not a property—in fact, the
variable saturates on the table, returning a proposition. Consequently, the structure in (164) is
ungrammatical.
(164) Scope-shifted derivation of (161)
CP

*
Q

1

DP
how many books

2
λ1

TP
vP

T
should

vP

DP
there
v

VP
V
be

3 7 Not a property
t1
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PP
on the table

2.5.3

No property traces

We can and should ask why movement out of Π-positions, as in (164), cannot map onto a trace
ranging over properties, where the moved DP denotes either a property or a generalized quantifier
over properties, as schematized in (165).
(165) Property traces are ungrammatical
a. * [ DP⟨e,t ⟩

λf ⟨e,t ⟩ [ . . . f . . . ] ]

b. * [ DP⟨⟨et,t ⟩,t ⟩ λf ⟨e,t ⟩ [ . . . f . . . ] ]
Empirically, if (165a) and (165b) were not ungrammatical, they would derive the wrong scope facts;
see sections 2.2 and 2.4. Even in instances that involve apparent quantification over properties, these
quantifiers over properties cannot take scope over other scope-bearing elements in the sentence,
as shown in (166) for existential constructions.
(166) Quantificational pivots cannot scope high
a.

(=79)

There wasn’t every kind of doctor at the convention.

3

not ≫ every; *every ≫ not

b. There wasn’t only one kind of doctor at the convention.
3

not ≫ only one; *only one ≫ not

This unavailability of wide-scope is expected if (165b), where a generalized quantifier over properties
has undergone QR, is an unavailable representation. Moreover, if a trace ranging over properties is
unavailable in (165b), then we can generalize that it is also unavailable in (165a). Thus, what the
ungrammaticality of scope-shifting movement targeting Π-positions ultimately reveals is that the
syntax–semantics mapping does not permit movement to map onto property traces.
However, there are no logical reasons why a property trace should be blocked, given that our
semantic machinery can generate such LFs. Exploring this question will be the main topic of
chapter 3. I will show that the prohibition on property traces is part of the more general restriction
that movement can only map onto traces over individual semantic types, which I call the Trace
Interpretation Constraint (167).
(167)

Trace Interpretation Constraint
* [ DP1 λf σ . . . [ . . . [ f σ ]1 . . . ] ], where σ is not an individual type
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2.5.4

Quantificational DPs in Π-positions

An open question is how quantificational DPs are interpreted in Π-positions. To recapitulate,
sections 2.2, 2.4, and 2.5.3 provided abundant evidence that quantificational DPs in Π-positions
cannot be targeted by QR or other scope-shifting movement. This fact indicates that a standard
analysis where the quantificational DP undergoes QR in order to be interpreted is not feasible for
Π-positions. Thus, we are forced into an analysis where quantificational DPs in Π-positions are
interpreted in situ. 60 However, working out the precise mechanics behind this in situ process is
challenging, and I can only sketch an avenue towards an analysis here.
Let us briefly consider the types of quantificational DPs that can occur in Π-positions. They
divide into two classes. The first class are DPs in which the NP is headed by what Partee (1986)
terms an attribute noun, e.g. color, length, and size. Though Partee does not mention them,
we can also add nouns like name and nickname to the class of attribute nouns. Some examples of
attribute nouns in Π-positions are given in (168); (168d) is from Williams (1983) and is discussed in
Partee (1986).
(168) Attribute nouns in Π -positions
a.

There was [ every size of dress ]Π-pos at the store.

b. Megan painted the house [ every color ]Π-pos .
c.

Irene has called the cat [ every nickname ]Π-pos .

d. The house has been [ every color ]Π-pos .
Intuitively, attribute nouns express properties of properties. For example, ⟦color⟧ includes ⟦red⟧,
⟦green⟧, and ⟦blue⟧, which are themselves properties of objects in a given world. What is special
about attribute nouns is that they can occur in predicative contexts as bare DPs. For instance, as
shown in (169), they can occur as postnominal modifiers. 61

60 One possibility is that quantificational DPs in Π-positions can undergo QR, but only to a position that would not
affect scope. However, this solution is unsatisfactory because it would posit an arbitrary operation just like QR,
except not able to target any proposition-denoting node, like QR can.

61 Partee (1986) observes that there is considerable individual variation in judgements about attribute nouns, which
suggests that it is a fairly idiosyncratic lexical property. My own judgements mostly align with hers.
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(169) Attribute nouns as postnominal modifiers
a dress { that size / that color / that length / that price /
*that material / *that design / ?that pattern / *that origin }

[Partee 1986:133]

Attribute nouns can also occur in copula constructions, as shown in (170c). (170c) is particularly
instructive because the entities in ⟦color⟧ are colors, not shirts. In some sense, the meaning of
(170c) is a combination of the meanings of (170a) and (170b).
(170) Attribute nouns in copula constructions
a.

This shirt is blue.

b. Blue is a nice color.
c.

This shirt is a nice color.

[Partee 1986:133]

What (169) and (170) show is that it must be possible to utilize the extensions of attribute nouns
as properties, either because the objects in their extensions are properties or because they can be
converted into properties. We will return to this matter shortly.
The second class of quantificational DPs that can occur in Π-positions are kind-nominal
constructions, e.g. every kind of bird and birds of every kind. Kind-nominal constructions are
characterized by the inclusion of a kind-nominal, like kind, sort, and type. Some examples of
kind-nominal constructions in Π-positions are given in (171).
(171) Kind-constructions in Π -positions
a.

There was [ every kind of linguist ]Π-pos at the LSA.

b. Megan painted the house [ both shades of blue ]Π-pos .
c.

Erika had been [ every kind of teacher ]Π-pos at the elementary school.

Similar to attribute nouns, kind-nominal constructions express properties of properties (see Wilkinson 1991; Zamparelli 1995, 1998, 2000; Carlson 1977). For example, consider every kind of bird. Its
extension, i.e. ⟦every kind of bird⟧, intuitively includes things like ⟦sparrow⟧ and ⟦magpie⟧, which
are themselves properties of objects in a given world. It also intuitively includes things like “small
birds”, “large birds”, and “birds that my mother likes”, however one elects to represent these. This
begets the question of whether ⟦every kind of bird⟧ should range over kinds—in the technical
sense, for which I will use small caps to disambiguate. We will return to this question shortly, but
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it is worth pointing out that if kind-nominal constructions do range over kinds, what qualifies
as a kind would have to be broad and context-dependent, not just ‘natural kinds’ (Carlson 1977;
Wilkinson 1991; Chierchia 1998).
There are obvious similarities between attribute nouns and kind-nominal constructions, namely
that kind-nominals might belong to the class of attribute nouns. Wilkinson (1991) argues for
such a reduction (see also Zamparelli 1995, 2000). I will also assume such a reduction in what
follows, adopting Wilkinson (1991), but motivating it will take us too far afield because kindnominal constructions present many unrelated complications of their own. The reader is referred
to Wilkinson (1991) and Zamparelli (1995, 2000). Be that as it may, the quantificational DPs that can
occur in Π-positions are those whose extensions involve properties at some level of abstraction.
Against this backdrop, I present sketches of two possible analyses of quantificational DPs in
Π-positions. The analyses differ in how they model the denotations of attribute nouns and kindnominal constructions. Crucially, neither solution requires QR of the DP for it to be interpreted.
For the sake of simplicity, I focus on change-of-color-verbs, but both analyses generalize to the
other Π-positions as well.
The first analysis rests on two assumptions. First, it takes a very extensional view of attribute
nouns and kind-nominal constructions. The logic is that ⟦color⟧ includes things like ⟦red⟧ and
⟦blue⟧ (172a), and the extensions of these expressions are sets of entities (172b). Therefore, ⟦color⟧
includes these sets of entities as well (172c). In the same vein, kind of birds ranges over sets of
birds (173).
(172) Extension of attribute nouns
a.

⟦color⟧ = {⟦red⟧ , ⟦blue⟧ , . . .}

b. ⟦red⟧ = {Clifford, fire trucks, . . .}
c.

⟦color⟧ = {{Clifford, fire trucks, . . .}red , {Babe, blueberries, . . .}blue , . . .}

(173) Extension of kind-nominal constructions
⟦kind of birds⟧ = {{b1 ,b2 , . . .}sparrow , {b3 ,b4 , . . .}magpie , . . .}
Second, these sets of entities can be directly quantified over. Under this analysis, then, the quantifier
every has (174) as one of its denotations, which I represent as everyE .
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(174) Quantifier over sets
⟦everyE ⟧ = λP⟨⟨e,t ⟩,t ⟩ λQ⟨⟨e,t ⟩,t ⟩ . ∀E[P(E) → Q(E)]
The derivation of quantificational DPs in Π-positions under this proposal is illustrated in (175). The
analytical ‘trick’ in (175) is that because everyE quantifies over sets, its two arguments are sets of
sets, i.e. generalized quantifiers. This allows it to take the object directly as its argument. 62 For the
sake of simplicity, I depict the object as having been lifted into a generalized-quantifier meaning.
1

(175)
DP
every
a.

DP
the house
color

⟦everyE color⟧ = λQ⟨⟨e,t ⟩,t ⟩ . ∀E[color(E) → Q(E)]

b. ⟦the house⟧ = λP⟨e,t ⟩ . P(ιx[house(x)])
c.

⟦ 1 ⟧ = ∀E[color(E) → [λP⟨e,t ⟩ . P(ιx[house(x)])](E)]
= ∀E[color(E) → E(ιx[house(x)])]

This analysis is unsatisfactory because it assumes second-order quantification, which is controversial, and requires a new category–type correspondence. 63 However, it shows that in a very
extensional framework, quantificational DPs in Π-positions do not require much extra machinery.
The second analysis assumes that ⟦color⟧ and ⟦kind of birds⟧ range over kinds, or entity
correlates of properties (176)–(177). Because kinds cannot be directly predicated of other entities,
the predication relationship is instead established with Chierchia’s (1984) π-operator (178).
(176) Extension of attribute nouns
⟦color⟧ = {redk , bluek , greenk . . .}
(177) Extension of kind-nominal constructions
⟦kind of birds⟧ = {sparrowk , magpiek , peacockk . . .}

62 In existential constructions, the quantificational DP would take the copula or existential predicate as its argument.
63 The new category–type correspondence would not be terribly different from the [±A] feature that Partee (1986)
proposes for attribute nouns, though its ramifications would be more widespread in the grammar.
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(178) ⟦π⟧ = λx λy . π(y)(x)
(where π(y)(x) means to apply the property corresponding to y to x)

[Chierchia 1998]

The derivation of quantificational DPs in Π-positions under this proposal is illustrated in (179). The
upshot of the proposal is that it is much cleaner and only uses ordinary quantification over entities.
(179)

1
DP
every
a.

2
color

π

DP
the house

⟦every color⟧ = λQ⟨e,t ⟩ . ∀x[color(x) → Q(x)]

b. ⟦ 2 ⟧ = λy . π(y)(the house)
c.

⟦ 1 ⟧ = ∀x[color(x) → π(x)(the house)]

In summary, I have sketched two possible analyses of quantificational DPs in Π-positions, but
ultimately the problem of quantificational DPs in Π-positions remains an open problem. It is worth
pointing out that while the second analysis may look appealing, it does require a slight revision to
the characterization of Π-positions. Rather than being positions where DPs host properties, they
are positions that host DPs with property correlates. The effects of this recharacterization at the
moment are unclear and are left for future research.

2.6

Previous analyses

There are two previous accounts of the Π-position asymmetry: Postal (1994) and Stanton (2016).
Note that Stanton (2016) deals with different data, though data which parallel the environments
that Postal discovered. This section discusses these analyses against the backdrop of the enriched
empirical picture of Π-positions developed in this chapter. Both Postal (1994) and Stanton (2016)
base their analyses on antipronominality and a categorical distinction between W-movements and
T-movements. I will show that for these reasons, in particular the latter, their analyses are inferior
to the analysis developed in section 2.5.
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2.6.1

Postal (1994)

This section discusses Postal’s (1994) analysis of the Π-position asymmetry in light of the discoveries
made in this chapter. Some of these points have already been made in the preceding sections, so
there will be some repetition. Postal develops an analysis of the Π-position asymmetry based on
antipronominality. He proposes that W-movements and T-movements differ in what they leave
behind in the launching site of movement: W-movements leave a trace (180a), while T-movements
leave a covert resumptive pronoun (180b). Therefore, T-movements cannot target Π-positions
because what they leave behind, viz. a pronoun, violates antipronominality.
(180) Postal’s (1994) analysis of Π -positions
a.

W-movements leave a trace
3

What1 is there t 1 in the pantry?
W-mvt

b. T-movements leave a covert resumptive
* [ A potato ]1 , there is it1 in the pantry.
T-mvt

There are several problems with Postal’s analysis. First, as mentioned at the outset of this
chapter, Postal does not offer an explanation for why Π-positions are antipronominal. He treats it as
an arbitrary property that some syntactic environments happen to have. Thus, under his analysis,
the movement types that leave behind pronouns amount to a list. This in turns calls into question
accounting for the distinction between W-movements and T-movements in terms of pronouns.
It could be the case that what underlies the movement asymmetry also independently underlies
antipronominality—this is what I argued in section 2.5 in linking them both to the propertyhood
of Π-positions. Second, as mentioned in section 2.2.6, antipronominality does not encompass all
pronouns. In particular, it does not extend to strong pronouns like that. As shown in (181), that can
occur in Π-positions—excluding existential constructions, which are independently incompatible
with all pronouns due to the Definiteness Restriction. Thus, antipronominality is not as simple as a
ban on pronouns. 64

64 Postal (1994) does make the claim that antipronominality is only sensitive to weak pronouns, but his only example to
motivate this claim is the acceptability of It was her that they hired. He claims that her is in a predicate-nominal
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(181) Only weak pronouns trigger antipronominality
a.

Existential constructions
Gloria bought a potato, and there is { *it / *that } in the pantry.

b. Change-of-color verbs
Megan liked the color magenta, and she painted the house { *it / 3that }
c.

Naming verbs
Irene liked the name Snowflake, and she called the cat { *it / 3that }.

d. Predicate nominals
Erika wanted to become a teacher, and she became { *it / 3that }.
Third, being antipronominal does not entail being a Π-position. Postal himself observes that there
are syntactic environments that block pronouns, but nevertheless allow both W-movements and
T-movements, as shown in (182).
(182) Antipronominality does not entail being a Π -position
a.

Baseline
* Thuy attended the University of Minnesota, but Rodica did not attend it.

b. Wh-movement
3

c.

[ What university ]1 did Thuy attend

1

for her undergrad?

Topicalization
3

[ The University of Minnesota ]1 , Thuy attended

1

for her undergrad.

(182) undermines the simple analysis that Postal otherwise presents. If the reason that T-movements
cannot target Π-positions is that they violate antipronominality, then (182c) should be ungrammatical, contrary to fact. Postal responds to this problem by tweaking antipronominality so that
it is specifically a prohibition on covert resumptive pronouns—the things left behind by T-movements, and only T-movements—and that this asymmetrically entails prohibiting overt pronouns. 65
Robbing his analysis of its independent support, this amounts to little more than restating that
T-movements cannot target Π-positions.

position despite being a pronoun. However, this is very clearly a cleft construction, not a predicate-nominal position.
As such, I do not know exactly what he intends by this claim.

65 This revised version of antipronominality is Postal’s “wide” and “narrow” distinction in antipronominal contexts.
Narrow antipronominal contexts prohibit only overt pronouns, while wide antipronominal contexts (what I have
been calling Π-positions) prohibit both covert and overt pronouns.
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Because Postal’s analysis rests on a categorical distinction between movement types, it is
unable to account for the scope generalization from section 2.4. Admittedly, one may rescue
Postal’s analysis, on an analytical level, by saying that W-movements leave a covert resumptive
pronoun whenever they shift scope. The meanings of “trace” and “covert resumptive pronoun”
would still need substantiated on such an analysis. If “trace” were taken to mean reconstruction and
“covert resumptive pronoun” a type-e variable, the analysis arrived at would be equivalent to what
I proposed in section 2.5. Such an analysis is of course not what Postal proposes, and it would be
antithetical to the larger point of his paper. The central claim of Postal (1994) is that A-movement
is not uniform, contra Chomsky (1977). His logic is that because A-movement types divide into two
groups on some metric, namely whether they can target Π-positions, there must be two movement
primitives accounting for this division, and hence A-movement is not syntactically uniform. In this
chapter, I have shown that the relevant distinction for the Π-position asymmetry—reconstruction—
crosscuts movement types. Thus, one cannot draw the conclusion that the Π-position asymmetry
diagnoses a movement-type division in the A-domain. 66 Moreover, the analysis developed in
this chapter directly demonstrates that the Π-position asymmetry can be accounted for without
resorting to separate primitives. In particular, I have shown that the Π-position asymmetry is a
byproduct of two extraneous factors: (i) the semantic nature of Π-positions, viz. DPs in Π-positions
denote properties, and (ii) whether the movement step leaving the Π-position reconstructs. Under
my analysis, the syntactic uniformity of A-movement is preserved.

2.6.2

Stanton (2016)

Stanton (2016) analyzes a similar set of data to Postal’s (1994) in terms of antipronominality. Unlike
Postal, she provides an explanation for why the environments that she examines are antipronominal
and also tries to reduce the movement-type division to something else, namely the possibility
of pied-piping. There are a number of problematic aspects about the analysis in Stanton (2016),
which I will discuss, but the most severe problem is that it does not extend to the data from Postal

66 Regarding the A/A-distinction, there is a substantial body of literature arguing that the various distinctions between Amovement and A-movement follow from different extraneous factors, rather than two separate primitive operations;
see van Urk (2015) and Keine (2016) for recent overviews. The approach that I have pursued in this chapter to the
Π-position asymmetry is in the same vein.
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(1994) or the property and scope generalizations advanced in this chapter. However, the analysis
from section 2.5 can extend to her data without further ado.
Stanton discovers that some movement types cannot strand a preposition in a certain class of
temporal and locative PPs. The movement types that can and cannot preposition-strand divide into
what I have been calling W-movements and T-movements respectively. Let us start by considering
the data underlying her proposal. The first set of environments are temporal PPs. Temporal PPs
that select for “interval” DPs, e.g. Monday and 5:00pm, allow preposition-stranding when targeted
by W-movements, but not T-movements (183). This pattern contrasts with temporal PPs that select
for “event” DPs, e.g. John’s party and Christmas dinner, which allow preposition-stranding with
both W-movements and T-movements alike (184). 67
(183) Interval-selecting temporal PPs
a.

Baseline
3

John went swimming in December.

b. Wh-movement
3

[ Which month ]1 did John go swimming in

1?

ii. [ In which month ]1 did John go swimming

1?

i.

3

c.

Restrictive RC
3

The month1 [RC that John went swimming in

1

] was cold.

d. Topicalization
i. * December1 , John went swimming in

1.

3

ii. [ In December ]1 , John went swimming
e.

1.

Tough-construction
*December1 is tough [ to swim in

1

[Stanton 2016:90]

].

(184) Entity-selecting temporal PPs
a.

Baseline
3

We left after John’s talk.

b. Wh-movement
i.

3

[ Which talk ]1 are we leaving after

3

ii. [ After which talk ]1 are we leaving

1?
1?

67 The baselines and minimal pairs without preposition-stranding in (183)–(186), I came up with.
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c.

Restrictive RC
3

The talk1 [RC we’re leaving after

1

] should be really good.

d. Topicalization
i.

3

[ John’s talk ]1 , we’re leaving after

1.

3

ii. [ After John’s talk ]1 , we’re leaving
e.

1.

Tough-construction
3

[ John’s talk ]1 will be easy [ to leave after

1

[Stanton 2016:93]

].

The second set of environments are locative PPs. Locative PPs that select for “location” DPs,
e.g. the fourth floor and 10,000 feet, allow preposition-stranding when targeted by W-movements,
but not T-movements (185). 68 This pattern contrasts with locative PPs that select for “entity”
DPs, e.g. the forest and the box, which allow preposition-stranding with both W-movements and
T-movements (184).
(185) Location-selecting locative PPs
a.

Baseline
3

We found cake on the fourth floor.

b. Wh-movement
3

[ Which floor ]1 did we find cake on

1?

ii. [ On which floor ]1 did we find cake

1?

i.

3

c.

Restrictive RC
3

The floor1 [RC that we found cake on

1

] was deserted.

d. Topicalization
i. * [ The fourth floor ]1 , we found cake on
3

ii. [ On the fourth floor ]1 , we found cake
e.

1.
1.

Tough-construction
*[ The fourth floor ]1 is easy [ to find cake on

1

].

[Stanton 2016:97]

(186) Entity-selecting locative PPs
a.

Baseline
3

Michelle’s cat hid in the cardboard box.

68 The T-movements in (185) have grammatical readings where the fourth floor has an entity reading instead of a
location reading. For example, (185d) is grammatical if the (fourth) floor refers to the actual ground and not the level
of a building (here, I find the entity reading better without fourth). Thus, the preposition-stranding asymmetry
in (185) really depends on the interpretation of the DP.
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b. Wh-movement
i.

3

[ Which box ]1 did Michelle’s cat hide in

1?

ii. [ In which box ]1 did Michelle’s cat hide

1?

3

c.

Restrictive RC
3

The box1 [RC that Michelle’s cat hid in

1

] was made of cardboard.

d. Topicalization
i.

3

[ That cardboard box ]1 , Michelle’s cat hid in

1.

ii. [ In that cardboard box ]1 , Michelle’s cat hid

1.

3

e.

Tough-construction
3

[ Cardboard boxes ]1 are easy [ for cats to hide in

1

[Stanton 2016:91]

].

The parallels with the Π-position asymmetry are fairly straightforward, so we might consider
PPs selecting for interval and location DPs to be Π-positions. Stanton observes that like Postal’s
Π-positions, interval and location DPs are antipronominal, but only in these PPs and not in other
positions (187). Thus, as with Π-positions, what is special is the position. The event and entity DP
counterparts are not subject to antipronominality (188).
(187) Interval-selecting and location-selecting PPs are antipronominal
a. * John visited his family in June, and Mary visited her family in it, too.
b. * I ate dinner on the fourth floor, and John ate dinner on it, too.
c.

3

I spent June at the pool, but John spent it in his office.

[Stanton 2016:92, 96]

(188) Event-selecting and entity-selecting PPs are not antipronominal
a.

3

I left after John’s party, and Mary left after it, too.

b. 3 I ate dinner on the wooden table, and John ate dinner on it, too.

[Stanton 2016:92, 96]

The logic underlying Stanton’s (2016) analysis of the movement asymmetry in (183) and (185) is
identical to Postal’s logic: T-movements create a representation that violates antipronominality,
while W-movements do not.
Following Postal (1966) and Abney (1987) (amongst others), Stanton assumes that pronouns
are determiners that lack an NP complement (cf. Elbourne 2005). She proposes that prepositions
selecting for interval and location DPs have some kind of dependency with the NP in their DP
complement. A pronoun is unable to satisfy this dependency because, by definition, they are just
determiners, thereby giving rise to the antipronominal effect. Prepositions selecting for event
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and entity DPs, on the other hand, do not have this dependency and thus are not subject to
antipronominality. This in turn requires that some prepositions have two versions, one that selects
for an event/entity DP or one that selects for an interval/location DP, e.g. after and all the locative
prepositions. What is the NP relevant for this dependency? Stanton proposes that interval DPs
contain a silent nominal time and location DPs contain place (Kayne 2005). Thus, interval-selecting
and location-selecting prepositions require that their complements contain one of the respective
silent nominals, which she speculates is a “semantic requirement”. 69
According to Stanton, the movement asymmetry with these PPs is due to the NP being forced to
countercyclically late-merge after the DP has vacated [Comp, PP] via movement, thereby leaving
in [Comp, PP] what is equivalent to a pronoun and bleeding the preposition’s access to the NP.
Late Merge of NP is what Takahashi and Hulsey (2009) term Wholesale Late Merger (WLM).
Under Stanton’s analysis, the asymmetry between W-movements and T-movements is derived
from WLM being obligatory with T-movements and prohibited with W-movements. Working
within an optimality-theoretic syntax, Stanton proposes that WLM is a violable preference such
that Merge prefers to apply as late as possible (189). 70
(189)

MergeLate
Assign one violation for each possible merge site x ′ whose mother node c–commands x,
where x is the position where NP is merged.

[Stanton 2016:107]

Following Takahashi and Hulsey (2009), WLM is constrained by the need for an NP to have Case,
formulated as the constraint GetCase in (190). For English, this “case” can in principle be either
abstract Case or morphological case, though I will assume that it is the former. WLM is possible as
long as the NP gets Case at some point in the derivation.
(190)

GetCase
Assign one violation if NP is caseless.

[Stanton 2016:107]

69 I do not know what Stanton intends by “semantic requirement”, and she does not elaborate on it.
70 I have reformulated her version of MergeLate so that it does not contain a conditional, which I am unsure how
Eval would handle.
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GetCase outranks MergeLate. Thus, the derivation prefers to merge an NP as late as possible,
while still being valued for Case. This preference interacts with how Case is assigned inside
PPs. Stanton proposes that PPs have a pP shell, where p can assign Case either via Agree or via
Spec–Head. This flexibility in Case assignment is crucial for her analysis.
For T-movements, the most harmonic derivation is the one where the NP is merged with D in
[Spec, pP]. From this position, the entire DP can be assigned Case by p in a Spec-Head configuration,
satisfying GetCase. This derivation is schematized in (191). The competing derivation where the
NP is merged in [Comp, PP], i.e. where there is no WLM, incurs one more violation of MergeLate
than the winning candidate (192).
(191) WLM derivation of a T-movement
Ê Move D to [Spec, pP].

CP
DP

Ë Late-merge the NP to D.

CP

Ì p assigns Case to DP.
D

NP

C

⋮
Í DP moves to [Spec, CP].
pP

⋮
Í
DP
D

pP

Ì
NP
Ë

p

PP
P

D

WLM

Ê
(192) GetCase ≫ MergeLate
GetCase
a.
b. +
c.

[pP [ D NP ]1 p [PP P [ D NP ]1 ] ]

n + 1 (W)

[pP [ D NP ]1 p [PP P [ D ]1 ] ]
[ [ D NP ]1 . . . [pP [ D ]1 p [PP P [ D ]1 ] ] ]

MergeLate
n

* (W)

n − 1 (L)

If the P head in (191) is one that selects for interval or location DPs, WLM of the NP in [Spec, pP]
means that the P head does not have access to the NP, resulting in ungrammaticality. Moreover,
because nothing comes between [Comp, PP] and [Spec, pP], except the heads themselves, (i) the NP
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will still trigger Condition C violations as expected and (ii) other factors like variable binding and
quantifier scope can never force the NP to be merged any lower. Consequently, with T-movements,
the NP will always be merged into the structure late, after D has moved to [Spec, pP].
For Stanton (2016), the crucial distinction between W-movements and T-movements is piedpiping. 71 W-movements target QPs and therefore allow pied-piping (following Cable 2007, 2010),
while T-movements instead only target DPs. 72 Stanton proposes that WLM into a QP is ruled out
because it is “too countercyclic”. To implement this proposal, she posits an additional constraint,
*TooLate in (193), which outranks MergeLate.
(193)

*TooLate
Assign one violation if the relationship established by late-merge is not the structurally
highest of its type.

[Stanton 2016:116]

According to *TooLate, an NP cannot be late-merged into a QP because NP merging with D
creates a complementation relationship which is not the structurally highest of its type within a
QP, since Q and DP also stand in a complementation relationship. For W-movements, *TooLate
thus forces the NP to be merged with D in [Comp, PP] (194). In this configuration, p assigns Case
to the entire DP via Agree. The competing derivation where the NP is late-merged in [Spec, pP]
violates *TooLate (195).

71 A problem that Stanton (2016) struggles with is that some T-movements allow pied-piping; see Stanton 2016:113–114.
72 In some respects, this proposal is similar to the one that I will advance in sections 3.3 and 3.4.1 of chapter 3 for
independent reasons. However, in my proposal, the relevant distinction between moving a QP and moving a DP
is how they are interpreted. That said, my analysis in chapter 3 faces the same pied-piping problem as Stanton’s
analysis that some T-movements allow pied-piping.
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(194) W-movement without WLM

(195) W-movement with WLM

pP

3

pP

QP
Q

p

DP
D

pP

*

NP

pP

QP
PP

P

Q
QP

Q

D
DP

p

DP
NP

PP
P

QP
Q

D

WLM

D

NP

*TooLate ensures that W-movements leave the P head with access to the NP. Thus, when the P head
in (194) is one that selects for interval or location DPs, it has access to the NP and yields a grammatical
derivation. In summary, according to Stanton’s analysis, the preposition-stranding asymmetry with
interval and location DPs results from the interplay of three constraints: MergeLate, GetCase, and
*TooLate. This interplay forces the NP to be late-merged with T-movements and not late-merged
with W-movements. Late-merging the NP in the case of T-movements leaves just a D head in
[Comp, PP], which is equivalent to a pronoun and thus violates antipronominality.
While the analysis in Stanton (2016) derives the preposition-stranding asymmetry, it faces both
empirical and theoretical problems. Let us start with the theoretical considerations. First, a minor
point, yet one still worth mentioning, is that her conception of Late Merge, which is pivotal for
her analysis, has no analogue in non-optimality-theoretic syntax. Even so, it is unclear why the
grammar would prefer to merge NPs late when it seems to prefer to do everything else as early as
possible (e.g. Pesetsky 1989). This conception of Late Merge is also quite different from what is
standardly assumed in the literature. Whereas traditionally Late Merge is forced in order to avoid
what would be an ungrammatical derivation, e.g. to obviate Condition C, Stanton’s Late Merge is
forced in order to avoid what would be a grammatical derivation, i.e. the NP being in [Comp, PP].
Second, there is no technically-definable domain for the constraint *TooLate. Stanton states
that the domain is the root node, but once the QP has merged with P, the QP is no longer a root
node. Relatedly, the relationship between p and its specifier is presumably a complementation
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relationship. Thus, it is unclear why *TooLate would not apply to DPs moved to [Spec, pP],
preventing WLM with T-movements as well.
Third, the idea that Late Merge is prohibited in cases that are “too countercyclic”, which
underlies the constraint *TooLate, is suspect. As Sportiche (2015) emphasizes, the pervasiveness
of countercyclicity is the inescapable problem with Late Merge: once one admits Late Merge as the
explanation of Lebeaux effects, one is simply forced to accept unbounded cyclicity as part of syntax.
Consider the example in (196), where he can corefer with Picasso, obviating Condition C. According
to Late Merge, this derivation involves late-merging the relative clause containing Picasso after
wh-movement has occurred. What is special about (196) is that the DP the man, to which the
relative clause must be late-merged, is the recursive complement of a complement of the main
head noun criticism. As such, none of the material intervening between criticism and the man can
itself be late-merged—because complements cannot be late-merged—and thus Late Merge must
target a DP that is at least four embeddings deep.
(196) Lebeaux effects are unbounded
[ Whose criticism of Mary’s rendition of (. . .) the claim [ that you formulated (. . .) the
hypothesis [ that Henri [ met a man [ who knew Picasso2 ] ] ] ] ]1 did he2 endorse

1?

[Sportiche 2015:20]

If there existed any constraint on Late Merge being too countercyclic, it would certainly apply in
cases like (196), but nevertheless (196) is a grammatical sentence of English.
It should be clear by now that many crucial aspects of the analysis in Stanton (2016), in particular
the silent nominals in interval and location DPs and how Case is assigned in pP-shells, are ad hoc
assumptions engineered to coerce the preposition-stranding asymmetry into a WLM analysis (and
then claim that it provides evidence for WLM). In fact, WLM might be the only piece of the analysis
that is independently justified, but even the version of WLM presented in Stanton (2016) is notably
different from what Takahashi and Hulsey (2009) propose; see the above three points.
Empirically, the WLM analysis in Stanton (2016) does not extend beyond the prepositionstranding cases to the Π-positions from Postal (1994). 73 For example, one of Stanton’s strongest

73 As Rajesh Bhatt (p.c.) has pointed out to me, one might think that because Stanton’s (2016) analysis involves WLM
of NP and NPs denote properties, her analysis is the “syntactic” version to my more “semantic” analysis involving
propertyhood. However, this is not the case. Whether or not a DP contains an NP has no bearing on its semantic
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arguments for the sensitivity of interval-selecting PPs to the presence of an NP is their incompatibility with a bare what (197a). However, exactly the opposite judgement holds for existential
constructions (197b) (Heim 1987). And change-of-color verbs are equally compatible with either a
bare what or a D-linked what NP (197c).
(197) a.

Interval-selecting PPs
[ What *(holiday) ]1 does your family eat turkey on

1?

[Stanton 2016:122]

b. Existential constructions
[ What (*picture) ]1 is there
c.

1

on the wall?

Change-of-color verbs
[ What (color) ]1 did you paint the house

1?

If Π-positions are not sensitive to the presence of an NP, as (197b) and (197c) suggest, there is no
way to extend the WLM analysis to them, since that dependency is what the analysis rests on. On
the other hand, one might find an alternative explanation of the ungrammaticality of (197a), such
as pragmatic competition with English’s temporal-specific wh-phrase when.
Setting (197) aside, the WLM analysis additionally cannot capture the scope generalization from
section 2.4. Under the WLM analysis, the NP merges with D in [Comp, PP] for W-movements and
in [Spec, pP] for T-movements. However, any operator that scopes over [Spec, pP] will also scope
over [Comp, PP] and vice versa, given their adjacency. Being in one position or the other will have
no effect on scope relations. Moreover, even if the two positions involved somehow did matter for
scope—e.g. if the point of WLM was actually higher than [Spec, pP]—there is no way to force the
NP to merge with D in the higher position with W-movements because *TooLate categorically
blocks such a derivation for QPs. In other words, there is no way to give W-movements the
representation of T-movements. Because of this categorical distinction between movement types,
the WLM analysis cannot explain why W-movements behave like T-movements, i.e. cannot target
Π-positions, when they shift scope.
The conservative approach is to treat Stanton’s and Postal’s environments as distinct phenomena, despite their similarities. Under such an approach, Stanton’s (2016) WLM analysis might

type under anyone’s theory. We have also seen that English has pronouns that can denote properties, and under
Stanton’s analysis, pronouns are determiners without NPs.
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account for the preposition-stranding asymmetry and the property-based analysis developed in
this chapter would account for Postal’s environments. However, it is possible to analyze intervalselecting and location-selecting PPs as positions where DPs denote properties, under Stanton’s own
characterization of these DPs, thereby providing a unified analysis. Stanton argues that interval
and location DPs are coordinate-denoting DPs, while event and entity DPs are concrete DPs. To
exemplify this distinction, she provides the contrast between Monday and John’s party: while
Monday is defined in terms of the amount of time that it occupies, John’s party takes up a portion
of time, but its length does not define it. A similar contrast can be made in the domain of locatives.
Consider the Swedish city of Kiruna. Because of destructive mining activity, Kiruna is currently
being moved three kilometres to the east to avoid the city caving in. The location reading of
Kiruna refers to the spatial coordinates that it occupies at the time of reference, whereas the entity
reading refers to the city itself whether it is uttered now (2017) or in 2033 when the city will have
(hopefully) finished moving to its new location. To capture Stanton’s characterization, interval
and location DPs do not denote one single coordinate, but rather a set of coordinates. A set of
coordinates crucially has a characteristic function, i.e. a property denotation. With these pieces
in place, the denotations in (198) and (199) capture her characterization of interval-selecting and
location-selecting PPs in terms of property-denoting expressions.
(198) Interval PPs as selecting for properties
a.

⟦intemp ⟧ = λP λe . τ(e) ⊆ P

(where τ maps an event onto its runtime)

b. ⟦December⟧ = λx . x is a temporal coordinate in December
(199) Location PPs as selecting for properties
a.

⟦onloc ⟧ = λP λe . location(e) ⊆ P

b. ⟦the fourth floor⟧ = λx . x is a spatial coordinate on the fourth floor
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Under the denotations in (198) and (199), the analysis of Π-positions developed in section 2.5 directly
extends to Stanton’s preposition-stranding cases. 74 Thus, while a unified analysis of Stanton’s and
Postal’s environments is possible under the analysis developed in this chapter, such a unification is
impossible under Stanton’s (2016) analysis.

74 One difference between Stanton’s and Postal’s environments is QR. The PP cases seem to allow for wide-scope
readings via QR (i), unlike Postal’s environments (see section 2.2). However, this scope mobility might be due to the
fact that the PPs themselves can undergo movement, and thus it is not the property-denoting interval or location
DP that move. Independent support for this analysis comes from the fact that these PPs are of the kind that can be
stranded by VP ellipsis, unlike Postal’s environments (ii).
3

a ≫ every; 3every ≫ a

(i)

A (different) child found cake on every floor.

(ii)

a. 3Rose found cheesecake on the first floor, and Dorothy did ⟨find cheesecake⟩ on the second floor.
b. *Rose painted the room yellow, and Dorothy did ⟨paint the room⟩ green.
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chapter 3
properties of movement
3.1

Introduction

This chapter argues that even though natural language has expressions over semantic higher types,
these expressions cannot be represented as traces, and then explores the dichotomy between leaving
a trace and reconstruction. 1 Chapter 2 showed that when movement targets a property-type DP, it
must reconstruct because the entity trace that movement would otherwise map onto is incompatible
with a position requiring a property-denoting expression. This requirement to reconstruct is
what gives rise to the Π-position asymmetry: some movement types, e.g. topicalization, cannot
reconstruct and therefore can never target property-type DPs, i.e. Π-positions. The investigation in
chapter 2 then ended with the broader conclusion that movement cannot map onto traces ranging
over properties. If such a representation were available, then property-type DPs would be able to
take scope higher than their base-generated position via overt or covert movement, which chapter 2
showed to (surprisingly) be impossible. This chapter explores this ban on property traces, asking
what the movement of properties reveals about the properties of movement.
Section 3.2 starts out by situating the prohibition on property traces from chapter 2 within
the broader context of the semantics of movement. I argue that the semantic-type constraint on
possible traces is more pervasive and more general. Not only can movement not map onto traces
over properties (200a), it also cannot map onto traces over generalized qantifiers (200b).
(200) a.

No property traces
*[ DP1 λf ⟨e,t ⟩ . . . [ . . . [ f ⟨e,t ⟩ ]1 . . . ] ]

1

A brief terminological note: I will continue to use the terms “variable” and “trace” interchangeably to refer to the
λ-bound variable that movement creates at LF when it does not reconstruct.
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b. No generalized-quantifier traces
*[ DP1 λf ⟨et,t ⟩ . . . [ . . . [ f ⟨et,t ⟩ ]1 . . . ] ]

The arguments for the ungrammaticality of generalized-quantifier traces (200b) come from Romero
(1998) and Fox (1999). They show that (200b) incorrectly predicts that semantic reconstruction
(e.g. quantifier scope) can happen in the absence of syntactic reconstruction (e.g. Condition C).
Taken together, the more general constraint to emerge is that movement can only map onto traces
over individual semantic types, such as entities (e) and degrees (d). I call this constraint the Trace
Interpretation Constraint (TIC), given in (201) (see also Chierchia 1984; Landman 2006).
(201)

Trace Interpretation Constraint
* [ DP1 λf σ . . . [ . . . [ f σ ]1 . . . ] ], where σ is not an individual type

Moreover, I will bolster the TIC with additional novel empirical arguments against generalizedquantifier traces from ACD, extraposition, and parasitic gaps, where the availability of higher-type
traces would overgenerate interpretations.
The worldview to emerge from the TIC is that movement only has two possible semantic
representations: mapping onto an individual-type trace (202) or reconstructing (203). All other
representations are ill-formed.
(202) Mapping onto a trace

(203) Reconstruction

[ DP1 λx e . . . [ . . . [ x e ]1 . . . ] ]

[

1

. . . [ . . . [ DP ]1 . . . ] ]
reconstruct

Against this backdrop, in section 3.3, I develop a syntax and semantics of movement where the
choice between (202) and (203) is not free, but deterministic. Thus, a given movement derivation
maps onto one and only one semantic representation. I propose that the semantic behavior of
a movement step depends entirely on the identity of the moving element: moving a DP versus
moving a QP (question-particle phrase; in the sense of Cable 2007, 2010). Moving a DP results in a
trace over type e (204) (with analogues for other individual types). DP-movement is interpreted via
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Trace Conversion, wherein the lower copies of a movement chain are converted into anaphoric
definite descriptions (Engdahl 1980, 1986; Sauerland 1998, 2004; Fox 1999, 2002, 2003).
(204) Movement of a DP
[ DP1 . . . [ . . . DP1 . . . ] ] ↝LF [ [DP D NP ]1 λx e . . . [ . . . [DP the [λy . y = x] NP ]1 . . . ] ]
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¸ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¶
Trace Conversion

Moving a QP results in reconstruction of everything except the Q head (205). The interpretation of
QP-movement follows from the Q head being unable to semantically compose with its complement,
forcing the two to disassociate at LF.
(205) Movement of a QP
[ [QP Q XP ]1 . . . [ . . . [QP Q XP ]1 . . . ] ] ↝LF [ [QP Q XP ]1 . . . [ . . . [QP Q XP ]1 . . . ] ]
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¸¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¶
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹¸ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¶
Interpret Q

Interpet XP

Therefore, movement that shifts scope is movement of a DP and movement that reconstructs is
movement of a QP. The interesting outcomes of this proposal materialize when individual steps
of QP-movement and DP-movement are chained together. I will argue that it is possible for QPmovement to follow DP-movement, but not vice versa. This is because a QP shell can be constructed
on top of an already moved DP (206a), but a QP layer cannot be shaved off or left behind to render
accessible the DP that it contains (206b).
(206) a.

QP-movement following DP-movement
QP-mvt
3

Build QP

[ [QP Q DP1 ]2 . . . [ [QP Q DP1 ]2 . . . [ . . . DP1 . . . ] ] ]
DP-mvt

b. DP-movement following QP-movement
DP-mvt

* [ DP1 . . . [ [QP Q DP1 ]2 . . . [ . . . [QP Q DP1 ]2 . . . ] ] ]
QP-mvt

Under this proposal, which I call the DP/QP-movement system, DP-movement is semantically
equivalent to QR. The difference between the two is that DP-movement may manifest overtly, a
difference that I will attribute to linearization. Consequently, whether a movement chain shifts
scope reduces to whether it invokes an initial step of QR, i.e. DP-movement. This allows different
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movement types to be stated in terms of different sequences of DP-movement and QP-movement,
which I will show, given the possibility of DP-movement preceding QP-movement, ultimately
reduces to whether the movement targets DPs or QPs. These proposals are all implemented in
a multidominant syntax, building on Johnson (2012, 2014). The structures in (204)–(206) will
therefore look somewhat different, but crucially they can be built without resorting to countercyclicity. Presented along the way are many arguments in favor of this multidominant conception
of movement. Additionally, I will show that the DP/QP-movement system (i) accounts for the
typology of movement types in English and crosslinguistically and (ii) handles the interpretation
of crossclausal movement better than a standard copy-theoretic conception of movement does.
In section 3.4, I then apply the DP/QP-movement system to a number of disparate reconstruction
phenomena and show that they follow without further ado: the Π-position asymmetry (§3.4.1),
Late Merge (or “Lebeaux”) effects (§3.4.2), focus intervention (§3.4.3), and bona fide predicate
movement of VPs and APs (§3.4.4). What these applications show is that a system of movement
where the choice between leaving a trace (which is constrained by the TIC) and reconstruction is a
deterministic choice yields widespread empirical coverage beyond the reconstruction properties of
movement itself.

3.2

Trace Interpretation Constraint

This section motivates the Trace Interpretation Constraint (TIC) in (207) that, unless it reconstructs—
which we will soon see means to reconstruct syntactically—, movement can only map onto traces
ranging over individual types, e.g. entities (e) and degrees (d).
(207)

Trace Interpretation Constraint
* [ DP1 λf σ . . . [ . . . [ f σ ]1 . . . ] ], where σ is not an individual type

The first half of the TIC (207) was motivated in chapter 2, where I argued, based on the Π-position
asymmetry, that movement cannot map onto property traces. Properties are, however, not the only
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kind of higher-type expression in the entity domain; the other kind of higher-type expression is a
generalized quantifier (208) (Partee 1986). 2
(208) Types of DP denotations
e

Entity

(individual type)

⟨e, t⟩

Property

(set of entities)

⟨⟨e, t⟩, t⟩

Generalized quantifier

(set of properties, i.e. set of sets of entities)

The second half of the argument thus concerns whether movement can map onto a trace ranging
over generalized quantifiers. Arguments against generalized-quantifier traces come from Romero
(1998) and Fox (1999). Their arguments are couched in terms of the dichotomy between so-called
“syntactic” and “semantic” theories of reconstruction, so section 3.2.1 begins by introducing these
two contrasting theories. Section 3.2.2 then presents Romero’s and Fox’s arguments against the
semantic theory of reconstruction, the key component of which are generalized-quantifier traces.
Section 3.2.3 takes stock of the overarching generalization to emerge: the Trace Interpretation
Constraint (207). In section 3.2.4, I reinforce the TIC with additional novel empirical arguments
against generalized-quantifier traces with data from ACD, extraposition, and parasitic gaps.

3.2.1

Syntactic vs. semantic theories of reconstruction

Recall from section 2.4.2 of chapter 2 that wh-movement optionally shifts the scope of the moved
DP. For example, in (209) (repeated from (106)), how many books has two possible scopes with
respect to the modal should. Under the wide-scope reading (209a), it is assumed that there is a
certain set of books that Nina should read; the speaker is asking how many such books there
are. A possible answer to the wide-scope reading is: ‘Three books, namely Aspects, Lectures on
Government and Binding, and The Minimalist Program’. Under the narrow-scope reading (209b),
there is no assumption that there are any specific books that Nina should read. Rather, it is assumed
that she should read a certain number of books, without having any particular books in mind.
A possible answer to the narrow-scope reading is: ‘Three books, any three’.

2

As in chapter 2, I will continue to treat properties in purely extensional terms. For discussion of representing
properties in natural language, see section 4.5 of chapter 4.
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(209) Wh-movement optionally shifts scope
[ How many books ]1 should Nina read
a.

this summer?

(=106)
how many ≫ should

Wide-scope reading
i.

1

For what number n: There are n-many particular books x such that Nina should

read x this summer.
∗
ii. ⟦(209)⟧ (w 0 ) = {p ∶ ∃n ∈ N[p = λw . ∃X[bookw
(X) ∧ #X = n ∧
∗
shouldw (λw ′ . readw
′ (X)(Nina))]]}

b. Narrow-scope reading
i.

should ≫ how many

For what number n: It is necessary for there to be n-many books x such that Nina

reads x this summer.
∗
ii. ⟦(209)⟧ (w 0 ) = {p ∶ ∃n ∈ N[p = λw . shouldw (λw ′ . ∃X[bookw
′ (X) ∧ #X = n ∧
∗
readw
′ (X)(Nina)])]}

The scope ambiguity in constituent questions like (209) follows from the possibility of reconstructing the moved wh-phrase. Reconstructing into the launching site of movement yields the
narrow-scope reading (209b). Otherwise, the wh-phrase takes wide scope in the landing site of
movement (209a). There are two predominant theories in the literature about how reconstruction
ensues: the “syntactic” theory of reconstruction (SynR) and the “semantic” theory of reconstruction
(SemR). Let us consider each theory in turn.
According to SynR, reconstruction means that at LF a moved element is syntactically put back
into the position that it occupied before movement had occurred. In other words, a reconstructed
element behaves like the movement has been undone because it has actually been undone. Analyses
that fall under the umbrella of SynR include ignoring the higher copy of a movement chain
under the Copy Theory of Movement (210) (Chomsky 1993, 1995b) or positing a special operation
like LF-Lowering that can apply to a moved element at LF (211) (Chomsky 1976; May 1977, 1985;
Longobardi 1987; Cinque 1990). I assumed the copy-theoretic analysis of reconstruction in chapter 2
and will continue to do so.
(210) Reconstruction by ignoring copies (SynR)
[ DP1 . . . [ Op [ . . . DP1 . . . ] ] ]
a.

Interpret higher copy ⇒ Wide scope
[ DP1 . . . [ Op [ . . . DP1 . . . ] ] ]

DP1 ≫ Op
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b. Interpret lower copy ⇒ Narrow/reconstructed scope
[ DP1 . . . [ Op [ . . . DP1 . . . ] ] ]

Op ≫ DP1

(211) Reconstruction by LF-Lowering (SynR)
[ DP1 . . . [ Op [ . . .
a.

1

... ]]]

Interpret structure as-is ⇒ Wide scope
[ DP1 . . . [ Op [ . . .

1

... ]]]

DP1 ≫ Op

b. Lower DP at LF ⇒ Narrow/reconstructed scope
[

1

. . . [ Op [ . . . DP1 . . . ] ] ]

Op ≫ DP1

LF-Lowering

Both ignoring copies (210) and LF-Lowering (211) produce the same result: the moved element
is semantically and syntactically back in the launching site of movement at LF. This means that
it will behave as reconstructed for both scope and binding. Scope reconstruction follows from
the standard assumption that logical scope is read off LF, while binding-theoretic reconstruction
follows from the standard assumptions (i) that the conditions on binding are defined in terms of
c–command (Chomsky 1981) and (ii) that Binding Theory applies at LF (Lebeaux 1990, 2009). See
section 2.5.2 of chapter 2 for a step-by-step derivation of reconstruction according to SynR.
According to SemR, reconstruction means that the variable left behind by movement is a
generalized-quantifier trace, which has the effect of the moved element taking scope at the trace
position (Rullmann 1995; Cresti 1995). Movement can produce two kinds of traces: an entity trace
of type e or a generalized-quantifier trace of type ⟨et, t⟩. Following Rullmann (1995), I will call
these ‘small’ t and ‘big’ T traces respectively. The former is the kind of trace that we standardly
use in syntax and semantics, but the latter is a unique innovation of SemR. While a small t trace
yields its standard wide-scope, nonreconstructed reading (212a), a big T trace instead yields the
narrow-scope, reconstructed reading (212b). The important point to observe about SemR is that
when a moved element reconstructs for scope, it is not syntactically back in that position; the
reconstruction is achieved purely via the semantic machinery.
(212) SemR analysis of reconstruction
a.

DP1 ≫ Op

Small trace ⇒ Wide scope
[ DP1 . . . [ Op [ . . . t 1 . . . ] ] ] ↝LF [ DP1 λx e . . . [ Op [ . . . x e . . . ] ] ]
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b. Big trace ⇒ Narrow/reconstructed scope

Op ≫ DP1

[ DP1 . . . [ Op [ . . . T1 . . . ] ] ] ↝LF [ DP1 λQ⟨et,t ⟩ . . . [ Op [ . . . Q⟨et,t ⟩ . . . ] ] ]

We have already seen derivations involving small t traces; see section 2.5.2 of chapter 2. Derivations
involving big T traces are somewhat more involved because of the trace being a higher type. The
derivation of the how many-question in (209) using a big T trace is given in (213) (ignoring the
role of the question operator). 3 , 4 Because (209) involves modality, generalized quantifiers are
treated in (213) as type ⟨⟨e, st⟩, st⟩. Moreover, to simplify the derivation, I assume that how many
books undergoes an initial step of movement that leaves a small t trace, which in turn produces a
semantic object that can then compose with a generalized quantifier. Nothing critical hinges on
this assumption; we could also have inflated the semantic type of verbs, as Rullmann (1995) does.
(213) Interpreting a big T trace in SemR
CP
Q

1

DP
how many books

2
λ2

TP
T
should

3
T2

4
λ1

vP
Nina read t 1

a.

д

∗
⟦ 4 ⟧ = λx e λw . readw
(x)(Nina)

3

Semantic types: e for entities, s for situations/worlds, d for degrees, and t for truth values. I assume the following
notational conventions: w and s are of type s, w 0 is reserved for the world of evaluation, f cf is a choice function f ,
and στ abbreviates ⟨σ, τ⟩. I mark predicates taking plural arguments with the ∗ -operator. For readability, I abbreviate
modal denotations, e.g. shouldw (p) ⇔ ∀w ′ [w ′ ∈ f (w) → p(w ′ )], where f projects a modal domain.

4

As in previous derivations, (213) glosses over the subject related A-movement of Nina from [Spec, vP] to [Spec, TP].
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b. ⟦T2 ⟧д = [д(2)]⟨⟨e,st ⟩,st ⟩
c.

д

∗
⟦ 3 ⟧ = [д(2)](λx e λw . readw
(x)(Nina))

∗
d. ⟦TP⟧д = λw . shouldw ([д(2)](λx e λw . readw
(x)(Nina)))
д

e.

∗
⟦ 2 ⟧ = λQ⟨⟨e,st ⟩,st ⟩ λw . shouldw (Q(λx e λw . readw
(x)(Nina)))

f.

∗
⟦how many books⟧ = λP⟨e,st ⟩ λw . ∃x[#x = f (Dd ) ∧ bookw
(x) ∧ P(x)(w)]
д

∗
g. ⟦ 1 ⟧ = λw . shouldw ([λP⟨e,st ⟩ λw . ∃x[#x = f (Dd ) ∧ bookw
(x) ∧ P(x)(w)]]
∗
(λx e λw . readw
(x)(Nina)))
∗
∗
= λw . shouldw (λw ′ . ∃x[#x = f (Dd ) ∧ bookw
′ (x) ∧ readw ′ (x)(Nina)])

The crucial step of the derivation occurs at 1 . Ordinarily, a moved generalized quantifier takes
its sister as its argument because the λ-abstraction over type e created by movement produces an
element of type ⟨e, st⟩, which is the correct semantic type to serve as the argument to a generalized
quantifier. However, in (213), the λ-abstraction below the generalized quantifier how many books is
instead over generalized quantifiers, so that how many books actually serves as the argument of its
sister, substituting for the λ-bound variable Q and yielding the reconstructed reading. The semantic
derivation in (213) thus proceeds as follows: First, starting from the point where the vP has been
composed, the λ-abstraction created by the first step of movement abstracts over the small t trace,
mapping the index 1 to the λ-bound variable x (213a). Second, the big T trace is interpreted as an
assignment-dependent variable over generalized quantifiers (213b). Third, the big T trace takes
4 as its argument, which is of the correct type (⟨e, st⟩) (213c). Fourth, should takes the resulting
proposition as its argument (213d). Fifth, the λ-abstraction created by the second step of movement
abstracts over the big T trace, mapping the index 2 to the λ-bound variable Q (213e). At this point,
one can see that the generalized quantifier that will saturate Q will scope below should, thereby
deriving the reconstructed reading. Finally, how many books does precisely that; it serves as the
argument of 2 , substituting for Q. It then takes what corresponds to the vP as its argument,
yielding the proposition in (213g).

3.2.2

Evidence against the semantic theory of reconstruction

Romero (1998) and Fox (1999) make the pioneering discovery that scope reconstruction feeds
binding-theoretic reconstruction, the latter of which is evaluated with Condition C connectivity.

110

I will call this discovery the Scope–Condition C Correlation (SCC) (214). According to the
SCC, when a moved element reconstructs for scope, it is necessarily evaluated for Condition C in
the reconstructed position where it has taken scope. Therefore, semantic reconstruction entails
syntactic reconstruction.
(214)

Scope–Condition C Correlation
The reconstructed scope of a moved element determines its Condition C connectivity.

This section reviews the evidence for this correlation, following primarily the presentation in
Romero (1998). Importantly, we will see that the SCC provides evidence against SemR because
SemR incorrectly predicts that a moved element should be able to reconstruct semantically, while
not reconstructing syntactically. Because SemR amounts to the availability of generalized-quantifier
traces, the SCC in turn provides evidence against their existence.
3.2.2.1

Creation verbs

Heycock (1995) observes the contrasts in (215) and (216) involving creation verbs, e.g. invent and come
up with, in intensional contexts. In each example, the moved wh-phrase contains an R-expression
coindexed with a pronoun that c–commands the launching site of movement, but only (215a)
and (216a) with creation verbs are ungrammatical. 5
(215) a. * [ How many stories about Diana2 ]1 is she2 likely to invent

1?

b. 3 [ How many stories about Diana2 ]1 is she2 really upset by

1?

[Heycock 1995:558]

(216) a. * [ How many lies aimed at exonerating Clifford2 ]1 is he2 planning to come up with
1?

b. 3 [ How many lies aimed at exonerating Clifford2 ]1 did he2 claim he2 had no knowledge
of

1?

[Heycock 1995:558]

The semantics of creation verbs idiosyncratically permit only the reconstructed-scope reading
in (215a) and (216a). The wide-scope, nonreconstructed reading is ruled out by its pragmatic oddity.
For example, consider the implausibility of the wide-scope reading of (215a), given in (217). How
5

All of the examples in this section (§3.2.2) involving Condition C rely on contrasts between minimally different
examples. The Condition C examples with a check mark (3) are sometimes considered degraded in the literature,
though never completely ungrammatical.
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can someone be likely to invent a story that is presupposed to already exist? They cannot, and
hence this anomalousness rules out the wide-scope reading.
(217) Hypothetical wide-scope reading of (215a)
#For what number n: There are n-many particular stories x about Diana such that Diane is
likely to invent x.

[Romero 1998:91]

The only plausible scope of how many in (215a) and (216a) is below the creation verb. By deduction
then, the reason that (215a) and (216a) are ungrammatical is because they violate Condition C. This
rationale is confirmed by the grammaticality of replacing the R-expression in the wh-phrase with
an anaphor, thereby not violating any binding conditions (218).
(218) Swapping the R-expression and pronoun
a.

3

1?

[ How many stories about herself2 ]1 is she2 likely to invent

b. 3 [ How many lies aimed at exonerating himself2 ]1 is he2 planning to come up with
1?

Therefore, in these examples with creation verbs, semantic reconstruction for scope feeds
Condition C connectivity, i.e. syntactic reconstruction, as predicted by the SCC. Condition C is
obviated in (215b) and (216b) because the wh-phrase has the option of taking wide scope, thereby
placing the R-expression outside the c–command domain of the offending antecedent at LF. This
strategy is unavailable in (215a) and (216a) because of the idiosyncratic semantics of creation verbs;
Condition C is hence necessarily violated, rendering the sentences ungrammatical.
3.2.2.2

Embedding the offending antecedent

Huang (1993) and Takano (1995) observe that the distance between the R-expression in the moved
phrase and the offending antecedent appears to matter for Condition C reconstruction. When the
R-expression and the offending antecedent are clausemates, the Condition C violation is “stronger”
than when they are separated by a clause boundary (219).
(219) a.

Offending antecedent in the matrix clause
*[ How many pictures of John2 ]1 does he2 think [ that I like
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1

]?

b. Offending antecedent in the embedded clause
3

[ How many pictures of John2 ]1 do you think [ that he2 will like

1

]?
[Romero 1998:92]

Romero (1998) shows that the amelioration of Condition C provided by embedding the offending
antecedent is contingent on the scope of the moved wh-phrase. While (219b) is indeed a grammatical
string, it is only grammatical provided that the wh-phrase takes wide scope; the narrow-scope
reading is absent. Simply embedding the offending antecedent does not in and of itself ameliorate
Condition C. Rather, Condition C is ameliorated iff the wh-phrase containing the R-expression
takes scope in a position higher than the offending antecedent, outside of its c–command domain,
which is possible only when the offending antecedent is in an embedded clause.
There are two relevant test configurations where the judgements are sharper: The first configuration uses wh-movement over a wh-island boundary to force the wh-phrase to take wide scope
(see section 2.4.2 of chapter 2) (220). The second configuration uses the quantifier per month to
induce a rate reading, which strongly biases the wh-phrase towards taking narrow scope (221).
When the offending antecedent is clausemates with the R-expression in the matrix clause, both
configurations are ungrammatical (220)–(221). 6
(220) Wh-island forces wide scope
* [ How many pictures of John2 ]1 does he2 wonder [ whether I like

1

]?

(Intended: For what number n: There are n-many pictures x of John such that John thinks
that I like x.)

[Romero 1998:92]

(221) Rate reading forces narrow scope
* [ How many pictures of Neil Young2 ]1 does he2 think [ that the newspaper should publish
1

per month ]?

(Intended: For what number n: Neil Young thinks that it should be the case that, every
month, there are n-many pictures x of Neil Young such that the newspaper publishes x.)
[Romero 1998:92]

When the offending antecedent is embedded, the scope of the wh-phrase containing the R-expression
determines whether there is a Condition C violation. In the wh-island configuration, where the

6

(219a) and (220) are ungrammatical either because Condition C involves clausematehood or because they violate
Condition B under a theory of binding like Reinhart and Reuland (1993). I do not take this issue up here.
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wh-phrase must take wide scope, there is no Condition C violation once the offending antecedent
has been embedded (222). However, in the rate-reading configuration, where the wh-phrase takes
narrow scope, there is a Condition C violation even when the offending antecedent has been
embedded (223).
(222) Wide scope and an embedded offending antecedent
3

[ How many pictures of John2 ]1 do you wonder [ whether he2 will like

1

]?

(Paraphrase: For what number n: There are n-many pictures x of John such that you wonder
whether John will like x.)

[Romero 1998:93]

(223) Narrow scope and an embedded offending antecedent
*[ How many pictures of Neil Young2 ]1 do you think [ that he2 should publish

1

per

month ]?
(Intended: For what number n: You think that it should be the case that, every month, there
are n-many pictures x of Neil Young such that Neil Young publishes x.)

[Romero 1998:93]

To further emphasize this point, contrast the ungrammatical (223) with the grammatical (224),
where the R-expression and the pronoun are swapped. This contrast shows that the reason why
(223) is ungrammatical is that it violates Condition C.
(224) Swapping the R-expression and pronoun
3

[ How many pictures of himself2 ]1 do you think [ that Neil Young2 should publish
per month ]?

1

[Romero 1998:93]

What these data show is that reconstruction for scope feeds Condition C connectivity. Thus,
a Condition C violation ensues only when the wh-phrase reconstructs into a position where the
offending antecedent then c–commands the R-expression at LF. Movement to a position above
the offending antecedent avoids a Condition C violation if the moved element takes scope in the
landing site and does not reconstruct. This strategy is possible in (219b) and (222), but impossible
in (223) because the rate reading forces the wh-phrase to take narrow scope, from where it is
c–commanded by the offending antecedent at LF. Therefore, embedding the offending antecedent
does not necessarily ameliorate Condition C, pace Huang (1993) and Takano (1995). It does so only
when the wh-phrase takes scope in a position higher than the offending antecedent, as predicted
by the SCC.
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3.2.2.3

Late Merge effects

Lebeaux (1990) famously observed that wh-movement amnesties Condition C for an R-expression
in an adjunct that is attached to the moved wh-phrase (225a) (also van Riemsdijk and Williams
1981). This amnesty, however, does not extend to an R-expression embedded in the complement
of a wh-phrase, which still triggers a Condition C violation (225b). This contrast is standardly
called Late Merge effects (or “Lebeaux” effects, for something more theory-neutral) because
the standard analysis is that adjuncts, but not complements, can be countercyclically late-merged
onto a wh-phrase after movement has occurred. For the present purposes, the precise mechanics
behind Late Merge effects are not important; though see section 3.4.2.
(225) Late Merge effects
a.

3

1?

[ How many pictures [adjunct that John2 took ] ]1 did he2 buy

b. * [ How many pictures [complement of John2 ] ]1 did he2 buy

1?

[Romero 1998:95]

Romero (1998) observes that the amnesty of Condition C provided by Late Merge requires that
the wh-phrase take wide scope in the landing site of movement. For example, consider (226) where
John and he are coindexed and John is contained in an adjunct to how many pictures. (226) is a
grammatical string because the relative-clause adjunct can be late-merged onto how many pictures
so that the pronoun he never c–commands the R-expression John throughout the course of the
derivation. However, (226) is only grammatical provided that how many takes wide scope (226a);
the narrow-scope reading is conspicuously absent (226b).
(226) Amnesty via Late Merge forces wide scope
[ How many pictures [adjunct that John2 took in Sarajevo ] ]1 does he2 want the editor to
publish
a.

1

in the Sunday Special?

Wide-scope reading
3

For what number n: There are n-many particular pictures x that John took in Sarajevo
such that John wants the editor to publish x.

b. Narrow-scope reading
* For what number n: John wants the editors to publish in the Sunday Special (any)
n-many pictures that John took in Sarajevo.
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[Romero 1998:96]

The narrow-scope reading in (226b) would require reconstructing the wh-phrase. Under the fairly
reasonable assumption that reconstruction cannot strand adjuncts, reconstructing the wh-phrase
entails reconstructing its adjuncts as well. By deduction, the reason that the narrow-scope reading
is unavailable is because reconstructing the entire wh-phrase puts the R-expression back into the
c–command domain of the offending antecedent, thereby triggering a Condition C violation. This
is supported by the fact that when the R-expression and the pronoun are swapped, as in (227), the
narrow-scope reading reappears, since reconstruction would not create a configuration violating
Condition C in this case.
(227) Swapping the R-expression and pronoun
3

[ How many pictures [adjunct that he2 took in Sarajevo ] ]1 does John2 want the editor to
publish

1

in the Sunday special?

[Romero 1998:96]

Therefore, Late Merge effects also support the SCC that scope reconstruction feeds Condition C
connectivity.
3.2.2.4

Binding pronominal variables

Fox (1999) observes that reconstruction for pronominal variable binding also feeds Condition C
connectivity, as predicted by the SCC. To illustrate, contrast the two examples in (228). In both (228a)
and (228b), the wh-phrase reconstructs so that the pronoun he can be bound by the quantificational
expression every student. Where they differ is in whether the pronoun she, which is coindexed with
the R-expression Ms. Brown in the wh-phrase, c–commands the launching site of movement, where
the wh-phrase crucially must reconstruct for variable binding. When the offending antecedent
c–commands the launching site, reconstruction for variable binding is impossible (228a), but when
it does not c–command the launching site, reconstruction is possible (228b).
(228) a.

Pronoun c–commands launching site
*[ Which of the books that he2 asked Ms. Brown3 for ]1 did she3 give every student2
1?

b. Pronoun does not c–command launching site
3

[ Which of the books that he2 asked Ms. Brown3 for ]1 did every student2 get
from her2 ?

1

[Fox 1999:174]
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The pattern in (228) follows directly if the wh-phrase is evaluated for Condition C in its reconstructed
position: In (228a), reconstruction for variable binding places the R-expression Ms. Brown in the
c–command domain of the coindexed pronoun she, which triggers a Condition C violation. However,
in (228b), because the offending pronoun does not c–command the launching site of movement,
the wh-phrase can reconstruct without triggering a Condition C violation. In the same manner as
seen in the previous sections, (228a) can be made grammatical by swapping the R-expression and
the pronoun so that reconstruction is possible without inducing a Condition C violation (229).
(229) Swapping the R-expression and pronoun
3

[Fox 1999:174]

[ Which of the books that he2 asked her3 for ]1 did Ms. Brown3 give every student2

1?

Reconstruction for pronominal variable binding is a form of scope reconstruction because it
requires that the bound variable be in the logical scope of its binder at LF. Therefore, the fact that
reconstruction for variable binding feeds Condition C connectivity, i.e. syntactic reconstruction,
supports the SCC.
3.2.2.5

Binding world variables

Not only does reconstruction for pronominal variable binding determine Condition C connectivity,
reconstruction for world variable binding does as well. Sharvit (1998) observes that Condition C
connectivity depends on the transparency or opacity of the moved wh-phrase. Crucially, it is in
fact possible for a wh-phrase to take narrow scope with respect to an intensional operator and still
avoid a Condition C violation as long as the wh-phrase is interpreted as transparent to that operator.
In other words, the world variable in the wh-phrase must be bound by an operator higher than the
intensional operator (or be a free variable), even though the wh-phrase takes quantificational scope
below that operator. 7
For example, in (230), how many students can take scope below the attitude predicate hope.
Given the data that we have seen thus far motivating the SCC, we would not expect this to be a
possible scope of how many because the R-expression Anton being coindexed with the pronoun he
should yield a Condition C violation. Crucially, however, this narrow-scope reading is possible

7

This is the so-called “third” reading in the de re/de dicto literature: nonspecific and transparent.
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only if the wh-phrase is interpreted as transparent to hope (230a). 8 Missing is the narrow-scope
opaque reading, where Anton believes that the individuals are students, but, unbeknownst to him,
they are not students in the actual world (230b). A wide-scope reading of how many students is of
course also possible, but the wh-phrase is then necessarily interpreted as transparent (230c).
(230) [ How many students who hate Anton2 ]1 does he2 hope
a.

1

will buy him2 a beer?

Narrow scope, transparent
3

For what number n: In all of Anton’s bouletic alternatives w ′ , there are n-many x that
are students who hate Anton in the actual world and that will buy him a beer in w ′ .

b. Narrow scope, opaque
*For what number n: In all of Anton’s bouletic alternatives w ′ , there are n-many x that
are students who hate Anton in w ′ and that will buy him a beer in w ′ .
c.

Wide scope, transparent
3

For what number n: There are n-many x that are students who hate Anton in the
actual world and in all of Anton’s bouletic alternatives w ′ , x will buy him a beer in w ′ .
[Sharvit 1998]

In all the examples considered thus far, the narrow-scope reading has been assumed to be an opaque
reading because this is the most natural interpretation. However, (230) shows that quantificational
scope and intensionality can be teased apart in the right circumstances, and then it is intensionality
that dictates Condition C connectivity. The opaque reading in (230b) is derived by reconstructing
the entire wh-phrase below the intensional operator, as schematized in (231). Thus, the R-expression
Anton will be c–commanded by the coindexed pronoun he, triggering a Condition C violation.
(231) LF of the narrow-scope opaque reading
*[ he1 hopew ′ [CP . . . [ how many studentsw ′ who hate Anton1 ] . . . ] ]

8

This raises the question of whether any other examples that Romero (1998) gives as ungrammatical are in fact
grammatical if the NP is interpreted transparently; see Romero (1998:100, fn. 21). I can only report preliminary
findings here. The relevant configuration is the Late Merge examples in section 3.2.2.3. Like (230), these examples
involve relative clauses, which can be late-merged (note that the examples in section 3.2.2.4 have relative clauses,
but not modal operators). My judgement is that (226) does have a grammatical narrow-scope, transparent reading in
a scenario like the following: John is holding a stack of 100 photos in his hands and wants the editor to publish 50
of them, but unbeknownst to him, these are his own pictures from Sarajevo. I leave this topic for future research;
though for some preliminary exploration, see Keine and Poole (forthcoming).
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On the other hand, a transparent reading is derived by leaving the NP content above the intensional
operator so that its world variable is not bound by that operator. 9 In particular, the narrow-scope
transparent reading is derived by reconstructing how many while leaving the rest of the wh-phrase
above the intensional operator. Romero (1998) proposes that this “split” reconstruction is possible
because how many NP is equivalent to how many of the NP such that the NP can scope separately
from how many. Therefore, to derive the reading in (230a), the wh-phrase reconstructs, but then
the students who hate Anton QRs to a position above hope, as schematized in (232). 10 The result is
that (i) the wh-phrase is interpreted as transparent to hope, (ii) how many takes quantificational
scope below hope, and (iii) Anton is outside the c–command domain of he, avoiding a Condition C
violation. Crucially, this split reconstruction is not available if the world variable needs to be bound
by the intensional operator in order to derive an opaque reading.
(232) LF of the narrow-scope transparent reading
3

[ [ the studentsw 0 who hate Anton1 ] λx [ he1 hopew ′ [CP . . . [ how many of x ] . . . ] ] ]

In sum, parallel to pronominal variable binding, reconstruction for world variable binding feeds
Condition C connectivity, i.e. syntactic reconstruction, as predicted by the SCC.
3.2.2.6

Section summary

This section has reviewed five pieces of evidence in support of the Scope–Condition C Correlation (SCC) that scope reconstruction feeds binding reconstruction. Crucially, the SCC allows
us to differentiate SynR and SemR empirically. The core insight of the SCC is that scope and
Condition C are read off the same structure. If a moved DP takes scope in the launching site of
movement (233a)—i.e. if it reconstructs—, then it is also evaluated for Condition C in the launching
site (233b).

9

More accurately, a transparent reading can be derived with this derivation precisely because the world variable is
not bound by the intensional operator. The same reading can still be derived by reconstructing the entire wh-phrase
below the intensional operator, but then Condition C will also be evaluated for the entire wh-phrase in this position.
Therefore, in the case of (230a), this derivation would be ungrammatical.

10 A similar structure is proposed in Heycock (1995:565) for degree questions. It would also be relatively straightforward
to execute in the Neglect theory of Sportiche (2015).
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(233) a.

Structure that scope sees
[

1

. . . [ Op . . . [ pronoun2 [ . . . 3 1 . . . ] ] ] ]

b. Structure that Condition C sees
*[

1

. . . [ Op . . . [ pronoun2 [ . . . [DP . . . R-expression2 . . . ]1 . . . ] ] ] ]

In the same vein, if a moved DP takes scope in the landing site of movement (234a), then it is also
evaluated for Condition C in the landing site (234b).
(234) a.

Structure that scope sees
[ 3 1 . . . [ Op . . . [ pronoun2 [ . . .

1

... ]]]]

b. Structure that Condition C sees
3

[ [DP . . . R-expression2 . . . ]1 . . . [ Op . . . [ pronoun2 [ . . .

1

... ]]]]

Let us consider how SynR and SemR fare with respect to the SCC. According to SynR, syntactic
and semantic reconstruction are one and the same such that a moved element that reconstructs
semantically also reconstructs syntactically. As schematized in (235), when the moved DP contains
an R-expression, any coindexed DP that c–commands the launching site will then trigger a Condition C violation because the syntactic material of the moved DP is present in the reconstructed
position. Therefore, the SCC follows under SynR without further ado.
(235) Correct prediction of SynR (should be ungrammatical)
*[ [DP . . . R-exp2 . . . ]1 . . . [ Op . . . [ pronoun2 . . . [DP . . . R-exp2 . . . ]1 . . . ] ] ]
reconstruct

On the other hand, according to SemR, semantic reconstruct does not entail syntactic reconstruction.
SemR thus predicts that a moved element should be able to reconstruct semantically, while not
reconstructing syntactically, a prediction falsified by the SCC (236).
(236) Incorrect prediction of SemR (should be ungrammatical)
3

[ [DP . . . R-expression2 . . . ]1 λQ⟨et,t ⟩ . . . [ Op . . . [ pronoun2 . . . Q⟨et,t ⟩ . . . ] ] ]
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The correlation between semantic and syntactic reconstruction is unpredicted under SemR. There
is no way to derive the correlation under SemR other than stipulating it; see Romero (1998:108–114)
for discussion. Thus, following Romero (1998) and Fox (1999), I take the SCC as discrediting SemR
and supporting SynR as the correct theory of scope reconstruction. 11 Importantly, because SemR
amounts to the existence of generalized-quantifier traces, the SCC in turn shows that generalizedquantifier traces do not exist.

3.2.3

Putting together the pieces

This section has argued that there are no generalized-quantifier traces (237b). The evidence came
from the correlation between scope reconstruction and binding reconstruction, as discovered
by Romero (1998) and Fox (1999), a correlation which generalized-quantifier traces are unable to
predict. This prohibition on generalized-quantifier traces is complemented by the generalization
from chapter 2 that there are no property traces (237a).
(237) a.

No property traces
*[ DP1 λf ⟨e,t ⟩ . . . [ . . . [ f ⟨e,t ⟩ ]1 . . . ] ]

b. No generalized-quantifier traces
*[ DP1 λf ⟨et,t ⟩ . . . [ . . . [ f ⟨et,t ⟩ ]1 . . . ] ]

While property and generalized-quantifier traces are prohibited, simple traces over entities are
of course allowed, as this is how scope-shifted readings of movement are derived. In sum, of the
possible denotations for DPs, the only possible trace that movement can map onto ranges over the
simple individual type e. The overarching generalization to emerge is that even though natural
language has expressions over higher types, these expressions cannot be represented as traces.

11 For some discussion of Lechner (1998), who argues that we need both SynR and SemR, see section 5.4.5 of chapter 5.
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I call this constraint the Trace Interpretation Constraint (TIC), given in (238) (see also
Chierchia 1984; Landman 2006). 12
(238)

Trace Interpretation Constraint
*[ DP1 λf σ . . . [ . . . [ f σ ]1 . . . ] ], where σ is not an individual type
(i.e. traces must be individual types)

Though the argumentation has focused on the entity domain, and will continue to do so for the
most part, the TIC is formulated more generally to include all individual types. 13 For instance, it
predicts that movement can map onto a degree trace of type d, but not ⟨d, t⟩ or ⟨d, ⟨e, t⟩⟩, etc. As
far as I know, this prediction holds for the various theories of degree constructions currently on
the market (e.g. Heim 1985, 2001; Bhatt and Pancheva 2007).
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to exploring the ramifications of the TIC for the
grammar more broadly. Section 3.3 develops a syntax and semantics for movement centered around
addressing the dichotomy between movement leaving a trace and reconstructing. In section 3.4,
I apply this system to a host of reconstruction phenomena and show that it explains them without
further stipulation. Before proceeding, however, the last part of this section provides additional
empirical arguments against higher-type traces that bolster the empirical base of the TIC.

3.2.4

More arguments against higher-type traces

This section provides three additional arguments against the existence of higher-type traces, in
particular generalized-quantifier (GQ) traces. Each argument follows the same logic: there is some
fact for which a type-e trace has been proposed, crucially for purposes unrelated to scope, and if
this trace were a higher semantic type, the original purpose of the trace would remain fulfilled, but
the wrong scope would ensue.

12 Chierchia (1984) and Landman (2006) propose similar constraints to the TIC, except on possible variables, not traces.
We will see in chapter 4 that there is reason to believe traces are more than just variables; rather, they are anaphoric
definite descriptions. For discussion of their proposals and a comparison with the TIC, see section 5.2 of chapter 5.

13 An alternative, which Landman (2006) advocates for, is to treat the different individual types as sorts on a general
semantic type. However, a semantics with different individual types (type theory) can trivially be recast as a semantics
with one type that is sorted (first-order many-sorted theory) and vice versa, so I do not see how to tease these apart.
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3.2.4.1

Antecedent Contained Deletion

The first argument concerns Antecedent Contained Deletion (ACD). It is standardly assumed that
ellipsis is resolved in ACD configurations by moving the object covertly to a VP-external position
(Sag 1976; Larson and May 1990; Fox 2002). The resulting representation satisfies the parallelism
requirement on ellipsis and avoids the infinite-regress problem (239).
(239) ACD derivation
[ Subj [ λ1 [VP V t 1 ] ] [DP NP [RC λ2 . . . ⟨V t 2 ⟩ ] ]1 ]
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹¸ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¶
²
antecedent VP

elided VP

This analysis is independently motivated by the observation in Sag (1976) and Larson and May
(1990) that the object in ACD configurations obligatorily takes scope above the VP. To illustrate,
consider the paradigm in (240). In the baseline sentence in (240a), every painting that Sakshi painted
can scope above or below the intensional verb want. On the narrow-scope reading, Katia is an
admirer of Sakshi’s and has the de dicto desire to own any painting that Sakshi has painted. On
the wide-scope reading, Katia wants a certain set of paintings, which happen to all be painted
by Sakshi, possibly unbeknownst to Katia. The equivalent narrow-scope reading disappears in
the ACD example in (240b). Only a wide-scope reading survives, where Katia wants a certain set
of paintings, all of which Sakshi also wants. In the absence of ellipsis, the narrow-scope reading
reappears. Thus, (240c) has a reading where Katia has the de dicto desire to have any painting that
Sakshi also wants.
(240) ACD forces scope shifting
a.

Baseline
Katia wanted every painting that Sakshi painted.

3

want ≫ every; 3every ≫ want

b. ACD
Katia wanted every painting that Sakshi did ∆.
c.

*want ≫ every; 3every ≫ want

No ellipsis
Katia wanted every painting that Sakshi wanted.

3

want ≫ every; 3every ≫ want

This scope pattern follows if the movement of the object to a VP-external position leaves a trace
of type e, i.e. is QR. Thus, covert movement of the object leaving a type-e trace not only creates
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a suitable antecedent for ellipsis, it also makes a nontrivial, correct prediction about the scope
of the object. Now, consider if the covert movement step instead mapped onto a GQ-trace. As
schematized in (241), a GQ-trace would still provide a suitable antecedent for ellipsis—assuming that
the movement in the relative clause could also leave a GQ-trace, a possibility that one admitting
GQ-traces into the grammar is forced to contend with.
(241) ACD derivation with GQ-traces
[ Subj [ λ1 [VP V T1 ] ] [DP DP [RC λ2 . . . ⟨V T2 ⟩ ] ]1 ]
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¸¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¶
´¹¹ ¹ ¸ ¹ ¹ ¹¶
antecedent VP

elided VP

However, a GQ-trace would not derive the scope pattern in (240). Crucially, QR is not done in
ACD configurations in order to give the object a certain scope; this can be done without ACD, as
illustrated by (240c). Rather, QR is done to provide a suitable antecedent for ellipsis, for which
at least type-e and type-⟨et, t⟩ traces would suffice. If the only possible trace that movement can
map onto is type e, in accordance with the Trace Interpretation Constraint (TIC), the scope facts
in (240) follow directly. On the other hand, if there are higher-type traces, then they would have to
be blocked in ACD.
3.2.4.2

Extraposition

The second argument concerns extraposition and is thus related to the ACD argument under Fox’s
(2002) proposal that ACD involves extraposition. Williams (1974) observes that extraposition of
an adjunct from a DP forces that DP to take scope at least as high as the extraposition site. Fox
and Nissenbaum (1999) call this Williams’s Generalization. 14 To illustrate, first consider the
baseline sentence in (242), which has two readings. On the first reading, I have read all the books in
some certain set before you read them. You may have read some of the individual books first, but I
finished the full set of books first. On the second reading, for each book, I read that book before
you read it. This scope ambiguity correlates with the position of every book. The first reading
results from every book being contained in the antecedent for ellipsis, i.e. below before. The second

14 Bhatt and Pancheva (2007) also show that Williams’s Generalization holds for degree adjuncts.
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reading results from every book having moved above the ellipsis site and binding variables in both
the antecedent and elided VPs, i.e. above before.
(242) I read every book [ before you did ∆].

[Fox 2002:72]

The sentence in (243a) without extraposition is ambiguous in the same way as (242). However, the
sentence in (243b), where the relative clause has been extraposed, is not ambiguous. It only has the
second reading from (242), where every book takes scope above before.
(243) a.

I read every book that John had recommended [ before you did ∆].

b. I read every book [ before you did ∆] that John had recommended.

[Fox 2002:72]

Fox and Nissenbaum (1999) propose that extraposition involves a derivation where the adjunct
late-merges to the host DP after it has undergone covert movement to the extraposition site. This
movement leaves a trace of type e, i.e. is QR, thereby accounting for Williams’s Generalization.
Again, consider if the covert movement step instead mapped onto a GQ-trace. A GQ-trace would still
allow for a Late Merge analysis of extraposition, but it would not derive Williams’s Generalization.
Although the reason that an adjunct extraposes is somewhat mysterious, it is presumably not done
to give the host DP a certain scope, which can be achieved without extraposition, as illustrated
by (243a). If the only possible trace that movement can map onto is type e, in accordance with the
TIC, the scope facts in (243) follow directly. 15 On the other hand, if there are higher-type traces,
then they would have to be blocked in extraposition.
3.2.4.3

Parasitic gaps

The third argument concerns parasitic gaps. Following Nissenbaum (2000), a parasitic gap is
derived by a null operator moving from the parasitic gap position to the edge of the adjunct clause,
the result of which is a λ-abstraction that binds a variable located in the gap position (244). This
predicate then conjoins with the λ-abstraction created by A-movement.

15 Assuming that adjuncts are a higher semantic type, the TIC also blocks whatever type of trace would be required to
move just the adjunct, perhaps independently forcing Fox and Nissenbaum’s (1999) Late Merge analysis.
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(244) Derivation of a parasitic-gap construction
[ Op1 [ . . . t 1 . . . ] ] ↝LF [ λx [ . . . x . . . ] ]

[Nissenbaum 2000]

If the trace forming a parasitic-gap construction could be a GQ-trace, it would be possible for
a moved quantificational expression to take scope inside the adjunct clause. This prediction is
somewhat difficult to test given independent constraints on where parasitic gaps can appear, but
consider the sentence in (245). To the extent that (245) is acceptable, how many people cannot take
scope below want. This hypothetical reading can be paraphrased as follows: what is the number n
such that there are n-many people that John blackmailed because in all of his doxastic alternatives,
there are n-many people that John extorts for money. Such a reading might be used, e.g., in a
scenario where John is blackmailing people in order to extort their spouses.
(245)

3

how many ≫ want; *want ≫ how many

Scope in parasitic-gap constructions
? [ How many people ]1 did John blackmail

1

[ because he wanted to extort pg for money ]?
The lack of this reading follows directly if the movement in a parasitic-gap construction must leave
a type-e trace because no other type is available, as per the TIC. On the other hand, if there are
higher-type traces, then they would have to be blocked in parasitic-gap constructions.
The crux of these arguments is that a grammar with higher-type traces would have to restrict
their distribution in an ad hoc manner. However, according to the Trace Interpretation Constraint,
the scope facts in ACD, extraposition, and parasitic gaps follow because if movement must be used
to achieve some means, the only trace available to that movement ranges over an individual type.

126

3.3

Traces vs. reconstruction

The view to emerge from the Trace Interpretation Constraint (TIC) is that movement only has two
possible semantic representations: mapping onto an individual-type trace (246) or reconstructing (247). All other representations are ill-formed.
(246) Mapping onto a trace

(247) Reconstruction

[ DP1 λx e . . . [ . . . [ x e ]1 . . . ] ]

[

1

. . . [ . . . [ DP ]1 . . . ] ]
reconstruct

Against this backdrop, this section develops a syntax and semantics of movement where the
choice between (246) and (247) is not free, but deterministic. 16 Thus, a given movement derivation
maps onto one and only one semantic representation. For reasons that will be clear shortly, I call
this system the dp/qp-movement system. I start in section 3.3.1 by sketching a copy-theoretic
version of the proposal, which is intended to lower the barrier of entry to the full multidominant
version and illustrate the main ideas. We will see that the copy-theoretic version is unable to
generate some of the syntactic structures required, which will drive us towards multidominance.
The multidominant implementation is developed across sections 3.3.2–3.3.7. Section 3.3.8 ends
by discussing the typology of movement both within English and crosslinguistically that the
DP/QP-movement system predicts.

3.3.1

A copy-theoretic sketch of the proposal

The core proposal is that the syntactic and semantic behavior of a movement step depends entirely
on the identity of the moving element. Limiting ourselves to the entity domain, I will focus on the
contrast between moving a DP and moving a QP (i.e. question-particle phrase; Cable 2007, 2010). 17
Under the proposal, these are the two types of phrases that allow entity-denoting expressions to be
displaced at PF or LF. For shorthand, I will refer to them as DP-movement and QP-movement,
but they should be understood as movement of DPs and QPs respectively and not as primitives in

16 This section is an exposé of using multidominance to solve a new problem. I thank Kyle Johnson for the many
meetings spent discussing the ideas here and apologize if they are clumsily executed.

17 QP should not be confused with quantifier phrase.
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any sense. 18 The properties of some other phrase types under movement—namely VPs, APs, and
DegPs—will be discussed in section 3.4.4.
Moving a DP maps onto a λ-abstraction that binds a variable of type e, i.e. an entity trace (248). In
particular, DP-movement is interpreted via Trace Conversion, wherein the lower copy of movement
is converted into an anaphoric definite description (Engdahl 1980, 1986; Sauerland 1998, 2004; Fox
1999, 2002, 2003). Thus, the λ-bound variable is a subpart of the definite description; it translates
into an identity function (249), which composes with the NP via conjunction.
(248) Movement of a DP
[ DP1 . . . [ . . . DP1 . . . ] ] ↝LF [ [DP D NP ]1 λx e . . . [ . . . [DP the id-x NP ]1 . . . ] ]
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¸¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¶
Trace Conversion

(249) Identity function
⟦id-x⟧ = λye . y = x
Moving a QP results in reconstruction of everything except the Q0 head (250). The interpretation
of QP-movement follows from the semantics of the Q0 head. It only composes with propositiondenoting expressions, and therefore it cannot semantically compose with its own complement,
thereby forcing the two to disassociate at LF. This process is equivalent to Kotek’s (2014) Q-fission.
(250) Movement of a QP
[ [QP Q XP ]1 . . . [ . . . [QP Q XP ]1 . . . ] ] ↝LF [ [QP Q XP ]1 . . . [ . . . [QP Q XP ]1 . . . ] ]
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¸¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¶
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹¸ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¶
Interpret Q

Interpet XP

Therefore, movement that shifts scope is movement of a DP and movement that reconstructs is
movement of a QP. Interesting interactions emerge when DP-movement and QP-movement are
chained together. I will argue that while QP-movement can follow DP-movement, it cannot precede
DP-movement. For now, we must take as assumptions that the derivation in (251a) is grammatical,
while the derivation in (251b) is ungrammatical. In the multidominant implementation, these will
not have to be taken as assumptions. Crucially, (251a) is the important structure that cannot be
generated under a copy-theoretic approach to movement.

18 DP-movement should not be confused with NP-movement in the sense of van Riemsdijk and Williams (1981).
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(251) a.

QP-movement following DP-movement
Build QP

QP-mvt
3

[ [QP Q DP1 ]2 . . . [ [QP Q DP1 ]2 . . . [ . . . DP1 . . . ] ] ]
DP-mvt

b. DP-movement following QP-movement
DP-mvt

*[ DP1 . . . [ [QP Q DP1 ]2 . . . [ . . . [QP Q DP1 ]2 . . . ] ] ]
QP-mvt

Under the DP/QP-movement system, DP-movement is semantically equivalent to QR. The difference
between the two is that DP-movement may manifest overtly, a difference that I will attribute to
linearization. Thus, drawing this connection to QR, whether a movement chain shifts scope reduces
to whether it invokes an initial step of QR, i.e. DP-movement.
This proposal therefore allows different movement types to be stated in terms of different
sequences of DP- and QP-movement. To illustrate, consider wh-movement and topicalization.
Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 showed that wh-movement can optionally shift the scope of the moved
DP, while topicalization must do so obligatorily. According to my proposal, these scope facts
reflect different syntactic derivations. Wh-movement has two possible derivations: one with DPmovement followed by QP-movement (252a) and one with only a step of QP-movement (252b).
Only when the derivation includes DP-movement is the scope of the wh-phrase shifted; otherwise,
it takes scope in situ.
(252) Two derivations for wh-movement
a.

QP-movement following DP-movement
QP-mvt

wh-phrase ≫ Op

Build QP

[CP [QP wh1 ]2 C0Q . . . [ [QP wh1 ]2 . . . [ Op . . . [ . . . wh . . . ] ] ] ]
DP-mvt

b. Just QP-movement
[CP [QP wh ]1 C0Q

Op ≫ wh-phrase

. . . [ Op . . . [ . . . [QP wh ]1 . . . ] ] ]
QP-mvt

Topicalization, on the other hand, only has a derivation involving DP-movement (253). Therefore,
it obligatorily shifts the scope of the moved DP.
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(253) Derivation of topicalization
[TopicP DP1 Topic0 . . . [ Op . . . [ . . . DP1 . . . ] ] ]

DP ≫ Op

DP-mvt

The difference between the derivations for wh-movement and topicalization ultimately reduces
to the category targeted by the final movement step. Following contemporary Minimalist syntax,
I assume that it is a probe that drives the movement. Wh-movement is driven by a probe targeting
a QP (254a), while topicalization is driven by a probe targeting a DP (254b). 19 Because a QP shell
can be constructed on top of a moved DP, the wh-movement probe is oblivious to whether the
wh-phrase has undergone prior DP-movement. It can happen or it can not happen; the wh-probe
will only see the QP. The topicalization probe is likewise blind to whether the DP that it targets has
undergone prior DP-movement. Notwithstanding, the step of DP-movement that the topicalization
probe itself triggers will render any intermediate steps of DP-movement superfluous because the
DP will take scope in the landing site of topicalization regardless, by virtue of being DP-movement.
(254) a.

Wh-movement probe
C0Q : [●q●]

b. Topicalization probe
Topic0 : [●d●]
Accordingly, the “wh-movement” and “topicalization” parts of the movement derivation really only
constitute the final movement step that the relevant probe triggers. DP-movement—what is essentially QR—can freely occur before that final movement step takes place. We will see in section 3.4
that this optional step of DP-movement is linked to a number of reconstruction phenomena. In
sum, under this proposal, different movement types do not constitute different primitives, but
rather amount to distinct syntactic derivations, which in turn are caused by movement-driving
probes targeting different phrase types.
The following four sections flesh out the details of the proposal sketched here. Section 3.3.2
introduces Johnson’s (2012, 2014) parallel-Merge multidominant syntax that the proposal is
implemented in. Section 3.3.3 demonstrates how these multidominant structures can be linearized.

19 A bullet feature [●x●] is satisfied by merging a projection of X. The notation comes from Heck and Müller (2007).
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In sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.5 respectively, I work through QP-movement and DP-movement in detail.
Section 3.3.6 discusses chaining together individual instances of QP-movement and DP-movement,
including which combinations are possible and which are not. Section 3.3.7 discusses crossclausal
movement. In section 3.3.8, I then discuss how these pieces account for different movement types
within and across languages.

3.3.2

Building structures with Parallel-Merge

As background, I will assume familiarity with the Copy Theory of Movement (CTM), wherein a
trace is a copy of the moved element (Chomsky 1993, 1995b). An established challenge for the CTM
is how to deal with copy identity. For copies to do even the minimal amount of work necessary
requires that two conditions be met: (i) exactly one copy of an element must be pronounced at PF
and (ii) at least one copy of an element must be interpreted at LF. The problem is that satisfying these
conditions requires knowing whether a syntactic object is a copy of another syntactic object—and
the Copy Theory of Movement does not give copy identity. Existing analyses of how to satisfy
these two conditions are forced to concede copy identity as a stipulation (e.g. Nunes 2004 for PF
and Sportiche 2015 for LF). One prevalent response to this problem, which I will pursue here, is that
instead of merging copies (255a), movement is really merging a single syntactic object in multiple
syntactic positions (255b). 20 This approach is called multidominance. 21
(255) a.

b. Multidominance

Copy Theory of Movement
XP
α1

XP
XP

X

XP
YP

Y

X
α1

α

YP
Y

20 For ease of presentation, the order of heads, complements, and specifiers in multidominant graphs will be depicted
in whichever order is convenient. It should not be read as implying a particular linearization.

21 See Engdahl (1986); Gärtner (1997, 2002); Nunes (2001); Starke (2001); Zhang (2004); Frampton (2004); Citko (2005);
van Riemsdijk (2006); Bachrach and Katzir (2009); de Vries (2009); Johnson (2012, 2014); amongst many others.
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Displacement in both theories is the surface manifestation of linearization forcing an element to
phonologically appear in only one of its syntactic positions (Nunes 2004). The difference between
the CTM and multidominance is that in multidominance, identity is simple selfhood. Therefore,
in (255b), the grammar does not have to do or know anything special to determine that α in
[Comp, YP] and α in [Spec, XP] are instantiations of the same syntactic object because they are
the same syntactic object. The same ease cannot be said of (255a). The CTM requires keeping some
record of a syntactic object and its copies, which would violate Inclusiveness.
Multidominant structures are built using a version of Internal Merge like (256), commonly
referred to as “re-Merge”.
(256) Internal Merge as re-Merge
Merge(α, γ) = {α, γ}, where γ ⊆ α
There are two problems with the formulation of Merge in (256), which will lead us to adopt a more
nuanced version of multidominance. First, it violates the Extension Condition, as formulated
in (257), according to which the arguments to Merge must be root nodes. The Extension Condition
derives the cyclicity of structure building in the syntax: Merge always extends the structure. 22
In (256), γ is by definition not a root node because it is a subpart of α.
(257)

Extension Condition
Merge is only defined for root nodes.

Second, the re-Merge theory requires two separate versions of Merge: one version that only
applies to root nodes (External Merge) and another version that applies to a root node and one of
its subparts (256) (Internal Merge).
Johnson (2012, 2014) proposes a solution to these problems of the re-Merge theory. Instead of
multidominant structures like (255b), the multidominant structures are actually like (258). There
are four things to observe about (258): (i) α is merged with two separate heads Y0 and Z0 , (ii) Y0
and Z0 project their own YP and ZP respectively, (iii) YP is merged in the structure as normal,

22 An avenue that one could pursue is to relax the Extension Condition such that only one of Merge’s arguments needs
to be a root node, but this would entail that Merge is an asymmetric relation. This is an undesirable concession if
Merge is to be a simple operation, as assumed in the Minimalist Program.
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and (iv) ZP is merged in the “landing site” of movement. The result is that α still exists in two
syntactic positions, but the violation of the Extension Condition in (255b) is circumvented by using
ZP as a “shell”. Consequently, in (258), all instances of Merge involve only root nodes. There is no
violation of the Extension Condition, and only one version of Merge is needed.
(258) Johnson’s (2012, 2014) multidominant syntax
XP
ZP

XP

Z

X
α

YP
Y

The technical machinery needed to build structures like (258) is Parallel-Merge (Citko 2005).
The basic idea behind parallel-Merge is that applications of Merge can happen simultaneously to
create structures like (259) with two separate root nodes sharing a subpart. 23
(259) Parallel-Merge
YP
Y

ZP
α

Z

After the structure in (259) has been constructed, the YP merges with X0 to form XP and finally ZP
merges with this XP, resulting in (258). Again, because of parallel-Merge, all instances of Merge
in this derivation involve only root nodes, thereby satisfying the Extension Condition. One of the
important questions thus becomes the identity of the shell ZP in different movement types. In
sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.5, I will extend on Johnson’s (2012, 2014) proposal that QP and DP are two
such shell projections that facilitate movement dependencies.
Johnson (2012, 2014) is not explicit about what motivates the creation of a movement dependency,
i.e. invoking parallel-Merge. Following standard assumptions in minimalist syntax, I assume that
movement is (abstractly) motivated by features. To distinguish movement-driving probes, I make

23 There are other ways of conceiving of parallel Merge, such as van Riemsdijk’s (2006) grafting, but I do not discuss
them here because it would take us too far afield. The precise mechanics of how to arrive at the structure in (259) is
not crucial to our purposes here.
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use of the “bullet” and “star” notation for features (Heck and Müller 2007). Bullet features are
structure-building features which trigger Merge (potentially after Agree); they are notated as
[●f●]. Star features are pure-agreement features which are satisfied by Agree alone and do not
invoke movement; they are notated as [⋆f⋆]. For example, in the structure in (258), the creation
of the movement dependency is driven by a [●z●]-feature on X (following Bare Phrase Structure,
XP is X), which the ZP satisfies by merging in its specifier, and α is shared by Z and Y, thereby
satisfying their individual [●α●]-features. This is schematized in (260).
(260) Bullet features drive “movement”
XP
ZP

XP

Z[●α●]

X[●z●] YP
α

Y[●α●]

For the sake of simplicity, I will continue to use nonmultidominance vocabulary like “launching
site” and “landing site”, even though there is no movement per se in multidominance.
Over the course of this chapter, we will see that the parallel-Merge multidominant syntax
when paired with an explicit semantics provides two novel benefits: First, it allows us to develop a
deterministic syntax–semantics mapping for movement. Under this system, whether a movement
dependency maps onto a trace or reconstructs depends solely on the syntactic derivation underlying the dependency, rather than being a free choice made at LF. As a consequence, the Trace
Interpretation Constraint (TIC) can be baked into the system while not affecting reconstruction.
Second, different movement types can be stated in terms of different syntactic derivations. This
will narrow down the range of answers to and make predictions about why some movement
types cannot reconstruct. I will show that these benefits are not available under the CTM without
permitting pervasive countercyclicity. At the same time, the parallel-Merge syntax, in particular
the importance it places on the Extension Condition, will limit the range of possible movement
derivations, and thus movement types, in novel—and I will argue, correct—ways.
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3.3.3

Linearizing multidominant structures

This section sketches an algorithm for linearizing the parallel-Merge multidominant structures
introduced in the previous section. The algorithm was developed in Johnson (2016), though I have
made minor improvements to some of the formulations. This section is intended as a proof of
concept to show that linearizing multidominant structures is in principle possible, though what
is presented here may not necessarily be the exact algorithm. Nonetheless, I will assume this
algorithm throughout the remainder of the chapter for the sake of concreteness.
The linearization algorithm generates a set of possible orderings of the Vocabulary Items
in a given structure, e.g. x < y or y < x. This set of orderings is then submitted to a series of
constraints that rule out illicit orderings. To accommodate multidominance, these constraints make
reference to the notion of a path: a set of nodes between some node α and the root node in the
structure. There are two preliminary components to the linearization algorithm: First, when a
structure is to be linearized, the algorithm picks out a set of paths Π for the vocabulary items in the
structure (261a). For the sake of simplicity, I will treat the vocabulary items as being the terminal
nodes. Second, the constraints make use of the relation d, which maps a phrase p onto the set of
vocabulary items containing p in their path (261b)–(261c). In other words, the d-relation returns
the terminal nodes that a phrase dominates given a particular set of paths.
(261) Let Σ be a structure, W be the set of vocabulary items w in Σ, and P be the set of phrases p
in Σ.
a.

Π(Σ) is a set of paths formed from members of W.

b. d(p) = {w ∣ w ∈ W ∧ ∃π ∈ Π[p ∈ π(w)]}
c.

d(w) = w

The set of orderings that the linearization algorithm generates must satisfy three constraints:
Totality ensures that every vocabulary item in the structure has a path in Π (262). Antisymmetry
prohibits the linearization from containing any contradictions (263). Finally, Contiguity guarantees (i) that every path is represented in the linearization and (ii) that a path is linearized uniformly
with respect to other elements not in that path (264).
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(262)

Totality
For every w ∈ W, Π(Σ) must contain a π(w).

(263)

Antisymmetry
A linearization cannot have both x < y and y < x.

(264)

Contiguity
Every π ∈ Π(Σ) must be a path in which for every p ∈ π that has a daughter p ′ ∉ π, then
the linearization contains ordering such that one of the following is true:
a.

∀x,y [(x ∈ d(p) − d(p ′ ) ∧ y ∈ d(p ′ )) → x < y]

b. ∀x,y [(x ∈ d(p) − d(p ′ ) ∧ y ∈ d(p ′ )) → y < x]
The choice between (264a) and (264b)—what is essentially headedness—is a language-specific
preference. There is further room in the algorithm for other language-specific preferences to affect
the linearization, namely via the selection of path when a vocabulary item has multiple possible
paths, i.e. is multidominated, as will be illustrated below shortly.
To illustrate how the path-based linearization algorithm works, let us start by examining how
the simple non-multidominant structure in (265) is linearized. Because the structure does not
invoke multidominance, there are only two possible linearizations, based on headedness.
(265)

XP1
Z

XP2
X

YP
Y

W

First, consider the largest possible set of paths Π that satisfies Totality, given in (266). It contains a
path for each vocabulary item. Every vocabulary item only has one possible path in (265) because
there is no multidominance. Therefore, (266) is the only possible Π for the structure in (265).
(266) Set of paths Π for (265)
a.

π(Y) = {YP, XP2 , XP1 }

b.

π(W) = {YP, XP2 , XP1 }

c.

π(X) = {XP2 , XP1 }
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d.

π(Z) = {XP1 }

Second, based on the set of paths Π in (266), the d-relations are calculated in (267). Only the drelations for phrases are shown, given that the d-relation of a vocabulary item is trivially itself.
(267) d-relations for (266)
a. d(XP1 ) = {Z, X, W, Y}
b. d(XP2 ) = {X, W, Y}
c.

d(YP) = {W, Y}

The set of paths Π in (266) and the d-relations in (267) allow a given linearization to be evaluated for
Contiguity. Assume that the language in question linearizes heads to the left of their complement,
like English. The correct linearization then is the set of orderings in (268).
(268) Linearization of (265)
⎧
⎪
Z<X X<Y Y<W
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨ Z<Y X<W
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩ Z<W

⎫
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎬
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎭

All of the orderings in (268) satisfy Contiguity. For illustration, consider the path π(X), which
contains the phrases XP1 and XP2 (266c). The phrase XP2 has a daughter YP which is not in π(X).
Therefore, all the vocabulary items that have YP in their path, namely W and Y (267c), must be
ordered uniformly with respect to X. This condition holds in (268) because it contains the orderings
X < Y and X < W, and not, e.g., X < Y and W < X. The reader can verify that Contiguity holds for
the other paths in (266) given the linearization in (268), as well.
With a multidominant structure, an element that has been merged in multiple positions will
have available to it multiple paths. This allows for different linearizations, contingent on the path
chosen to be in Π. For example, consider the structure in (269) where W is both the complement of Y
and the complement of Z. W has two possible paths to the maximal projection XP1 . If Π contains
the path in (269a), then the linearization will be identical to the one in (268) because the paths in Π
will be the same (modulo the addition of ZP). However, if Π instead contains the path in (269b),
then W must be linearized contiguously with Z in order to satisfy Contiguity, which crucially
results in W appearing displaced in the surface string.
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(269) a.

b. Path for W resulting in displacement

Path for W resulting in in situ
XP1
XP2
X

ZP

YP
Y

XP1
XP2
Z

X

W

ZP

YP
Y

Z
W

Consider the path π(W) in (269b), which contains the phrases ZP and XP1 . The phrase XP1 has
a daughter XP2 that is not in π(W). Therefore, to satisfy Contiguity, every vocabulary item that
has XP2 in its path, namely X and Y, must be ordered uniformly with respect to Z and W. There
are two possible linearizations satisfying this condition: one where W and Z are linearized to the
right (270a) and another one where W and Z are linearized to the left (270b).
(270) Possible linearizations of (269b)
a.

{X < W, Y < W, X < Z, Y < Z, . . .}

b. {W < X, W < Y, Z < X, Z < Y, . . .}
A linearization containing the orderings Y < W and Z < Y, where W follows Y but Z precedes Y,
would violate Contiguity. The decision between (270a) and (270b) is language-specific. For example,
one language might prefer its Zs to the left, while another language might prefer them to the right.
What is important to the algorithm is that both options in (270) satisfy Contiguity and hence are
valid linearizations.

3.3.4

QP-movement

Constituent questions crosslinguistically vary on two dimensions: (i) whether the wh-phrase stays
in situ or moves to the clause edge and (ii) the presence of a special question morpheme, which I will
call a Q-particle (following Hagstrom 1998; Kishimoto 2005; Cable 2007, 2010). All four factorial
possibilities are instantiated across the world’s languages: 24 Japanese is a wh-in-situ language

24 Another type of language is one that appears to be wh-in-situ on the surface, but wh-phrases actually undergo
covert movement to the clause edge at LF. Cable (2007, 2010) proposes that Sinhala (Indo-Aryan; Sri Lanka) is such a
language. In the interest of not going too far afield, I will not discuss such languages in the main text. However,
note that Japanese and Hindi do not fall under this classification. Following Kotek (2014), I assume that genuine
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with a Q-particle ka (271a). Hindi-Urdu (henceforth Hindi) is a wh-in-situ language lacking a
Q-particle (271b). Tlingit (Na-Dene; Alaska, British Columbia, Yukon) is a wh-fronting language
with a Q-particle sá (271c). 25 Finally, English is a wh-fronting language lacking a Q-particle (271d).
(271) Crosslinguistic variation in constituent questions
a.

Japanese
John-ga

[−wh-mvt] [+Q-particle]
nani-o

kaimasita

ka?

John-nom what-acc bought.polite q
‘What did John buy?’
b. Hindi
raam-ne kyaa khaa-yaa thaa?
Ram-erg what eat-pfv
‘What did Ram eat?’
c.

Tlingit
[Daa sá]1 i

[Hagstrom 1998:15]

[−wh-mvt] [−Q-particle]

be.past
[Mahajan 1990:125]

[+wh-mvt] [+Q-particle]
éesh

1

al’óon?

he.hunts.it
what q
your father
‘What is your father hunting?’
d. English
What1 did Mary eat

[Cable 2010:13]

[+wh-mvt] [−Q-particle]
1?

I adopt Cable’s (2007, 2010) proposal that all the constituent questions in (271) actually involve
Q-particles. In languages like Hindi and English, the Q-particle just has no overt realization and
thus is silent. The Q-particle contributes both syntactically and semantically to the formation of a
constituent question. Let us consider each role in turn.
Syntactically, the presence of the Q-particle is what drives interrogative movement of the
wh-phrase to the clause edge. This connection is more transparent in Tlingit, the main language of
Cable’s study. Tlingit is a wh-fronting language, but what is important is that the Q-particle sá
fronts along with the wh-phrase, rather than appearing at the leftmost or rightmost edge of the
clause, like the Japanese Q-particle ka does (see (271a)). Cable supports this generalization with a

wh-in-situ can be diagnosed with focus-intervention effects (see section 3.4.3). Both Japanese and Hindi constituent
questions are subject to intervention and thus are true wh-in-situ languages (Japanese: Hoji 1985 and Hagstrom 1998;
Hindi: Beck 1996, 2006 and Keine 2016). To the best of my knowledge, it is still unknown whether or not Sinhala
constituent questions are subject to intervention (see Hagstrom 2004).

25 Following Cable (2007, 2010), I do not gloss any of the verbal morphology in Tlingit (not that I could).
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number of arguments, three of which I will review here. First, despite Tlingit’s fairly flexible word
order, the wh-phrase along with the Q-particle must appear linearly before the predicate in order
to receive a question interpretation (272). When they appear after the predicate, as in (272c), only a
wh-indefinite interpretation is possible.
(272) Wh-phrase must appear before the predicate
a.

3

Daa sá kéet

axá?

what q killer.whale he.eats.it
‘What do killer whales eat?’
b. 3 Kéet

daa sá axá?

killer.whale what q he.eats.it
c. * Kéet

axá?

daa sá.

killer.whale he.eats.it what q
Intended: ‘What do killer whales eat?
Okay: A killer whale will eat anything.

[Cable 2010:24–26]

Second, in a long-distance question, the wh-phrase and the Q-particle must appear to the left of
the main predicate (273a) and cannot appear in their lower base position (273b).
(273) Long-distance questions require long-distance movement
a.

3

[Daa sá]1 haa kóo at latóowu haa yawsikaa [
what q
our teacher
he.told.us
‘What did our teacher tell us to read?’

1

wutootoowú ]?
we.read.it

b. * Haa kóo at latóowu haa yawsikaa [ daa sá wutootoowú ]?
our teacher

he.told.us

what q we.read.it

[Cable 2010:29]

Third, the wh-phrase and the Q-particle travel together and cannot be separated (274).
(274) Wh-phrase and Q-particle travel together
a.

3

Daa sá iyatéen?
what q you.can.see.it
‘What can you see?’

b. * Daa iyatéen

sá?

what you.can.see.it q

[Cable 2010:35]
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Cable concludes based on these data that the wh-phrase and the Q-particle move from their base
position to the clause edge in Tlingit constituent questions.
Like English, in Tlingit, the wh-phrase may pied-pipe additional material along with it to the
clause edge. The Q-particle sá always appears at the right edge of the fronted constituent (275).
(275) Tlingit pied-piping
a.

[Aadóo yaagú sá] ysiteen?
who
boat q you.saw.it
‘Whose boat did you see?’

b. [Daakw keitl sá] asháa?
which dog q it.barks
‘Which dog is barking?’
c.

[Goodéi

wugootx sá] has oowajée i

shagóonich?

where.to he.went q they.think your parents.erg
‘Where do your parents think that he went?’
d. [[CP Wáa kwligeyi

] xáat sá] i

tuwáa sigóo?

how it.is.big.rel fish q your spirit it.is.happy
‘How big a fish do you want?’ (Literally: ‘A fish that is how big do you want?’)
[Cable 2010:32–33]

Cable argues that the constituent moving in Tlingit constituent questions is a projection headed by
the Q-particle itself. The Q-particle merges with a constituent that properly contains the wh-phrase,
and it projects a further phrasal layer, namely a QP (276).
(276)

QP
XP

Q projects

Q

wh-phrase

Interrogative movement to the clause edge hence does not target a wh-phrase directly, but rather a
QP, or more precisely Q-features (277).
(277) Tlingit interrogative movement is Q-movement
a.

[ [QP Aadóo yaagú sáq ]1 . . . [

b. [ [QP Daakw keitl sáq ]1 . . . [

1
1

ysiteen ] ]?

asháa ] ]?

141

(=275a)
(=275b)

c.

[ [QP Goodéi wugootx sáq ]1 . . . [ has oowajée

d. [ [QP Wáa kwligeyi xáat sáq ]1 . . . [ i tuwáa

1
1

i shagóonich ] ]?

(=275c)

sigóo ] ]?

(=275d)

The main advantage of the Q-movement analysis of pied-piping is that it achieves the same result
of feature percolation without the problematic mechanism (see Heck 2004 for discussion of the
problems with feature percolation). Moreover, the analysis for Tlingit extends to English piedpiping as well, as schematized in (278). In each example, what moves to the clause edge is not the
wh-phrase—or some larger constituent up to which the wh-feature has percolated—, but rather a
QP that contains the wh-phrase. The difference between Tlingit and English is that only in Tlingit
is the Q-particle overtly realized.
(278) English interrogative movement is Q-movement
a.

[ [QP Q what ]1 did Mary eat

1

]?

b. [ [QP Q whose sandwich ]1 did Mary eat
c.

1

]?

[ [QP Q at which table ]1 did Mary eat the sandwich

1

]?

As exemplified in (275), the range of pied-pipeable material in Tlingit is greater than that in English.
For example, Tlingit can pied-pipe clausal material (275c), while English cannot. A large part of the
Q-movement analysis involves regulating where in the structure the Q-particle can merge, and this
factor is subject to crosslinguistic variation. I will limit our focus to English; the reader is referred
to Cable (2007, 2010) for more detailed discussion. Cable argues that English belongs to the class
of Limited Pied-Piping Languages (279), where the Q-particle must agree with the wh-phrase
and this Agree-relationship is sensitive to locality.
(279)

Limited Pied-piping Languages
If the Q-particle must Agree with the wh-word it c-commands, then a wh-word cannot be
dominated in the sister of Q by islands or lexical categories (e.g. NP, AP, VP). Thus, limited
pied-piping languages are those where Q/wh-agreement must occur.

[Cable 2010:147]

The limiting locality constraint on English pied-piping thus is that the Agree-relationship between
the Q-particle and the wh-phrase cannot cross lexical heads, which explains the piped-piping
distribution in (280). Note that this requires treating prepositions as functional material.
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(280) English pied-piping cannot cross lexical material
a.

3

I wonder [ [DP whose pictures ]1 John brought

1

b. * I wonder [ [NP pictures of whom ]1 John brought
c. * I wonder [ [AP proud of whom ]1 John was
d. * I wonder [ [VP eaten what ]1 John has

1

1

].
1

].

].
[Cable 2010:151]

].

Regarding wh-in-situ languages, Cable proposes that in such languages, the Q-particle instead
adjoins to a constituent containing the wh-phrase and does not project its own phrasal QP-layer.
Whether the Q-particle adjoins or projects is a language-specific parameter. The two possible
resulting structures are schematized in (281).
(281) a.

b. Q-adjunction language

Q-projection language
QP
XP
wh-phrase

XP
Q

XP

Q

wh-phrase

Agree

In both kinds of languages, the wh-probe on C0 targets Q-features to move to the clause edge,
i.e. [Spec, CP]. In a Q-projection language, like Tlingit and English, the wh-probe searches into the
structure, finds the QP, and moves the entire QP to [Spec, CP], thereby resulting in a wh-fronting
language (282). In a Q-adjunction language, like Japanese and Hindi, the wh-probe searches into
the structure, but only finds the Q-particle itself, which it moves to [Spec, CP], thereby resulting in
a wh-in-situ language (283). Again, in English and Hindi, the Q-particle has no overt realization,
obscuring its syntactic role in forming a constituent question.
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(282) Q-projection language

(283) Q-adjunction language

CP

CP

QP
Q

CP
XP

Q

C

C

⋮
QP

wh-phrase

CP
⋮
XP

⋮
Q

⋮
XP

wh-phrase

As we will see below shortly, once we transition to the parallel-Merge multidominant syntax, the
distinction between Q-adjunction and Q-projection languages becomes unnecessary. Instead, in all
languages, the Q-particle projects a phrasal QP-layer, but languages differ in whether or not the
wh-phrase is linearized contiguously with the Q-particle.
Implementing Cable’s (2007, 2010) Q-particle proposal in multidominance yields the structure
in (284), where the wh-phrase occupies both its ordinary base position (here, the internal argument
of the verb) and the complement position of QP (Johnson 2012, 2014). The QP is merged directly
in [Spec, CP], satisfying the [●q●]-feature on the question complementizer C0 . Thus, the “shell”
projection in the movement dependency is the QP.
(284) Q-particles under multidominance
CP
QP
Q

CP
C[●q●]

⋮
vP

⋮

v

VP
wh-phrase

V
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The structure in (284) involves the wh-phrase being merged in parallel with Q0 and the sister of its
base position, e.g. V0 for an object (285a) and vP for a subject (285b). 26 These instances of Merge
all involve only root nodes and result in two root nodes sharing the wh-phrase. The two resulting
root nodes are then merged into the structure like normally.
(285) a.

b. Wh-phrase in subject position

Wh-phrase in object position
QP
Q

VP
wh

vP

QP
V

Q

wh

vP

Displacement in constituent questions is purely the byproduct of linearization, in particular which
path for the wh-phrase is passed into the linearization algorithm (see section 3.3.3). In wh-fronting
languages, like Tlingit and English, there is a language-specific preference to linearize a wh-phrase
in [Spec, CP], contiguous with the Q-particle. This preference is encoded by choosing the path
for the wh-phrase through the QP, as schematized in (286). By selecting the path through QP,
the algorithm returns a linearization with the wh-phrase displaced in the surface string. On the
other hand, in wh-in-situ languages, like Japanese and Hindi, there is no such preference, and the
chosen path for the wh-phrase is through its base position, as schematized in (287). The resulting
linearization hence places the wh-phrase in situ. The Q-particle will nevertheless be linearized via
the only path available to it, i.e. through the QP, but it will not be linearized contiguously with the
wh-phrase; this is the behavior of the Japanese Q-particle ka.

26 An advantage of the parallel-Merge structures in (285) is that they straightforwardly account for how a wh-phrase
satisfies subcategorization requirements: it merges with the subcategorizing head directly, like it normally would if
it were not a wh-phrase. Subcategorization requires an extra stipulation under a standard copy-theoretic conception
of movement because the QP would always intervene between the wh-phrase and the subcategorizing head.
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(286) Wh-fronting language

(287) Wh-in-situ language

CP
QP
Q

CP
QP

CP
C[●q●]

Q

⋮
vP

⋮

wh-phrase

C[●q●]

⋮
vP

⋮
v

VP

CP

v

VP

V

wh-phrase

V

Consequently, under parallel-Merge multidominance, constituent questions have a uniform syntax
across languages. 27 Surface differences in constituent questions crosslinguistically are the result
of (i) whether the Q-particle is overt and (ii) whether the wh-phrase is linearized contiguously
with the Q-particle. The upshot of this syntactic uniformity is that the semantics of constituent
questions can be treated uniformly as well, irrespective of how a constituent question is linearized.
At LF, the Q-particle establishes a long-distance semantic dependency with the wh-phrase.
QP-movement does not alter the scope of the wh-phrase. Modulo a prior step of DP-movement, as
will be discussed in section 3.3.6, the wh-phrase thus necessarily takes scope in situ. I will entertain
two possibilities about the long-distance dependency instantiated: existential closure over choice
functions (288a) (Engdahl 1980, 1986; Reinhart 1997) or percolation of focus alternatives (288b) (Beck
2006; Beck and Kim 2006; Cable 2007, 2010; Kotek 2014). The squiggle arrow in (288b) indicates
the percolation of focus alternatives.

27 Something equivalent to the Q-adjunction structure is also possible in the parallel-Merge multidominant syntax.
The Q-particle would be merged in the left periphery, but not merged with the wh-phrase. The relationship between
the Q-particle and the wh-phrase would hence need to be handled solely via Agree. This is roughly the analysis
that Hagstrom (1998) proposes for wh-in-situ languages. Cable’s (2007, 2010) proposal where the Q-particle starts
out lower and moves to the left periphery is impossible under parallel-Merge multidominance because the relevant
structure cannot be created without violating the Extension Condition. Regardless, neither of these options is
necessary to derive wh-in-situ languages given that the distinction can be handled purely in terms of linearization.
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(288) Q-particles at LF
a.

Choice functions
[ Q . . . [ Op . . . [ . . . f (wh-phrase) . . . ] ] ]

Op ≫ DP

∃f cf

b. Focus alternatives
[ Q . . . [ Op . . . [ . . . wh-phrase . . . ] ] ]

Op ≫ DP

Under both possiblities, the Q-particle and the wh-phrase disassociate at LF: the Q-particle is
interpreted in [Spec, CP], the landing site of movement, and the wh-phrase is interpreted in its
base position. This disassociation is equivalent to Kotek’s (2014) proposal that the Q-particle and
the wh-phrase separate at LF through a process that she dubs Q-fission (289). However, under the
parallel-Merge multidominant syntax, there is no need to posit a separate operation to achieve
this disassociation. As will be exemplified below, because the wh-phrase exists in two positions in
the structure, it may be interpreted in only one of those positions.
(289) Kotek’s (2014) Q-fission
[ Q [ wh-phrase [ . . . QP . . . ] ] ]

We have already seen the choice-function semantics in action in section 2.5.2, but I will review
it again here in our multidominance framework. According to the choice-function semantics of
constituent questions, the wh-phrase introduces a choice function (290). Because, for a given
set, there are at least as many choice functions over that set as there are elements in it, the resulting
question meaning is equivalent to the standard Hamblin/Karttunen question semantics wherein
questions denote sets of propositions that are possible answers to that question (Hamblin 1973;
Karttunen 1977).
(290)

Choice Function
A function f is a choice function (f cf ) if it applies to any nonempty set and yields a
member of that set.

[Reinhart 1997:372]

Existential closure applies to the choice function introduced by the wh-phrase. Therefore, the
constituent question in (291a) has the denotation in (291b). The set of answers will be functions
that return a cat from the set of all cats. Note that given the definition of a choice function, the
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choice function f in (291b) must return a cat and cannot return, e.g., a dog because a dog would
not be in the set of cats.
(291) Choice-function semantics for constituent questions
a.

[ Which cat ]1 did Mary adopt

b.

λw 0 λp⟨s,t ⟩ . ∃f cf [p = λw . Mary adopted f (cat) in w]

(=156)

1?

Paraphrase: What is the (choice) function f such that the following proposition is true:
Mary adopted the x picked out by f from the set of cats.
A syntacticized version of the choice-function semantics is given in (292). 28 The Q-particle handles
both the existential closure of the choice function and the question formation (the p = q part).
Crucially, even though Q0 merges with a wh-phrase in the syntax, the result is a semantic-type
mismatch. Q0 only composes with the proposition-denoting question nucleus, thereby forcing
the wh-phrase to be interpreted only in its lower position. Finally, the existential closure must
target the choice function that the wh-phrase introduces, and not something else. I assume that
the sisterhood relationship between Q0 and the wh-phrase is sufficient to enforce this connection,
perhaps via the local Agree-relation between the two (see (281a)). 29
(292) Syntacticized choice-function semantics
a.

(=157)

⟦which NP⟧ = λw . f (⟦NP⟧ (w))

b. ⟦Q⟧ = λq ⟨s,t ⟩ λw 0 λp⟨s,t ⟩ . ∃f cf [p = q]
To illustrate, the derivation of (291) is shown in (293). 30 A dashed line is used to indicate that the
wh-phrase is not interpreted in the complement position of QP—descriptively it reconstructs.

28 Note that C0 plays no role in the choice-function semantics of constituent questions, even though it is what drives
interrogative movement in the narrow syntax. This will hold for the focus-alternative semantics as well.

29 It is worth pointing out that Reinhart (1997) does not provide a compositional semantics for her choice-function
analysis of constituent questions.

30 For the sake of simplicity, I ignore intensionality within the DP and do not depict vP in what follows.
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(293) Derivation of (291) with choice-function semantics
CP
QP
Q

CP
C[●q●]

TP

DP
Mary

TP
T

VP
DP

V
adopt

D
NP
which cat
a.

⟦which cat⟧ = f (cat)

b. ⟦adopt⟧ = λx e λye λw . adoptw (x)(y)
c.

⟦VP⟧ = ⟦adopt⟧ (⟦which cat⟧)
= λye λw . adoptw (f (cat))(y)

d. ⟦TP⟧ = ⟦VP⟧ (⟦Mary⟧)
= λw . adoptw (f (cat))(Mary)
e.

⟦CP⟧ = ⟦Q⟧ (⟦TP⟧)
= λw 0 λp⟨s,t ⟩ . ∃f cf [p = λw . adoptw (f (cat))(Mary)]

The semantic derivation in (293) proceeds as follows: First, adopt composes with which cat and
then with Mary via Function Application (293c,d). The result is the proposition “Mary adopted
f (cat)”. At this point in the derivation, the choice function f introduced by the wh-phrase is a free
variable; it will need to be bound in the course of the derivation. Second, the complementizer C0
passes the denotation upwards to the Q-particle, which takes the proposition denoted by TP as its
argument. It applies existential closure over the choice function f and forms the question nucleus
using the proposition denoted by TP (293e).
According to the focus-alternative semantics of constituent questions, the wh-phrase denotes
a set of alternatives. For the sake of concreteness, I will adopt a simplified implementation
of Kotek (2014), which itself builds on the semantics in Beck (2006) and Beck and Kim (2006).
Following the standard alternative semantics developed in Rooth (1985, 1992), natural-language
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expressions have both an ordinary value (⟦. . .⟧o ) and a focus-semantic value (⟦. . .⟧f ). F-marked
constituents have as their focus-semantic value a set of alternatives to the expression’s ordinary
denotation. If an expression is not F-marked, its focus-semantic value is the singleton set containing
its ordinary value. This is stated in the Terminal Nodes semantic-composition rule in (294a). Focussemantic values compose pointwise with each other using the recursive definition of Function
Application in (294b). The focus alternatives “percolate” up the structure until a focus-sensitive
element, e.g. only or the Q-particle, makes use of them or resets the focus-semantic value.
(294) Semantic-composition rules in alternative semantics
Terminal Nodes
⎧
o
⎪
if α not F-marked
⎪ {⟦α τ ⟧ }
⟦α τ ⟧f = ⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩ a subset of Dτ if α F-marked
b. Function Application
L
Mf
Q
P
α
τ
⎧
f
f
Q
P
⎪
if α not F-marked
⎪ {b(д) ∣ b ∈ ⟦β⟧ , д ∈ ⟦γ⟧ }
Q
P
Q =⎨
P
Q
P
⎪
⎪
Q
Pβ
⎩ a contextually-determined subset of Dτ if α F-marked
P ⟨σ, τ⟩ γσ Q
N
O
a.

What makes a wh-phrase special is that it has no ordinary value (295a), but its focus-semantic
value is a set of alternatives (295b). The alternatives correspond to the possible answers to the short
question denoted by the wh-phrase.
(295) Alternative semantics of wh-phrases
a.

⟦what⟧o is undefined

b. ⟦what⟧f = {x e ∶ x ∈ nonhuman}
The focus alternatives introduced by a wh-phrase percolate up the structure. However, because a
wh-phrase lacks an ordinary value, any structure containing a wh-phrase also lacks an ordinary
value. This violates the Principle of Interpretability (296).
(296)

Principle of Interpretability
An LF must have an ordinary semantic interpretation.

[Beck 2006; Beck and Kim 2006]

Kotek (2014) proposes that structures containing a wh-phrase must be interpreted using a Q-particle.
The Q-particle takes a set of propositions as its argument and returns that set as the ordinary
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semantic value (297). 31 By shifting the focus-semantic value to the ordinary value, the Q-particle
results in the structure satisfying the Principle of Interpretability. Thus, the Q-particle indirectly
remedies a problem introduced by a wh-phrase’s lack of an ordinary value. As with the choicefunction semantics, even though Q0 merges with a wh-phrase in the syntax, the two do not compose
together semantically. Q0 only composes with the proposition-denoting question nucleus, thereby
forcing the wh-phrase to be interpreted only in its lower position.
(297) Q-particle with alternative semantics
⟦Q α⟧o = ⟦α⟧f
The result of Q-particle is a set of propositions that are possible answers to the question. To
illustrate, the derivation of (291) under the focus-alternative semantics is shown in (298).
(298) Derivation of (291) with alternative semantics
CP : {Mary adopt Garfield, Mary adopt Snowball, . . .}o
QP
Q
foc→ord

CP : {Mary adopt Garfield, Mary adopt Snowball, . . .} f
C[●q●]

TP : {Mary adopt Garfield, Mary adopt Snowball, . . .} f
TP : {adopt Garfield, adopt Snowball, . . .} f

DP
Mary
T

VP : {adopt Garfield, adopt Snowball, . . .} f

{Garfield, Snowball, . . .} f : DP

V
adopt

D
NP
which cat
a.

⟦which cat⟧o is undefined
⟦which cat⟧f = {x e ∶ x ∈ cat}
= {Garfield, Snowball, . . .}

31 Kotek (2014) also proposes that the Q-particle rewrites the focus value to be the singleton set containing the focus

value of its sister: ⟦Q α⟧f = {⟦Q α⟧o }. This is used to derive the semantics of questions with multiple wh-phrases,
which will not concern us here.
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b. ⟦VP⟧o is undefined
⟦VP⟧f = {λye λw . adoptw (x)(y) ∶ x ∈ cat}
= {y adopted Garfield, y adopted Snowball, . . .}
c.

⟦TP⟧o is undefined
⟦TP⟧f = {λw . adoptw (x)(Mary) ∶ x ∈ cat}
= {Mary adopted Garfield, Mary adopted Snowball, . . .}

d. ⟦CP⟧o = ⟦TP⟧f = {λw . adoptw (x)(Mary) ∶ x ∈ cat}
= λp⟨s,t ⟩ . ∃x[cat(x) ∧ p = λw . adoptw (x)(Mary)]
The semantic derivation in (298) proceeds as follows: First, which cat introduces a set of alternatives
as its focus-semantic value (298a). Second, these focus alternatives compose pointwise with adopt
and Mary (298b,c), resulting in a TP whose focus-semantic value is a set of propositions. Because
which cat has an undefined ordinary value, the TP likewise is undefined for an ordinary value. If
the derivation were to stop here, it would violate the Principle of Interpretability because the LF
would lack an ordinary semantic interpretation. Third, the Q-particle takes the focus-semantic
value of its sister and returns it as the ordinary value. The end result is a set of propositions that
are possible answers to the question (298d).
There are two reasons why I entertain different options for the semantics of the Q-particle.
First, it shows that both semantics are in principle compatible with my proposals in this chapter.
Thus, the syntax and semantics of movement developed in this chapter do not require one to choose
between a choice-function or focus-alternative semantics for constituent questions; this decision
can be made independently. Second, although the alternative semantics is generally more suitable
for our purposes, it faces a handful of unresolved problems, the greatest of which, in my opinion, is
functional qestions. Its advantage is that it straightforwardly accounts for focus-intervention
effects, which will be discussed in section 3.4.3. There is not necessarily a principled choice-function
account of focus intervention. 32 However, consider the question in (299a) with the quantificational
phrase no woman. It is possible to answer (299a) with a phrase representing a function like her
first picture, which when given a woman, returns her first picture (Engdahl 1980, 1986; Groenendijk

32 That said, one could analyse focus intervention as a syntactic phenomenon where interveners and wh-phrases bear
the same licensing feature such that an intervener blocks licensing a wh-phrase across it, as Kratzer and Shimoyama
(2002) suggest.
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and Stokhof 1984). 33 Under the choice-function semantics of constituent questions, functional
readings can be easily accommodated by Skolemizing the choice function (299c), in effect passing
it a variable that is bound by the quantifier that yields the functional reading.
(299) Functional questions
a.

[ Which picture (of herself2 ) ]1 does no woman2 like

1?

b. her first picture, her prom picture, . . .
c.

Skolemized choice functions
λw 0 p⟨s,t ⟩ . ∃f cf [p = λw . ¬∃x[womanw (x) ∧ likew (f x (picture))(x)]]

Functional questions crucially require reconstruction of the wh-phrase so that a variable inside the
wh-phrase can be bound by the quantifier (300).
(300) Functional questions require reconstruction
[ Q no woman λx [ x like [ which picture of x ] ]
It is this reconstruction that the focus-alternative semantics cannot handle. While the variable in
the wh-phrase needs to be bound by the quantifier, that same quantifier can also be an intervener,
as the quantifier no is in (299a). According to the alternative semantics, the wh-phrase being in the
scope of an intervener like no should result in ungrammaticality, as it does in other configurations,
e.g. English superiority-violating multiple-wh questions (301) (examples based on Pesetsky 2000),
but it does not.
(301) Negative quantifiers otherwise intervene
a. * [ Which boy ]1 did no girl give [ which book ] to
b. 3 [ Which boy ]1 did the girl give [ which book ] to

1?
1?

Focus intervention will be discussed in greater detail in section 3.4.3. The point to take away now
is that both the choice-function semantics and the focus-alternative semantics are in principle

33 Importantly, as Engdahl (1980, 1986) argues, functional answers cannot be reduced to pair–list answers. For example,
functional answers are possible with quantifiers that do not allow pair–list answers, such as no in (299a). Thus,
“Mary doesn’t like the red picture, Susan doesn’t like the blue picture, . . .” is not a felicitous answer to (299a). Functional
answers have an independent status.
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compatible with the proposals developed in this chapter. I leave resolving which semantics is the
correct one to future research.
In sum, constituent questions involve Q-particles. The Q-particle merges with the wh-phrase
and projects a QP that itself merges in [Spec, CP]. At LF, because the Q-particle cannot semantically
compose with the wh-phrase with which it has merged, the two disassociate: the Q-particle is
interpreted in [Spec, CP] and the wh-phrase is interpreted in its base position. The result is that
the scope of the wh-phrase does not change as a consequence of QP-movement; it acts as if it has
reconstructed.

3.3.5

DP-movement

As seen in the previous section, there is not really a sense in which QP-movement creates a “trace”
because the constituent being shared across the two projections is only interpreted in its lower
position, i.e. it obligatorily reconstructs. Rather, “traces” are the result of DP-movement, a general
scope-shifting mechanism wherein two DPs share an NP, thereby forming a movement dependency
across them. At LF, DP-movement creates a λ-abstraction over a variable of semantic type e such
that if the moving DP is quantificational, it will take scope upstairs in the landing site of movement.
Let us begin the discussion assuming the copy-theoretic approach to movement. Downstairs
copies of moved quantificational DPs cannot be interpreted as is at LF. These structures are
standardly rendered interpretable by converting the downstairs copy to an anaphoric definite
description (Engdahl 1980, 1986; Sauerland 1998, 2004; Fox 1999, 2002, 2003). The technical apparatus
performing this operation is Trace Conversion, a special LF rule that comprises two parts:
insertion of a variable (302a) and determiner replacement (302b). The inserted variable is bound by
the λ-abstraction introduced below the landing site of movement. I will refer to this variable as the
index (Elbourne 2005). Replacing the determiner converts the DP into a definite description. 34
Thus, the output of Trace Conversion is an anaphoric definite description.

34 It is not necessary that Determiner Replacement literally insert the lexical item the. It is only necessary that it inject

the semantics of anaphoricity and make the lower copy type e. The determiner the is merely a convenient shorthand.
This is a misunderstanding in Sportiche (2015), who argues for replacing Trace Conversion with restricted bound
variables—which is exactly what Trace Conversion produces.
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(302)

Trace Conversion
a.

Variable Insertion
(Det) Pred → (Det) [ [Pred] [ λy . y = д(n) ] ]
(where д is the assignment function)

b. Determiner Replacement
(Det) [ [Pred] [ λy . y = д(n) ] ] → the [ [Pred] [ λy . y = д(n) ] ]

[Fox 1999, 2002, 2003]

The predicate denoted by the NP and the index function combine via Predicate Modification, as both
are functions of type ⟨e, t⟩. The definite determiner then composes with this conjoined predicate,
introducing a uniqueness presupposition (303a) and returning the (maximal) entity for which the
predicate holds (303b), which crucially must be the entity identified by the index.
(303) Semantics of the definite determiner
⟦the⟧д = λP ∶ ∃!x[P(x)] . ιx[P(x)]
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹¸ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¶ ´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¸ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹¶
presupposition

a.

assertion

Presupposition: There is a unique x for which P(x) is true.

b. Assertion: The unique x such that P(x) is true.
To illustrate, a schematic derivation is given in (304) in which the universal DP every cat QRs above
the existential subject a child to derive the inverse-scope reading, where there is a different child
for each cat. At PF, the lower copy is unpronounced, and hence the movement is covert (304a). At
LF, Trace Conversion applies to the lower copy, minimally altering it so as to render the structure
interpretable, yet maintain a dependency between the upstairs and downstairs copies (304b), e.g. as
opposed to outright ignoring one of the copies.
(304) Trace Conversion derivation
[ [DP every cat ]1 [ [DP a child ] [VP adopted [DP every cat ]1 ] ] ]
a.

PF: Pronounce the lower copy
[ [DP every cat ]1 [ [DP a child ] [VP adopted [DP every cat ]1 ] ] ]

b. LF: Apply Trace Conversion
[ [DP every cat ] λ1 [ [DP a child ] [VP adopted [DP the [λy . y = д(1)] [ cat ] ]1 ] ] ]
The semantic derivation of (304) is provided in (305). For the sake of explicitness, I include the
presupposition introduced by the definite determiner throughout the entire derivation, but it might
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be read more easily by substituting the shorthand in (306) for the more verbose (305c). The result
of the presupposition is that the nodes above the starred DP to which Trace Conversion has applied
are only defined if д(1) returns a cat.
(305) Semantic derivation of (304)
1
DP
every cat

2
λ1

TP
DP
a child

VP
V
adopt

DP*
D
the

NP
NP
cat

1

The nodes from DP* upwards are defined iff cat(д(1)) = 1.
a.

⟦1⟧д = λx e . x = д(1)

b. ⟦NP⟧д = λx e . cat(x) ∧ x = д(1)
c.

⟦DP⟧д is defined only if ∃!x[cat(x) ∧ x = д(1)];
where defined, ⟦DP⟧д = ιx[cat(x) ∧ x = д(1)]

d. ⟦VP⟧д = λye ∶ ∃!x[cat(x) ∧ x = д(1)] . adopt(ιx[cat(x) ∧ x = д(1)])(y)
e.

⟦a child⟧д = λP⟨e,t ⟩ . ∃z[child(z) ∧ P(z)]

f.

⟦TP⟧д is defined only if ∃!x[cat(x) ∧ x = д(1)];
where defined, ⟦TP⟧д = ∃z[child(z) ∧ adopt(ιx[cat(x) ∧ x = д(1)])(z)]
д

g. ⟦ 2 ⟧ = λye ∶ ∃!x[cat(x) ∧ x = y] . ∃z[child(z) ∧ adopt(ιx[cat(x) ∧ x = y])(z)]
h. ⟦every cat⟧д = λP⟨e,t ⟩ . ∀y[cat(y) → P(y)]
i.

д

⟦ 1 ⟧ = ∀y[cat(y) → ∃z[child(z) ∧ adopt(ιx[cat(x) ∧ x = y])(z)]]

(306) Shorthand for Trace Conversion
⟦DP⟧д = д(1) if cat(д(1)) = 1, otherwise undefined
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The semantic derivation in (305) proceeds as follows: First, the NP cat and the index (305a) conjoin
via Predicate Modification (305b). Second, the definite determiner introduced by Trace Conversion
takes this conjoined NP as its argument. It returns the unique entity x such that x is a cat and x is
equal to whatever д(1) returns (305c). It also presupposes this entity’s existence. In other words,
the definite description returns д(1) as long as д(1) is a cat. Third, the definite description composes
with adopt and a child via Function Application to yield the assignment-dependent proposition
“There exists z such that z is a child and z adopted д(1)” (305d, f). Fourth, the λ-abstraction created
by QR maps the index 1 to the λ-bound variable y (305g). Due to the presupposition introduced by
the definite determiner, this λ-abstraction is a partial function whose domain is restricted to cats.
Finally, the quantifier every cat takes 2 as its argument, yielding the final proposition (305i) and
vacuously satisfying the presupposition.
There are several sources of independent empirical motivation for Trace Conversion and
having the lower copy be a definite description that retains the NP, as opposed to being a simple
variable. First, QR cannot bleed Condition C, which would be possible if the lower copy of QR
were interpreted as a simple variable lacking lexical material. For example, in (307), the inversescope reading where every rumor takes scope above a different neighbor (still) forces disjoint
reference between her and Susan. This follows from Trace Conversion because the launching site
of movement still contains a copy of Susan, thereby triggering a Condition C effect (307a). It does
not follow though if the launching site contains a simple variable (307b).
(307) QR does not bleed Condition C
* A different neighbour told her1 every rumor about Susan’s1 parents.
a.

every ≫ a

Trace Conversion: Predicted to be ungrammatical
[ [ every rumor about Susan’s1 parents ] λx [ a different neighbour told her1
[ the [λy . y = x] rumor about Susan’s1 parents ] ] ]

b. Simple variable: Predicted to be grammatical
[ [ every rumor about Susan’s1 parents ] λx [ a different neighbour told her1 x ] ]
Second, Sauerland (1998) observes that retaining the downstairs NP accounts for some otherwise
puzzling facts about ACD resolution. Consider the pair of sentences in (308). If the downstairs
copy in the elided VP were translated into a simple variable, ACD resolution should be possible in
both (308a) and (308b) under parallelism with the antecedent VP, contrary to fact.
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(308) Antecedent VP = ⟦visit x⟧f
a. * I visited a city near the lake John did ⟨visit x⟩.
b. 3 I visited a city near the city John did ⟨visit x⟩.

[Sauerland 1998]

However, if the downstairs NP is retained, as it is under Trace Conversion, the antecedent and
elided VPs match under parallelism in (309b), but not (309a). This is the correct prediction.
(309) Antecedent VP = ⟦visit the city x⟧f
a. * I visited a city near the lake John did ⟨visit the lake x⟩.
b. 3 I visited a city near the city John did ⟨visit the city x⟩.

[Sauerland 1998]

Third, Trace Conversion forces quantifiers to be conservative (Fox 2001, 2002; Bhatt and Pancheva
2007). Because the NP restrictor is also interpreted in the scope of the quantifier as a presupposition
that projects, everything in the scope will necessarily be a member of the restrictor. More precisely,
the scope will denote a partial function defined only for elements that are members of the restrictor
set. This equivalence is shown in (311) (from Fox 2001).
(310)

Conservativity
D(A)(B) ⇔ D(A)(A ∩ B)
(e.g. Every cat is orange ⇔ Every cat is an orange cat)

(311) a.

D(A)(B) =

(by conservativity)

b. D(A)(A ∩ B) =
c.

(by presupposition projection)

D(A)(A ∩ [λx ∶ A(x) . B(x)]) =

(by conserativity)

d. D(A)(λx ∶ A(x) . B(x)) =
e.

(by denotation of ‘the’)

D(A)(λx . B(the [Ax]))

◻

For example, in (304)–(305), everything in the scope of the universal quantifier every cat will be a
cat (technically be a member of ⟦cat⟧) because of the presupposition introduced by the definite
determiner. Given the equivalence in (311), Trace Conversion will also derive trivial meanings for
nonconservative quantifiers, like only if it were a determiner—another desirable consequence.
Johnson (2012, 2014) proposes that, under multidominance, Trace Conversion is baked into the
narrow syntax. The quantificational DP is merged upstairs in the position where it takes scope,
and the anaphoric definite description, which is usually the output of Trace Conversion, is merged
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downstairs. The two DPs share an NP-restrictor as the output of parallel-Merge. This proposal is
illustrated in (312). The semantics for (312) are identical to Trace Conversion, e.g. (305), because the
NP is interpreted in both of its positions.
(312) Trace Conversion under multidominance
CP
CP

DP
λ1

⋮

D
∀

DP*

⋮
D
the

NP
1

NP

The nodes from DP* upwards are defined iff ⟦NP⟧ (д(1)) = 1.
There are two immediate advantages to this proposal. First, it dispenses with Trace Conversion
as an ad hoc LF rule. Second, although Trace Conversion could in principle apply to any DP
at LF, as nothing restricts it to movement chains, this problem does not extend to Johnson’s
proposal because the equivalent of Trace Conversion is only invoked as an inherent part of forming
movement dependencies, not as an LF rule to rescue an uninterpretable structure that the narrow
syntax has (for some reason) generated.
The idea that the quantificational component of a quantificational expression is introduced in
its scope position is not new. Johnson cites a number of authors who have made this argument,
but as far as I see it, this idea is equivalent to Montague’s (1970, 1973) quantifying-in rule, only
with modern machinery. The question then becomes how a DP is linearized in one position if its
various pieces are dispersed across the structure. For instance, (305) is not linearized as “every
cat a child adopted the cat”, or some variation thereof. Johnson proposes that the covertness of
the movement is the result of the morphology. The basic idea is that the is pronounced as every
by virtue of appearing in a structure in which it is associated with the semantics of every. I will
present an implementation of this idea based loosely on Fox and Johnson (2016), but I will be more
explicit about the machinery involved than they are.
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Let us assume that quantificational DPs are introduced by a functional head L, which bears an
index [⋆i⋆] and a selectional feature [●d●]. The index on L must be checked in the syntax with
a matching index elsewhere in the structure (Kratzer 2004), and hence it is represented as a star
feature in our notation. This checking of indices happens with the downstairs definite description;
thus, the index presumably must be an argument of the determiner (see also Schwarz 2009). The
selectional feature on L is satisfied by merging the quantificational DP in [Spec, LP]. Thus, there
are two independent Agree-relationships: one between L and the downstairs definite description
and another between L and the upstairs quantificational DP, as schematized in (313).
(313)

LP
LP

DP
L

⋮

[●d●]
[⋆1⋆]

[⋆1⋆]

D
∀

[●d●]

DP*

⋮
D
the

NP
1

The nodes from DP* upwards are defined iff ⟦NP⟧ (д(1)) = 1.
Assuming some form of feature unification (Pesetsky and Torrego 2004; Kratzer 2009), the Agreechain mediated by L gives the definite determiner access to at least one identifying feature of
the upstairs quantificational determiner, namely its counterpart to L’s selectional feature [●d●].
Thus, the Vocabulary Items in (314) and the NP selecting its path through the downstairs DP for
the linearization algorithm result in the movement being covert. Moreover, since L needed some
feature to agree with the downstairs DP, this feature being the index means that L can also translate
into the λ-abstraction that binds the index (315).
(314) Vocabulary Items
√
a. [ the, [d:every]] ↔ /every/
√
every ↔ ∅
b.
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(315)

λ-abstraction functional head
д
⟦L[⋆i⋆] α⟧ = λx . ⟦α⟧д[i→x ]

For the sake of simplicity, I will not depict these Agree-relationships going forward, with the
understanding that behind the scenes, this particular setup allows the movement to be covert.
I propose that DP-movement follows Johnson’s (2012, 2014) proposal for Trace Conversion:
the “moved” DP is merged upstairs, a definite description is merged downstairs, and the two share
an NP across them. DP-movement may be overt or covert. QR instantiates the covert option and
follows the derivation above in (313). Topicalization, on the other hand, instantiates the overt
option, which is driven by the idiosyncratic demands of Topic0 to linearize its specifier to the
left (316). 35
(316) Topicalization as overt DP-movement
TopicP
TopicP
Topic

⋮

DP
D
∀

DP*

⋮
D
the

NP
1

The nodes from DP* upwards are defined iff ⟦NP⟧ (д(1)) = 1.
Having both overt and covert linearization options for DP-movement in English suggests that the
definite determiner involved in forming a DP-movement dependency is more abstract than the
√
exact lexical root the, e.g. a maximality operator, but I leave this issue for future work.

35 It is of course possible to front phrases other than DPs in English. In section 3.4.4, I will argue that fronting VPs
and APs is distinct from topicalizing DPs. This leaves fronting of PPs. Here, I propose that PP-fronting is a case of
DP-topicalization wherein prepositions in English are part of the extended nominal projection (excluding perhaps
their particle uses), something like case clitics. PPs are introduced by dedicated functional heads that house their
semantics, akin to what Morzycki (2005) proposes for other kinds of modifiers, but they are themselves of the same
semantic types as ordinary nominals. This sketch obviously requires more exploration, but it would explain the
nominal-like behavior of some PPs, such as allowing an element to bind outside of them.
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3.3.6

Chaining QP-movement and DP-movement

QP-movement and DP-movement may be chained together to create complex movement derivations. There are four logically possible combinations comprising two steps: QP→QP (§3.3.6.1),
DP→DP (§3.3.6.2), DP→QP (§3.3.6.3), and QP→DP (§3.3.6.4). I will show that given the syntax
and semantics of QP-movement and DP-movement proposed above, only DP→DP and DP→QP
constitute valid movement chains. These two possible pairs then generalize to more complex
movement chains; for example, DP→DP→QP is a possible movement chain, but not DP→QP→DP.
3.3.6.1

QP→QP chain

Parallel-Merge is able to generate a QP→QP movement chain: the wh-phrase is merged in parallel
with its base position and two separate Q-particles. The resulting two QPs are then merged into
the structure separately. The structure of a QP→QP movement chain is schematized in (317).
(317) QP→QP movement chain
CP
CP

QP

C

Q

⋮
CP

⋮
CP

QP

C

Q

⋮
⋮

⋮
⋮

wh-phrase

While a QP→QP movement chain is syntactically licit, it is not clear that it is possible semantically. Recall the two possible semantics entertained for the Q-particle in section 3.3.4: existential
closure over choice functions (318a) and percolation of focus alternatives (318b).
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(318) Q-particle semantics
a.

Choice-function semantics
⟦Q⟧ = λq ⟨s,t ⟩ λw 0 λp⟨s,t ⟩ . ∃f cf [p = q]

(=292)

b. Focus-alternative semantics
⟦Q α⟧o = ⟦α⟧f

(=297)

According to either of these semantics, a QP→QP movement chain would require the intermediate
Q-particle to be semantically vacuous for the higher Q-particle to derive a matrix question by
applying existential closure to the choice function or catching the focus alternatives associated with
the wh-phrase. The needs of the wh-phrase are satisfied as long as there is at least one semantically
contentful Q-particle. However, the grammar has no means of “looking ahead” to ensure that the
semantically contentful Q-particle is the highest one and not an intermediate one. This is what
presents a problem. Naturally, distinguishing between intermediate and criterial positions is not
a new problem. For example, edge features are designed precisely to force elements to move to
intermediate positions in anticipation of them needing to move to a subsequent position in some
higher domain. In princip, such a solution could extend to QP→QP movement chains, but it would
require the rather baroque stipulation that all and only Q-particles associated with an edge feature
are semantically vacuous. If we are forced to acquiesce that English has two different Q-particles for
constituent questions and relative clauses respectively, where pied-piping possiblities differ, then
having a third Q-particle that is semantically vacuous becomes even less implausible, assuming
that there is some means of regulating its distribution.
Moving forward, I will assume that a QP→QP movement chain is impossible because it is incompatible with the semantics of Q-particles. In actuality, it remains an open question. Nevertheless,
whether a QP→QP movement chain is possible will not bear significantly on the main arguments
in this chapter. The topic of QP→QP movement chains will come up again in section 3.3.7 in the
context of crossclausal movement, where a QP→QP chain across a clause boundary would predict
that long movement can reconstruct all the way into the base position. I will show that there is
reason to believe that this kind of reconstruction is not available, which further suggests that a
QP→QP movement chain is impossible.
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3.3.6.2

DP→DP chain

A DP→DP movement chain is possible both syntactically and semantically. The NP is merged in
parallel with three separate determiners, the lower two of which are definite determiners as part of
the multidominance implementation of Trace Conversion. The structure of a DP→DP movement
chain is schematized in (319).
(319) DP→DP movement chain
LP
LP

DP
L2

⋮

D
∀

LP

⋮
LP

DP
L1

⋮

D
the 2

DP

⋮
D
the 1

NP

Semantically, the moved DP takes scope in the landing site of the final DP-movement step. In effect,
the intermediate step has no semantic effect. A helpful way of conceptualizing the semantics of a
DP→DP movement chain is in a procedural sense: the first step of DP-movement shifts scope to
the intermediate position (320a) and then the second step shifts scope to the final position (320b).
(320) a.

First step of DP-movement
[ Op2 . . . [ DP1 . . . [ Op3 . . . [ . . .

1

... ]]]]

Op2 ≫ DP1 ≫ Op3

b. Second step of DP-movement
[ DP1 . . . [ Op2 . . . [

1

. . . [ Op3 . . . [ . . .
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1

... ]]]]]

DP1 ≫ Op2 ≫ Op3

Therefore, a DP→DP movement chain requires that the lower two DPs be definite descriptions.
One might wonder why this ordering necessity does not inherit the same problem as QP→QP chains,
as discussed above. The reason that it does not is because the ordering is forced independently.
Consider a singleton DP-movement step. First, the lower DP must be semantic type e in order
for the semantic composition to proceed without crashing; a definite description is the minimal
alteration that achieves type e. Second, the higher DP being a definite description and the lower DP
being quantificational would result in vacuous quantification, which is ruled out by scope economy
(Fox 2000). Thus, in a singleton DP-movement step, there are independent factors forcing the
lower DP to be a definite description. These same factors extend to DP→DP movement chains,
forcing them to have the correct ordering. Moreover, the components needed to form the chain,
i.e. different determiners, are observable independently. The same kind of independent means of
enforcing a particular semantic shape of the chain is unavailable in a QP→QP chain.
3.3.6.3

DP→QP chain

In addition to movement chains involving just QP-movement or DP-movement, it is also possible
for a movement chain to consist of an initial step of DP-movement feeding a subsequent step
of QP-movement. Such a DP→QP chain has two effects: First, it shifts the scope of the moved
expression to the landing site of the initial DP-movement step. Second, it shrinks the region over
which the wh-dependency is computed. Rather than being computed from the expression’s base
position, it is computed from the position achieved by DP-movement. These effects are schematized
in (321) by comparing a singleton QP-movement step (321a) and a DP→QP movement chain (321b),
where the squiggle arrows represent the wh-dependency.
(321) a.

Just QP-movement
QP-mvt

[ wh-phrase1 . . . [ Op . . . [ . . .

... ]]]

1

Op ≫ wh-phrase

b. DP-movement feeding QP-movement
QP-mvt

[ wh-phrase1 . . . [

DP-mvt
1

. . . [ Op . . . [ . . .
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1

... ]]]]

wh-phrase ≫ Op

In (321a), where the wh-phrase only undergoes QP-movement, the wh-phrase takes scope in its
base position, and the wh-dependency is computed across the entire region between the base
position and the landing site of QP-movement. On the other hand, in (321b), the wh-phrase takes
scope in the landing site of DP-movement, and the wh-dependency is computed across the region
between that position and the landing site of QP-movement. The crucial difference between (321a)
and (321b) is whether the wh-dependency is computed over the operator Op (which stands in for
any scope-bearing element). This difference will prove important in sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3, which
discuss Late Merge effects and focus intervention respectively, because the operator could be a DP
coindexed with an R-expression in the moving element or a focus intervener.
The reason that wh-movement optionally shifts scope is because wh-movement is ambiguous
between a derivation with a single step of QP-movement and a derivation with a DP→QP movement
chain, only the latter of which shifts the scope of the wh-phrase to derive the wide-scope reading.
To illustrate this, let us walk through the derivation of the wide-scope reading of (322).
(322) [ How many books ]1 should Nina read
a.

1

this summer?

(=106)
how many ≫ should

Wide-scope reading

For what number n: There are n-many particular books x such that Nina should read x
this summer.
b. Narrow-scope reading

should ≫ how many

For what number n: It is necessary for there to be n-many books x such that Nina reads
x this summer.
The derivation of the wide-scope reading of (322) is given in (323), where the wh-phrase first
undergoes a step of DP-movement to a position above the modal should and then undergoes a step
of QP-movement to [Spec, CP].
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(323) DP→QP movement chain
CP
CP

QP

C

LP

Q
DP†

1
L1

TP

D
how many
vP

T
should

vP

Nina
v

VP
V
read

DP*
D
NP
the 1 books

The nodes from DP* upwards are defined iff ⟦book⟧ (д(1)) = 1.
a.

⟦DP*⟧д = ιx[book∗ (x) ∧ x = д(1)]

∗
(ιx[book∗ (x) ∧ x = д(1)])(Nina)
b. ⟦vP⟧д = λw . readw

c.

∗
∗
⟦TP⟧д = λw . shouldw (λw ′ . readw
′ (ιx[book (x) ∧ x = д(1)])(Nina))
д

∗
∗
d. ⟦ 1 ⟧ = λy λw . shouldw (λw ′ . readw
′ (ιx[book (x) ∧ x = y])(Nina))
д

e.

⟦DP† ⟧ = λP⟨e,st ⟩ λw . ∃x[#x = f (Dd ) ∧ book∗ (x) ∧ P(x)(w)]

f.

⟦LP⟧д = λw . ∃x[#x = f (Dd ) ∧ book∗ (x) ∧
∗
∗
shouldw (λw ′ . readw
′ (ιx[book (x) ∧ x = y])(Nina))]

g. ⟦CP⟧д = λw o λp . ∃f cf [p = λw . ∃x[#x = f (Dd ) ∧ book∗ (x) ∧
∗
∗
shouldw (λw ′ . readw
′ (ιx[book (x) ∧ x = y])(Nina))]]
The semantic derivation in (323) proceeds as follows: First, the books composes with read and Nina
to yield an assignment-dependent proposition (323b). Second, should takes this proposition as
its argument (323c). Third, the L head introducing the wh-phrase translates into a λ-abstraction
that maps the index 1 to the λ-bound variable x (323d). Fourth, how many books takes 1 as
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its argument (323f). Last, the Q-particle applies its semantics, which here is existential closure
over the choice function f introduced by how many and forming the question nucleus using the
proposition denoted by 1 (323g). In the end result, how many scopes above should. Therefore, the
ambiguity between QP and DP→QP movement derivations derives the optionality of scope shifting
in English constituent questions. This ambiguity is obscured in the linearization because the final
step of QP-movement always forces the wh-phrase to be linearized in [Spec, CP] regardless of the
underlying derivation.
This analysis of scope in constituent questions highlights an advantage of the DP/QP-movement
system developed here over more traditional conceptions of movement: there is no sense in which
movement optionally reconstructs. That is, movement either reconstructs or does not reconstruct
based solely on the underlying syntactic derivation—it is deterministic. A more traditional conception of movement wherein a given movement type, e.g. wh-movement, might optionally reconstruct
has the disadvantage of having to state any conditions that block reconstruction as ad hoc constraints on reconstruction itself. As will be discussed in section 3.4, under the DP/QP-movement
system, these reconstruction-blocking conditions simply target DPs and hence only interact with
DP-movement, which by definition does not reconstruct.
3.3.6.4

QP→DP chain

While DP-movement may feed QP-movement, the inverse is not possible, where QP-movement
feeds DP-movement. Such a QP→DP movement chain can in principle be generated by parallelMerge, as schematized in (324).

168

(324) QP→DP movement chain
LP
LP

DP
L1

⋮

D
wh

QP

⋮
⋮

Q

⋮
⋮

⋮
DP

⋮
D
the 1

NP

However, the structure in (324) is degenerate for two reasons. First, the Q-particle does not
c–command the wh-phrase, which in turn creates two problems: (i) the Q-particle cannot establish
an Agree-relation with the wh-phrase (as required under Cable’s (2007, 2010) proposal), and (ii) the
semantics of the Q-particle cannot successfully target the wh-phrase because it is not in its scope.
Consequently, a QP→DP chain is ungrammatical on both syntactic and semantic grounds because
the Q-particle and the wh-phrase bear no relation to one another. Second, unlike a DP→QP chain,
the amount of structure being shared in a QP→DP chain does not stand in a proper-containment
relation across the two movement steps. The lower step of QP-movement targets the DP, while
the higher step of DP-movement targets the NP inside that DP. There is no link between the two
movement steps and no sense in which the QP-movement is actually feeding the DP-movement. In
other words, QP-movement does not furnish the right kind of element for DP-movement. Therefore,
a QP→DP movement chain is impossible.

3.3.7

Crossclausal movement

An implication of the DP/QP-movement system is that crossclausal movement necessarily involves
DP-movement. One of the central discoveries in generative syntax is that crossclausal movement
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is not created in one fell swoop (325a), but rather proceeds successive cyclically via the edges of
intermediate clause boundaries (325b) (Chomsky 1973, 1977, 1981).
(325) Successive-cyclic movement
a. * [CP Who1 did [TP Rose think [CP that [TP Blanche saw who1 ] ] ] ]?
b. 3 [CP Who1 did [TP Rose think [CP who1 that [TP Blanche saw who1 ] ] ] ]?

Consequently, crossclausal movement requires a chain consisting of more than one movement
step. Given that, as discussed in section 3.3.6, there are only two licit types of movement chains
in the DP/QP-movement system, DP→DP and DP→QP, the intermediate steps in a crossclausal
movement dependency must be DP-movement.
Although this implication might appear to be too restrictive, it does successfully derive the
narrow-scope and wide-scope readings of a wh-phrase extracted out of the complement clause of
an attitude predicate. To illustrate, consider the sentence in (326), in which how many books can
take narrow or wide scope with respect to the attitude predicate hope.
(326) [ How many books ]1 does Dorothy hope [CP that Sophia will read
a.

1

]?

hope ≫ how many

Narrow-scope reading

For what number n: In all of Dorothy’s bouletic alternatives, there are n-many books x
such that Sophia reads x.
b. Wide-scope reading

how many ≫ hope

For what number n: There are n-many particular books x such that in all of Dorothy’s
bouletic alternatives, Sophia reads x.
The narrow-scope reading in (326a) follows from the DP→QP chain that is minimally necessary to
move across a clause boundary. First, the wh-phrase undergoes DP-movement to [Spec, CP] in the
embedded clause, i.e. the intermediate clause edge position. Second, it undergoes QP-movement to
[Spec, CP] in the matrix clause, the criterial wh-position. This derivation is schematized in (327).
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The wh-phrase how many books takes scope in the highest position achieved by DP-movement,
which is in the scope of the attitude predicate hope. 36
(327) Narrow-scope derivation of (326)
CP
CP
C

QP
TP

DP
Dorothy

Q
TP
vP

T
v

VP
V
hope

CP
DP

⋮
⋮

D
how many

⋮
V
read

DP
D
the

NP
books

The wide-scope reading in (326b) involves a derivation with two steps of DP-movement. First, the
wh-phrase undergoes DP-movement to the edge of the embedded clause. Second, it undergoes
another step of DP-movement into the matrix clause, crucially above the attitude predicate hope.
Finally, it undergoes QP-movement to [Spec, CP] in the matrix clause. This derivation is schema-

36 This makes the prediction that crossclausal wh-movement should force the wh-phrase to take scope above all other
elements in the embedded clause. This might prove problematic for things like binding, which I have not considered
extensively here. With regards to the logical scope of quantifiers, it is difficult to test this prediction, but the relevant
sentence is something like (i). It is unclear to me how to differentiate the reading of how many scoping below hope
from the reading scoping below want.
(i)

[ How many books ]1 does Dorothy hope [CP

1

that [TP Sophia wants to read

1

] ]?

If this prediction turns out to be false, then the theory must permit QP→QP movement chains to account for the lack
of scope shifting to the edge of the embedded clause in crossclausal movement.
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tized in (328). The wh-phrase how many books takes scope in the highest position achieved by
DP-movement, which is outside the scope of the attitude predicate hope.
(328) Wide-scope derivation of (326)
CP
CP

QP

C

TP
DP
Dorothy

Q
TP
vP

T
vP
v

DP
VP

D
how many

V
hope

CP
DP

⋮
⋮

D
the

⋮
V
read

DP
D
the

NP
books

In recent minimalist syntax, successive cyclicity falls under the purview of Phase Theory
(Chomsky 2000, 2001, 2004, 2008). According to Phase Theory, syntactic derivations are built in
chunks known as phases, which are periodically shipped off to the interfaces, at which point they
are rendered inaccessible to further syntactic operations. Only the edge of a phase remains accessible
to operations outside of that phase. This restriction is formulated in the Phase Impenetrability
Condition (PIC) in (329), where the domain of a phase head is its complement and the edge is its
specifier.
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(329)

Phase Impenetrability Condition (PIC)
In phase α with head H, the domain of H is not accessible to operations outside of α, only
H and its edge are accessible to such operations.

[Chomsky 2000:108]

According to the PIC, successive cyclicity follows from C0 being a phase head. Thus, for an element
in an embedded clause to remain accessible to material in a higher clause, it must first move to
[Spec, CP] of the embedded clause to escape the phase.
A rarely addressed problem in Phase Theory is how to interpret a movement chain that spans
two phases, if semantic interpretation proceeds by phase and assuming a standard copy-theoretic
approach to movement. The core problem is that the grammar does not know how to interpret the
lower copy until it has (i) encountered the higher copy and (ii) determined whether the movement
reconstructs. To illustrate, consider the derivation of (326), repeated below in (330), at the point
when the embedded clause has been constructed and the phase complement (TP) is shipped off to
LF, as schematized in (331).
(330) [ How many books ]1 does Dorothy hope [CP that Sophia will read

1

]?

(=326)

how many ≫ hope; hope ≫ how many
(331) Interpreting movement dependencies under Phase Theory
[CP [ how many books ]1 thatC [TP Sophia will read [ how many books ]1 ] ]
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹¸ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¶
phase complement

Immediately, two problems present themselves: First, the grammar has no way of knowing that
how many books is a lower copy of an element to be introduced in a higher phase. The Copy Theory
of Movement does not furnish this kind of information, and adding any kind of special diacritic
signaling what is a (lower) copy would violate Inclusiveness; see section 3.3.2. Second, even if the
grammar knew that how many books is a copy, it then has to decide whether to interpret it as is
or to apply Trace Conversion. Selecting the former option would in turn require not interpreting
the corresponding copies in higher phases (and knowing that they are copies, and presumably
having access to the trace-converted copy in the lower phase, despite the PIC, so as to be able to
make such a decision). One might counter that the choice between interpreting as is and applying
Trace Conversion is a free choice. However, Trace Conversion cannot be a free operation without
ascribing an optional definite interpretation to every single DP, including quantificational ones.
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Since quantificational DPs do not all have such a meaning, the choice of how to interpret the lower
copy cannot be a free one. Furthermore, limiting this choice to copies runs into the first problem
that the grammar does not know that a copy is a copy. Avoiding these problems requires that LF
delay interpreting structure sent to it until the sentence has been fully constructed so that LF has
all of the relevant information available to it. This is not in the spirit of Phase Theory; there would
then be no reason at all to ship structure off to the LF interface on a phase-by-phase basis.
These problems for Phase Theory do not carry over to the DP/QP-movement system. As
discussed in section 3.3.2, multidominance does not face the problems associated with copy identity.
More particularly, in the DP/QP-movement system, the intertwined nature of the syntax and
semantics underlying the deterministic system of movement allows movement dependencies to be
interpreted on a phase-by-phase basis. Consider again the derivation of (326)/(330) at the point
when the embedded clause has been constructed and the phase complement (TP) is shipped off to
LF, except now in the DP/QP-movement system, as schematized in (332).
(332) DP/QP-movement system and Phase Theory
CP
CP
C

DP
TP

⋮

D
how many
⋮

V
read

DP
D
the

NP
books

The phase complement transfered to LF contains the bottom half of a DP-movement dependency.
The bottom half is an anaphoric definite description. In the eyes of the grammar, it will be interpreted
as such, and it is irrelevant that it is part of a movement dependency to be further constructed as the
derivation proceeds. 37 The semantic value of the phase complement will, however, be assignment
37 Here, I am assuming that the NP can be interpreted even though it is dominated by a DP that is outside the phase
domain and thus not sent to LF at the same time as the NP. This assumption differs from O’Brien (2015), who argues
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dependent until the next phase is sent to LF and interpreted. The DP/QP-movement system avoids
the problems outlined above because (i) Trace Conversion is baked into the syntax (à la Johnson
2012, 2014) and (ii) reconstruction is not an optional process at LF, but rather is always the result of
moving a QP.
Standardly, C0 is not taken to be the only phase head; rather, v 0 is considered a phase head as
well (Chomsky 2000, 2001, 2004, 2008). The DP/QP-movement system is incompatible with vP
phases because obligatory successive-cyclic movement through [Spec, vP], being DP-movement,
would bleed the ability to take scope in the embedded clause, below the matrix verb, which
is necessary for deriving narrow-scope readings like (326a). I do not have much to say about
this incompatibility, other than that I do not see it as a problem. vP phases are independently
incompatible with an entire class of size-based locality constraints in the spirit of the Williams
Cycle; for discussion of this problem, see Müller (2014b), (Keine 2016:ch. 6), and Poole (2016). Given
the substantial and growing amount of evidence for a size-based locality constraint in syntax and
the scant empirical evidence for vP phases (see Keine 2016:ch. 6 for an overview; also Williams
1974, 2003, 2013; Müller and Sternefeld 1993, 1996; Abels 2007, 2009, 2012a,b; Neeleman and van de
Koot 2010; Müller 2014a,b), I take the incompatibility of the DP/QP-movement system with vP
phases as a further argument—admittedly theory-internal—that vP is not a phase.

3.3.8

Typology of movement

Against the backdrop of the syntax and semantics of DP-movement and QP-movement laid out
in sections 3.3.4–3.3.6, this section discusses the typology of movement types under the DP/QPmovement system. There are two dimensions of variation on which movement types are defined:
The first dimension is the underlying syntactic derivation: a singleton QP-movement step, a
singleton DP-movement step, a DP→DP chain, or a DP→QP chain. The second dimension is
whether the movement is realized overtly or covertly, i.e. how the multidominance representation
underlying the movement dependency is linearized.

that in a multidominant syntax fashioned after Johnson (2012, 2014), a node must be completely dominated in its
Spellout domain to be sent to the interfaces. O’Brien uses this condition to derive the behavior of movement out of
wh-islands. However, O’Brien’s (2015) Spellout domains are not identical to phase domains, so a reconciliation of
these ideas might lie in teasing apart exactly what is sent to the interfaces at Spellout.
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Section 3.3.8.1 discusses English movement types in the DP/QP-movement system. I propose
that English movement types can be characterized solely in terms of (i) whether the movement
targets QPs or DPs, (ii) an optional initial step of covert DP-movement, i.e. QR, and (iii) the landing
site of the movement. Section 3.3.8.2 then discusses the crosslinguistic typology of constituent
questions. This typology was partially addressed in section 3.3.4 while introducing QP-movement,
but here I take into account the strategies employed across languages to shift the scope of the
wh-phrase, which QP-movement does not itself do.
3.3.8.1

English movement types

Modulo covert QP-movement, English instantiates the factorial typology of movement derivations
available in the DP/QP-movement system. The different possible derivations correspond to standard
labels for different movement types. When QP-movement is involved, the movement is what we
standardly would call wh-movement. Overt DP-movement is what we would call topicalization,
and covert DP-movement is QR. This is summarized in (333); the probe and target columns in the
table are explained below. 38
(333) Movement types in English
Derivation

Overt

Name

Probe

Target

QP

3

wh-movement

[●q●]

[Spec, CP]

DP→QP

3

wh-movement

[●q●]

[Spec, CP]

DP

3

topicalization

[●d●]

[Spec, TopicP]

DP

7

QR

[●d●]

propositional node

The DP/QP-movement system and its typology for English in (333) captures the reconstruction
properties and linearization of different movement types in English. Needless to say, there are
other differences between English movement types that are not immediately captured. For instance,
topicalization and QR clearly do not have the same meaning. While the DP/QP-movement system
successfully captures that they both shift scope but differ in their linearization, it does not capture
(i) the “topic” component of topicalization and (ii) that QR does not share this “topic” meaning.

38 There are obviously more movement types in English than depicted in (333), e.g. relative clauses. I have simplified
the picture for the sake of discussion.
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Under the DP/QP-movement system, and as is fairly standard, such differences rather stem from
the landing site of the movement, specifically the head that bears the movement-driving probe. 39
Thus, the “topic” part of topicalization comes from the semantic contribution of Topic0 , whatever
that might be. In the same vein, some part of the meaning of wh-movement might come from the
question complementizer C0Q that drives interrogative movement. 40 As for QR, its distribution is
somewhat more free in that it can target roughly any node that denotes a proposition and whatever
drives the movement does not contribute any meaning of its own.
Given that all of the movement types in (333) involve or can involve DP-movement, English
movement derivations can be characterized in terms of (i) the identity of the final movement step
and (ii) an optional initial step of DP-movement. The “wh-movement” and “topicalization” parts of
the movement derivation thus only constitute the final movement step. DP-movement—what is
essentially QR—can freely occur before that final movement step takes place. Let us call this the
QR Hypothesis in (334).
(334)

QR Hypothesis
Movement (in English) may be fed by QR.

The QR Hypothesis is possible because the second movement step in both QP→DP and DP→DP
movement chains is oblivious to the movement history of the phrase that it targets. In both types
of chains, the second step targets a DP for parallel-Merge, but it is indifferent to whether that
DP is sharing its NP with another DP, i.e. is itself part of a DP-movement step (§§3.3.6.2, 3.3.6.3).
Moreover, in a DP→DP movement chain, the moved DP takes scope in the landing site of the
second step of DP-movement, thereby rendering the first step semantically superfluous (§3.3.6.2).
We will see in section 3.4 that this optional step of DP-movement explains a number of disparate
reconstruction phenomena.
Because only the final movement step in a movement derivation is needed to characterize
English movement types, the difference between wh-movement, on one hand, and topicalization and

39 Differences in the locality profiles of movement types may also be attributed to their landing site (Williams 2003;
Müller 2014b; Keine 2016).

40 Although the semantics of constituent questions proposed in section 3.3.4 attributed no meaning contribution to the
complementizer, this does not preclude it from contributing something.
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QR, on the other hand, ultimately reduces to the probe that drives the movement. Wh-movement is
driven by a probe targeting a QP (335a), while topicalization and QR are driven by a probe targeting
a DP (335b, c).
(335) a.

Wh-movement probe
C0Q : [●q●]

b. Topicalization probe
Topic0 : [●d●]
c.

QR probe
L0 : [●d●]

To summarize, under the DP/QP-movement system, English movement types can be characterized solely in terms of three factors: (i) whether the movement probe targets QPs or DPs, (ii) an
optional initial step of DP-movement, i.e. QR, and (iii) the landing site of the movement.
3.3.8.2

Crosslinguistic typology

The DP/QP-movement system also captures the crosslinguistic typology of constituent questions.
Recall from section 3.3.4 that the difference between wh-fronting and wh-in-situ languages reduces
to linearization. In wh-fronting languages, the path selected for the wh-phrase goes through the QP,
forcing it to be linearized with the QP in [Spec, CP]. In wh-in-situ languages, the path selected for
the wh-phrase instead goes through its base position, forcing it to be linearized in situ. Missing from
this simple typology is how the wh-phrase takes scope in a position other than its base position,
either covertly with QR or overtly with scrambling. Given that QP-movement does not alter the
scope of the wh-phrase, this is the domain of DP-movement.
In many wh-in-situ languages, while the wh-phrase is typically in situ, it may also move. To
illustrate, consider constituent questions in Hindi. In Hindi, the wh-phrase may appear in situ (336a),
but it may also scramble into other positions (336b) (e.g. Mahajan 1990; Dayal 1996; Kidwai 2000).
(336) Scrambling in Hindi constituent questions
a.

Wh-phrase in situ
raam-ne kis-ko

ek kitaab dii?

[S IO DO V]

Ram-erg who-dat a book give.pfv
‘Who did Ram give a book to?’
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b. Wh-phrase scrambled
kis-ko1 raam-ne

1

ek kitaab dii?

[IO S DO V]

a book give.pfv
who-dat Ram-erg
‘Who did Ram give a book to?’

[Mahajan 1990:113]

Scrambling kis-ko ‘who’ in (336b) is DP-movement because it shifts the scope of the wh-phrase.
I show two pieces of evidence for this scope shifting. First, scrambling the wh-phrase can obviate
a focus-intervention effect (see section 3.4.3 for focus intervention). This is illustrated in (337)
with a negative polarity item (NPI). In (337a), the subject is an NPI licensed by sentential negation.
The wh-phrase is forced to be interpreted in the scope of negation—a focus intervener—, thereby
causing an intervention effect. When the wh-phrase is scrambled over the subject and hence is not
in the scope of negation, the intervention effect is obviated (337b).
(337) Focus intervention in Hindi
a. ?? [kisi-bhii

lar.ke-ne ] kis-ko
nahı̃ı̃ dekh-aa?
some-npi boy-erg who-dom not see-pfv
Intended: ‘Who did no boy see?’

b. 3 kis-ko1

lar.ke-ne ]
who-dom some-npi boy-erg
‘Who did no boy see?’
[kisi-bhii

1

QP

nahı̃ı̃ dekh-aa?
not

DP→QP

see-pfv
[Keine 2016:118]

Second, the wh-phrase can bind a pronoun from the scrambled position, as shown in (338b).
(338) Scrambling to bind in Hindi
a. *[uskii1 mãã-ne

ghar-se

] kis-ko1

nikaal diyaa?

QP

his
mother-erg who-dom home-instr threw.out
Intended: ‘Who1 did his1 mother throw out of the house?’
b. 3 kis-ko1

[uskii1 mãã-ne

]

1

ghar-se

nikaal diyaa?

home-instr threw.out
who-dom his
mother-erg
‘Who1 did his1 mother throw out of the house?’

DP→QP
[Mahajan 1990:124]

Thus, in wh-in-situ languages with scrambling, like Hindi, QP-movement is covert, but DPmovement is overt. Therefore, in a DP→QP movement chain, like (337b) and (338b), the wh-phrase
is linearized and takes scope in the position obtained by DP-movement.
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It is also possible for DP-movement to be overt in a wh-fronting language, but it will not be
observable with a DP→QP movement chain because the QP-movement, being overt itself, masks
whether the DP-movement is overt or covert. Rather, one must look at multiple-wh questions,
wherein only the higher wh-phrase fronts. Under the DP/QP-movement system, this means that
the higher wh-phrase undergoes QP-movement and the lower wh-phrase does not, though the
latter can still undergo DP-movement (see Kotek 2014 for a proposal along these lines). In English
multiple-wh questions, the lower wh-phrase must appear in situ (339). However, in German
multiple-wh questions, while the lower wh-phrase can appear in situ like English (340a), it can also
scramble to a higher position in the Mittelfeld (340b). 41 , 42
(339) English multiple-wh questions
Who1 has already

1

read which book?

(340) German multiple-wh questions
a.

Wer hat schon

[welches Buch] gelesen?

who has already which
book read
‘Who has already read which book?’
b. Wer hat [welches Buch]1 schon
who has which
book already
‘Who has already read which book?’

1

gelesen?
read
[Stefan Keine, p.c.]

Thus, while English and German both have overt QP-movement, only German has overt DPmovement of wh-phrases, allowing the lower wh-phrase to appear displaced. For evidence that the
lower wh-phrase can take scope via DP-movement, i.e. which book in (339) can covertly take higher
scope and welches Buch ‘which book’ in (340b) takes scope in the landing site of scrambling, see
section 3.4.3. This claim about English and German is compatible with the well-known difference
between the two languages: English has covert movement and German does not, being a more
scope-rigid language with access to scrambling.

41 Note that (333) and both sentences in (340) allow pair-list readings.
42 It has been claimed in the literature that wh-phrases cannot scramble in German (e.g. von Stechow and Sternefeld
1988:466; Fanselow 1990:117–118; Müller and Sternefeld 1993, 1996), but the cited examples are confounded by the
information-structural constraints on the German Mittelfeld (for an overview of these constraints, see Müller 1999).
When these confounds are controlled for, scrambling wh-phrases is indeed allowed, e.g. (340b); see Beck (1996);
Wiltschko (1997); Fanselow (2004) for discussion.
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In sum, the two factors relevant in the crosslinguistic typology of constituent questions are
(i) whether QP-movement is overt or covert and (ii) whether DP-movement is overt (=scrambling)
or covert (=QR). The typology is summarized in (341).
(341) Crosslinguistic typology of constituent questions
QP-movement

DP-movement

Language

overt

overt

German

overt

covert

English

covert

overt

Hindi, Japanese

covert

covert

??

It is unclear whether there is a language where both QP-movement and DP-movement are covert.
To answer this question, we would need to look deeper into a wh-in-situ language that lacks
scrambling—perhaps Mandarin 43 —and examine the scope possibilities in how many-questions.
This is a topic for future research.

3.4

Application to reconstruction phenomena

This section applies the DP/QP-movement system developed in 3.3 to four reconstruction phenomena: the Π-position asymmetry (§3.4.1), Late Merge effects (§3.4.2), focus intervention (§3.4.3),
and predicate movement of VPs and APs (§3.4.4). These phenomena divide into two classes:
reconstruction-forcing conditions and reconstruction-blocking conditions. Reconstruction-forcing
conditions are environments that are incompatible with the semantic output of DP-movement,
namely a definite description, which is type e. Thus, they disallow any movement that shifts scope,
i.e. is not QP-movement (342).
(342) Reconstruction-forcing condition
* [ [DP D NP ] . . . [ . . . [ [DP the NP ] ] . . . ] ]
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¸¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¶
Incompatible with type e

43 I looked preliminarily at Mandarin, but in such a short timespan, I did not reach any conclusions worth including
here. Many thanks to Hsin-Lun Huang for answering (and enduring) my many questions about Mandarin.
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Reconstruction-blocking conditions, on the other hand, require that the moving expression or some
subpart of it be outside the scope of another element in the structure. They target DPs and hence
achieve this scope-shifting with DP-movement, which by definition does not reconstruct. This is
schematized in (343), where α must be outside the scope of β.
(343) Reconstruction-blocking condition
[ [DP D NP α ] . . . [ β . . . [ . . . [DP the NP ] . . . ] ] ]

DP, α ≫ β

The ease with which the DP/QP-movement system accounts for these reconstruction phenomena—
which I show in the coming sections—provides independent support for the DP/QP-movement
system and its account of the dichotomy between leaving a trace and reconstructing.

3.4.1

Π-positions

Chapter 2 introduced a novel reconstruction phenomenon, the Π-position asymmetry, and explored its properties in detail. 44 I argued that DPs in Π-positions denote properties and hence are
incompatible with elements of semantic type e, which is encoded in the Π-position Restriction (344).
(344)

Π-position Restriction
*[ x ]Π-pos , where x is an element of type e

As a result, a given step of movement cannot target a Π-position if it shifts the scope of the moved
DP because scope shifting requires leaving a trace of type e (345). Therefore, movement that targets
a Π-position must reconstruct (346). The important consequence of this restriction is that some
movement types are categorically precluded from targeting Π-positions because they can never
reconstruct, as shown in section 2.4, thereby giving rise to the Π-position asymmetry.
(345) Scope shifting ⇏ Π -positions

(346) Reconstruction ⇒ Π -positions

* [ DP1 λx e . . . [ . . . [ x e ]Π-pos . . . ] ]

3

[

1

. . . [ . . . [ DP1 ]Π-pos . . . ] ]
reconstruct

type e trace

44 To qualify that statement: Although the Π-position asymmetry was discovered by Postal (1994), viewing it in terms
of reconstruction is novel.
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The analysis that was proposed in chapter 2 translates rather unceremoniously into the DP/QPmovement system: DP-movement is incompatible with Π-positions because the resulting definite
description is type e and thus violates the Π-position Restriction (347). Only QP-movement
may target Π-positions, which entails that all movement targeting Π-positions reconstructs (348).
Depicted in (347) and (348) is an existential construction.
(347) DP-movement cannot target Π -positions (348) QP-movement can target Π -positions
CP

CP

CP
λ1

TP
DP
there

DP

CP

D

C

TP
T

QP
TP

DP
there
VP

V
be

TP
T

DP
D
the

Q

7

VP
V
be

DP

3

NP
1

Any movement chain involving DP-movement is ruled out from targeting Π-positions because
a step of DP-movement targeting a Π-position results in ungrammaticality regardless of what
happens subsequently. This includes entire movement types, like topicalization, which necessarily
include a step of DP-movement; see section 3.3.8.1.

3.4.2

Late Merge effects

Late Merge effects (or “Lebeaux effects”) refer to instances where Condition C is amnestied
under A-movement. Lebeaux (1990) famously observed that wh-movement amnesties Condition C
for an R-expression in an adjunct that is attached to the moved wh-phrase (349a) (also van Riemsdijk
and Williams 1981). This amnesty, however, does not extend to an R-expression embedded in the
complement of a wh-phrase, which still triggers a Condition C violation (349b).
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(349) Late Merge effects
a.

3

(=225)
1?

[ How many pictures [adjunct that John2 took ] ]1 did he2 buy

b. * [ How many pictures [complement of John2 ] ]1 did he2 buy

1?

[Romero 1998:95]

The amelioration of Condition C afforded by A-movement is standardly analyzed in terms of
countercyclicity, hence the name “Late Merge”: the wh-phrase undergoes movement (350b), after
which the adjunct is countercyclically merged to it (350c). Thus, the R-expression in the adjunct is
never c–commanded by the coindexed pronoun, thereby avoiding a Condition C violation.
(350) Late Merge derivation of (349a)
a.

Structure prior to movement
did he2 buy [ how many pictures ]1 ?

b. Step One: Wh-movement
[ how many pictures ]1 did he2 buy
c.

1?

Step Two: Late-merge adjunct
[ how many pictures [adjunct that John2 took ] ]1 did he2 buy

1?

Recall from section 3.2.2.3 that the amnesty of Condition C provided by Late Merge requires that
the wh-phrase take wide scope in the landing site of movement (Romero 1998). This is illustrated
in (351), where only the wide-scope reading of how many is possible. Late-merging the adjunct so
that the pronoun he never c–commands the R-expression John in the adjunct, thereby avoiding a
Condition C violation, bleeds the narrow-scope reading of how many.
(351) Amnesty via Late Merge forces wide scope

(=226)

[ How many pictures [adjunct that John2 took in Sarajevo ] ]1 does he2 want the editor to
publish
a.

1

in the Sunday Special?

Wide-scope reading
3

For what number n: There are n-many particular pictures x that John took in Sarajevo
such that John wants the editor to publish x.

b. Narrow-scope reading
*For what number n: John wants the editors to publish in the Sunday Special (any)
n-many pictures that John took in Sarajevo.
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[Romero 1998:96]

When the R-expression and the pronoun are swapped, the adjunct no longer needs to be late-merged
to avoid triggering a Condition C violation, and the narrow-scope reading becomes available again.
Thus, (352) has both the wide-scope reading in (351a) and the narrow-scope reading in (351b).
(352) Swapping the R-expression and pronoun
3

(=227)

[ How many pictures [adjunct that he2 took in Sarajevo ] ]1 does John2 want the editor to
publish

1

in the Sunday special?

[Romero 1998:96]

This behavior of Late Merge can be explained in terms of reconstruction: The narrow-scope reading
in (351b) requires reconstructing the wh-phrase. Under the fairly reasonable assumption that
reconstruction cannot strand adjuncts, reconstructing the wh-phrase entails reconstructing its
adjuncts as well. By deduction, the reason that the narrow-scope reading is unavailable is because
reconstructing the entire wh-phrase puts the R-expression back into the c–command domain of
the offending antecedent, thereby triggering a Condition C violation. In sum, Late Merge blocks
reconstruction.
In the DP/QP-movement system, this blocking effect follows from Late Merge interacting with
DP-movement. In order to avoid a Condition C violation, the adjunct containing the R-expression
must be outside the scope of the coindexed pronoun. Crucially, in a DP-movement step, there are
two DPs, which allows the adjunct to be adjoined to the NP in the higher DP and hence not be in
the c–command domain of the coindexed pronoun, as illustrated in (353) for the only grammatical
parse of (351). This is also the structure that Johnson (2012) proposes for Late Merge, but in the
context of ACD resolution. An advantage of this approach to Late Merge effects is that it does not
invoke countercyclicity: (i) the NP pictures is merged in parallel with the definite determiner and
the adjunct, (ii) the NP dominating the adjunct is merged with how many, and finally (iii) the two
resulting DPs are merged in the launching and landing sites of the movement.
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(353) Derivation of (351) in the DP/QP-movement system
CP
CP

QP

C

TP

Q

TP

DP
vP

T

D
how many

NP

vP

DP
he2
v

CP
. . . John2 . . .

VP
V
want

⋮
⋮

DP*
D
NP
the 1 pictures

The nodes from DP* upwards are defined iff ⟦pictures⟧ (д(1)) = 1.
In (353), the adjunct and crucially the R-expression John that it contains is not in the scope of the
coindexed pronoun he, but this is achieved with a step of DP-movement. Thus, the wh-phrase takes
scope in the landing site of that DP-movement step, thereby deriving Romero’s (1998) observation.
Semantically, the lower anaphoric definite description presupposes that the assignment function
returns a picture(s) for the index 1. The higher DP then asserts that these pictures are pictures that
John took in Sarajevo, thereby satisfying the presupposition.

3.4.3

Focus intervention

Focus intervention is the penalty that a wh-phrase incurs when at LF, it occurs in the scope of
various interveners, as schematized in (354) (Beck 1996, 2006; Beck and Kim 2006; Cable 2007, 2010;
Kotek 2014). The squiggle line indicates the region over which the wh-computation takes place. The
class of interveners varies across languages, but it most often comprises negation, focus-sensitive
items like only, and universal quantifiers like every.
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(354) Focus intervention schema
*[ CQ . . . [ intv. . . [ . . . wh-phrase . . . ] ] ]

It is easiest to observe focus intervention in wh-in-situ languages. Consider the contrast between
the Korean sentences in (355). In (355a), the wh-phrase nuku ‘who’ occurs within the scope of
man ‘only’; this incurs an intervention effect, yielding ungrammaticality. However, when nuku is
scrambled above the intervener in (355b), the intervention effect disappears and the sentence is
grammatical because nuku is no longer in the scope of man.
(355) Focus intervention in Korean
a. * Minsu-man nuku-lûl po-ass-ni?
Minsu-only who-acc see-past-q
Intended: ‘Who did only Minsu see?’
b. 3 nuku-lûl1 Minsu-man
who-acc Minsu-only
‘Who did only Minsu see?’

1

po-ass-ni?
see-past-q
[Beck 2006:3]

In wh-fronting languages, the fronting of the wh-phrase circumvents any intervention effect that
would occur because the wh-phrase can take widest scope in the landing site of movement, above
any potential intervener. This is illustrated in (356a) for English and (356b) for German.
(356) No focus intervention in wh-fronting languages
a.

English
3

Who1 did only Mary see

1?

b. German
3

Wen1 hat nur die Maria
whom has only the Maria
‘Who has only Maria seen?’

1

gesehen?
seen

Focus intervention nevertheless occurs in wh-fronting languages, but it does so only in multiple-wh
questions, where one of the wh-phrases fronts and the other(s) remains in situ. In German multiple-wh questions, when an intervener scopes above the in-situ wh-phrase, the resulting question is

187

ungrammatical (357a). Scrambling the lower wh-phrase over the intervener, so that it scopes above
it, ameliorates the intervention effect (357b). 45
(357) German multiple-wh questions
a. * Wen

hat niemand wo

gesehen?

whom has nobody where seen
Intended: ‘Where did nobody see who?’
b. 3 Wen

hat wo

niemand gesehen?

whom has where nobody seen
‘Where did nobody see who?’

[Beck 2006:4]

The situation in English is more nuanced than in German. In an ordinary English multiple-wh
question, there are still no intervention effects (358a, c). However, Pesetsky (2000) argues that the
lack of intervention holds only if the question obeys superiority (based on an observation initally
made by É. Kiss 1986). When the question contains an intervener, the superiority-violating version
of the question becomes ungrammatical (358d). 46 , 47 Pesetsky proposes that the ungrammaticality
of a superiority-violating question containing an intervener is a focus-intervention effect.
(358) English multiple-wh questions
a.

3

[ Which boy ]1

1

[Kotek 2014:31]

read which book?

b. 3 [ Which book ]1 did which boy read
c.

3

[ Which boy ]1 didn’t

1

[+superiority] [−intv]
1?

[−superiority] [−intv]

read which book?

d. *[ Which book ]1 didn’t which boy read

1?

[+superiority] [+intv]
[−superiority] [+intv]

The difference between English and German, Pesetsky (2000) attributes to covert movement. In an
English superiority-obeying multiple-wh question, the in-situ wh-phrase may move covertly to the
left periphery, “tucking in” below the overtly moved wh-phrase, thereby avoiding an intervention

45 I am not entirely convinced that (357b) necessarily involves scrambling because wo ‘where’ is an adjunct and could
be base-merged in different positions. However, this does not have a bearing on the argument in the main text.

46 In (358), [+superiority] represents a question obeying superiority and [−superiority] represents one that does not.
47 Pesetsky (2000) and Beck (2006) report that for multiple-wh questions with an intervener, some speakers report
ungrammaticality, while others report that the question only loses its pair–list reading. I belong to the latter group.
Kotek (2014) hypothesizes that the surviving single-pair reading is a kind of echo question.
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effect (359). German, on the other hand, does not have access to this step of covert movement, so
that the in-situ wh-phrase must be interpreted in situ (360) (irrespective of superiority).
(359) Derivation of an English superiority-obeying multiple-wh question
[ wh-phrase1 [ wh-phrase2 . . . [ (intv) . . . [ . . . wh-phrase1 . . . wh-phrase2 . . . ] ] ] ]
(360) Derivation of a German multiple-wh question
[ wh-phrase1 . . . [ (*intv) . . . [ . . . wh-phrase1 . . . wh-phrase2 . . . ] ] ]

An English multiple-wh question that violates superiority behaves analogously to a German
multiple-wh question: the in-situ wh-phrase cannot move covertly to the left periphery and thus
must be interpreted in situ, which yields sensitivity to focus intervention (361). 48
(361) Derivation of an English superiority-violating multiple-wh question
[ wh-phrase2 . . . [ (*intv) . . . [ . . . wh-phrase1 . . . wh-phrase2 . . . ] ] ]

Kotek (2014) shows that the empirical landscape in English is somewhat broader than Pesetsky
makes it out to be. She crucially observes that even in superiority-obeying questions, it is in fact
possible to induce an intervention effect if the lower wh-phrase must scope below the intervener
for independent reasons. I present her argument from Association with Focus. It is well-known
that focus-sensitive operators like only associate with another constituent in their c–command
domain that bears focus (Tancredi 1990). Aoun and Li (1993) observe that this association must
hold at LF and hence blocks covert movement of a focused element, as illustrated in (362b) where
focus association between only and boy prohibits every boy from undergoing QR to derive the
inverse-scope reading. 49

48 The superiority-violating derivation in (361) might involve, e.g., the higher wh-phrase not having a [wh]-feature
such that the [wh]-probe on C can look past it in order to target the lower wh-phrase without violating Relativized
Minimality. In the same vein, Kotek (2014) proposes that the higher wh-phrase does not project a QP such that the
probe on C can look past it.

49 (362) is taken from Erlewine (2014). It is based on an example in Aoun and Li (1993), fixing some confounds in their
particular example. See Erlewine (2014:108–110) for discussion.
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(362) Association with Focus can block QR
a.

[Erlewine 2014:109–110]

Someone wants to meet [ every boy in the room ].
3

someone ≫ every; 3every ≫ someone

b. Someone wants to only meet [ every [ boy ]F in the room ].
3

someone ≫ every; *every ≫ someone

Against this backdrop, Kotek uses Association with Focus to block covert movement of the lower
wh-phrase in a multiple-wh question, thereby forcing it to remain in the scope of an intervener.
The result is an intervention effect and hence ungrammaticality, as shown in (363b). The intended
pair–list reading in (363b) can be paraphrased as: I can tell you all the pairings of students and
books, such that the student read that book (but I don’t know about articles).
(363) Forcing intervention with Association with Focus
a.

I can tell you [ which student read [ which book ] ].

b. Context: The students in the class were supposed to read one book and one article.
However, everyone got confused and read one book or one article. I’ve been reading
everyone’s squibs. I’ve finished all the ones about books, so:
* I can tell you [ which student only read [ which [ book ]F ] ].

[Kotek 2014:130]

According to Kotek’s (2014) proposal, English superiority-violating questions are but one instance
where a wh-phrase is forced to be interpreted in situ, thus yielding sensitivity to focus intervention.
Kotek presents additional arguments from NPI licensing and binding that support this conclusion,
which are not discussed here. 50

50 There is a confound in Kotek’s (2014) argument from binding that is worth mentioning. She argues based on examples
like (i) that reconstruction for binding can force intervention. In (i), the binder of herself is no girl and hence which
picture of herself must be interpreted in its scope. This reconstruction should induce an intervention effect because
no is also an intervener. The fact that (i) lacks a pair–list reading would appear to support this assessment.
(i)

Which boy gave no girl1 [ which picture of herself1 ]?

[Kotek 2014:134]

The confound is that, as Kotek herself notes in a footnote, the question in (i) does have a licit functional reading.
However, this is in fact the only reading that we expect because no independently does not allow pair–list readings
(Engdahl 1980, 1986; Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984):
(ii)

[ Which picture (of herself1 ) ] does no woman1 like?
*Mary doesn’t like the red picture, Susan doesn’t like the blue picture, . . .

(=299)

It might be the case that the reason why no does not allow pair–list readings is because it would induce an intervention
effect. However, it would still be problematic for Kotek’s (2014) proposed question semantics that the wh-phrase
needs to be in the scope of the binder/intervener to generate a functional reading (and as the parentheses in (ii)
indicate, an anaphor is not even necessary for a functional reading). Moreover, whatever mechanism permits
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The picture to emerge is that focus intervention depends on the scope of wh-phrases with
respect to various interveners. When a wh-phrase takes scope below an intervener, it results in
ungrammaticality. If a wh-phrase takes scope above that intervener, the intervention effect is
circumvented. Why a wh-phrase being in the scope of an intervener results in ungrammaticality
is beyond the scope of this dissertation, though the reader is referred to Beck (2006); Beck’s
explanation requires a focus-alternative semantics for constituent questions, which section 3.3.4
showed was compatible with QP-movement. In the DP/QP-movement system, focus intervention
is avoided by first taking a step of DP-movement to a position above the intervener, before doing
QP-movement to [Spec, CP], i.e. a DP–QP movement chain. The wh-computation takes place over
the region between the wh-word and the Q-particle (see sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.6.3). If the wh-phrase
undergoes QP-movement directly from its base position, the wh-computation crosses the intervener,
producing an intervention effect and ungrammaticality (364). DP-movement, however, places the
wh-word above the intervener so that it does not interfere with the wh-computation (365). 51
(365) DP–QP derivation ⇏ Intervention

(364) QP derivation ⇒ Intervention
CP
QP
Q

CP
CP

C

QP
Q

⋮
⋮

7

⋮
intv

D
wh

C

3

⋮
DP

D
wh

⋮

DP

CP

⋮
intv

⋮

DP

⋮
NP

NP

⋮
D
the

functional readings in these cases would in principle allow (something like) pair–list readings as well, which can be
analyzed as a special case of functional readings (as proposed by Engdahl 1980, 1986; Chierchia 1993).

51 This proposal is similar to what Kotek (2014) proposes for the lower wh-phrase in a multiple-wh question. She
proposes that the wh-phrase scrambles to a position above the intervener, from where the Q-particle moves to
[Spec, CP]. The result is semantically equivalent to a DP–QP movement chain.
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I do not seek here to develop a complete analysis of multiple-wh questions within the DP/QPmovement system, but I will sketch how it would account for the focus-intervention effects in (358):
In superiority-obeying questions, both wh-phrases undergo DP-movement and then subsequent
QP-movement, maintaining their base-generated order with respect to one another via “tucking
in” (366). In superiority-violating questions, the lower wh-phrase first undergoes DP-movement
to get above the higher wh-phrase; then, both wh-phrases undergo QP-movement (367). Since
QP-movement does not shift scope, the lower wh-phrase in superiority-violating questions may be
in the scope of an intervener, yielding sensitivity to focus intervention.
(366) Derivation of a superiority-obeying question
QP-mvt

DP-mvt

[ wh-phrase1 [ wh-phrase2 . . . [

1

[

2

. . . [ (intv) . . . [ . . .

QP-mvt

1

...

2

... ]]]]]]

DP-mvt

(367) Derivation of a superiority-violating question
QP-mvt

[ wh-phrase2 [ wh-phrase1 . . . [

2

. . . [ (*intv) . . . [ . . .

QP-mvt

3.4.4

1

...

2

... ]]]]]

DP-mvt

Movement of VPs and APs

A well-known contrast in the reconstruction literature is the predicate/nonpredicate asymmetry
(Barss 1986; Huang 1993; Heycock 1995; Takano 1995). The basic observation is that moving a VP
or an AP—collectively called predicates–displays binding-theoretic connectivity effects, while
moving an ordinary argument does not (or does not as strongly). 52 This contrast is illustrated
in (368) and (369) for Condition A and Condition C respectively. In (368), an anaphor in a moved
argument can refer to an antecedent in either the matrix clause or the embedded clause (368a)
(presumably being evaluated for Condition A in the intermediate [Spec, CP] position), but an
anaphor in a moved predicate must refer to the antecedent closest to the gap position (368b, c).
In (369), an R-expression in a moved argument does not result in a Condition C violation when a

52 There is some disagreement in the literature about the status of arguments reconstructing for Condition C. However,
this disagreement does not extend to predicates, for which the judgements about Condition C are stronger and more
reliable, so this contention does not affect the reconstruction status of predicates.
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coindexed pronoun c–commands the gap position (369a), but an R-expression in a moved predicate
does (369b, c). 53
(368) Condition A
a.

[based on Heycock 1995]

[DP Which pictures of herself2/3 ]1 does Sophia2 think that Blanche3 admired

b. [AP How proud of herself∗2/3 ]1 does Sophia2 think that Blanche3 is
c.

[VP Criticize herself∗2/3 ]1 , Sophia2 thinks that Blanche3 will not

(369) Condition C
a.

1?
1.

[based on Heycock 1995]

[DP Which allegations about Sophia2 ]1 do you think that she2/3 denied

b. [AP How proud of Sophia2 ]1 does she∗2/3 think that you are
c.

1?

[VP Criticize Sophia2 ]1 , she∗2/3 thinks that you will not

1?

1?

1.

The generalization reached in the literature is that predicates obligatorily reconstruct, hence the
connectivity effects, while arguments do so only optionally.
First and foremost, it is important to draw a distinction between predicates and Π-positions,
despite the fact that they share a “nonargument” status and both reconstruct obligatorily (see
chapter 2 for Π-positions). The terms “predicate” and “property” are often used interchangeably,
but VPs and APs (or vP and aP in modern terms) crucially denote propositions ⟨s, t⟩ and not
properties ⟨e, t⟩ (or intensional ⟨s, et⟩). The reason that VPs and APs are called “predicates” is
because in the traditional sense, they take a subject. However, given the VP-Internal Subject
Hypothesis (Fukui and Speas 1986; McCloskey 1997; amongst others), all of the arguments of VPs
and APs are in fact saturated internally, and the subject position is a derived position. Consequently,
VPs and APs denote propositions. This holds true even if the external argument is severed from the
verb, in which case both VP and vP denote propositions (Kratzer 1996). Assuming uncontroversially
that nonmaximal projections (i.e. bar levels in X-theory) cannot be targeted for movement, moving
a VP or an AP thus means moving a proposition-denoting node. Π-positions, on the other hand,
host DPs that denote actual properties. If the open argument slot is ever saturated, it is done so
external to the DP, unlike in VPs and APs. Therefore, Π-positions and the predicate/nonpredicate
asymmetry prima facie cannot be reduced to one and the same phenomenon, though they may of

53 Embedding the pronoun she in (369b) and (369c) does not improve coreference with the R-expression Sophia.
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course share an underlying explanation, as I will suggest below. I will continue to use the term
“predicate” to refer to VPs and APs.
The Trace Interpretation Constraint (TIC) provides a straightforward explanation of why
predicates obligatorily reconstruct: a trace ranging over propositions ⟨s, t⟩ is not a possible trace
(see also Landman 2006). Thus, there is no λ-abstraction available to movement that corresponds
to the semantic type of VPs and APs. As such, they are forced to reconstruct. Below, I review two
other approaches to predicate reconstruction, Takano (1995) and Heycock (1995), and then discuss
how they compare to the analysis offered by the TIC.
Takano (1995) capitalizes on the fact that predicates have internal subject traces and argues that
predicates must reconstruct to avoid the subject trace being unbound. 54 That is, because the subject
is base-generated in [Spec, VP] or [Spec, AP] and then moves to [Spec, TP], moving the entire VP
or AP would leave that trace unbound, violating the so-called Proper Binding Condition (370a)
(Fiengo 1974, 1977; Saito 1985). Therefore, the moved predicate must fully reconstruct into its base
position (370b), which gives rise to the binding connectivity effects.
(370) Takano’s (1995) analysis
[AP How proud of Sophia2 ]1 does she∗2/3 think that you are
a.

1?

No reconstruction ⇒ Unbound subject trace
*[ how5 [AP t 5 t 4 proud of Sophia2 ]1 [ does she2 think that you4 are t 1 ] ]?

b. Reconstruction ⇒ Binding connectivity
*[ how5 [ does she2 think that you4 are [AP t 5 t 4 proud of Sophia2 ]1 ] ]?
The analysis in (370) explains predicate reconstruction insofar as VPs and APs have an internal
subject trace. If the external argument is introduced by a dedicated functional head, i.e. v 0 and a 0 ,
one must stipulate (or derive) that VPs and APs cannot be moved on their own, only vPs and aPs.
Heycock (1995) advances a different line of reasoning about predicate reconstruction. She argues
that the predicate/nonpredicate distinction is part of a larger referential/nonreferential distinction,
wherein predicates are subsumed under the class of nonreferential expressions. According to her

54 Huang (1993) also links the predicate/nonpredicate asymmetry to a predicate-internal trace, but he proposes that the
trace itself factors into Binding Theory and thus is relevant for evaluating Conditions A and C. Under his proposal,
there is no actual reconstruction of the moved predicate. See Heycock (1995) and Takano (1995) for discussion of the
problems with Huang’s (1993) analysis.
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proposal, it is nonreferential expressions that must reconstruct. This characterization combines
the predicate asymmetry with some of her observations where wh-phrases must reconstruct in
intensional contexts, such as in (371) with creation verbs (see also section 3.2.2.1).
(371) Referential/nonreferential asymmetry

(=215)

a. * [ How many stories about Diana2 ]1 is she2 likely to invent

1?

b. 3 [ How many stories about Diana2 ]1 is she2 really upset by

1?

[Heycock 1995:558]

Heycock proposes that moved nonreferential expressions have a special LF where the wh-word is
in [Spec, CP] and the remainder of the wh-phrase (namely the NP) is in its base position (372a),
thus giving rise to the binding connectivity effects. Referential expressions, on the other hand,
leave an ordinary trace (372b). Though she does not discuss it in such terms, this implementation
amounts to reconstruction for world-variable binding to achieve a de dicto interpretation, which is
required in cases like (371a) because the de re reading is infelicitous (one cannot be likely to invent
stories that already exist).
(372) Heycock’s (1995) analysis
[ How many stories about Diana2 ]1 is she2 likely to invent
a.

1?

Nonreferential
*[ how many1 [ is she2 likely to invent [ t 1 stories about Diana2 ] ] ]?

b. Referential
# [ [ how many stories about Diana2 ]1 [ is she2 likely to invent t 1 ] ]?
While this proposal may account for reconstruction of nonreferential DPs where a de dicto reading
is required, e.g. (371a), it is less clear how it accounts for reconstruction of VPs and APs. Heycock
attempts to explain predicate reconstruction by drawing a connection between amount questions
with creation verbs and degree questions based on their similar behavior in wh-islands. However,
this evidence merely amounts to the fact that wh-islands block reconstruction. To argue that
two things x and y have the same representation because an environment that always blocks
reconstruction blocks x and y does not go much beyond stating that x and y must reconstruct.
Both Takano’s (1995) and Heycock’s (1995) proposals are compatible with the DP/QP-movement
system and the TIC, though, if either were true, they would operate independently, outside the
confines of the DP/QP-movement system. The analysis offered by the TIC, that there are no traces
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ranging over propositions ⟨s, t⟩, is arguably simpler. Moreover, unlike Takano’s (1995) analysis, the
TIC-based analysis is compatible with severed external arguments without further ado, because
regardless of whether the moving node is a vP, VP, aP, or AP, it will be a proposition-denoting
node. Within the DP/QP-movement system, this explanation of predicate reconstruction entails
that moving VPs and APs is actually moving QPs, wherein the Q-particle has merged with the
VP or AP. With respect to moving APs, there is already reason to believe that QPs are involved
because degree questions necessarily involve pied-piping: the wh-word how is a DegP, but it is the
entire AP that must front. For predicate fronting outside of constituent questions, we are forced to
say that this movement is also QP-movement and thus categorically different from topicalizing a
DP, which might explain why the two do not share the same kind of meaning.
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chapter 4
moving and shifting
4.1

Introduction

The previous two chapters developed the hypothesis that movement can only map onto traces
ranging over individual semantic types, e.g. entities (e), and never onto traces ranging over higher
types, e.g. properties (⟨e, t⟩) and generalized quantifiers (⟨et, t⟩). This hypothesis is formalized as
the Trace Interpretation Constraint (TIC), repeated in (373).
(373)

Trace Interpretation Constraint
*[ DP1 λf σ . . . [ . . . [ f σ ]1 . . . ] ], where σ is not an individual type

Amongst other things, the TIC is what gives rise to the Π-position asymmetry from chapter 2.
On one hand, the property trace required for scope-shifting movement to target Π-positions is an
ungrammatical trace according to the TIC. On the other hand, the entity trace that the TIC does
allow is incompatible with the property-type requirement of Π-positions. These two factors force
reconstruction.
The TIC raises the possibility that the grammar could use an entity trace, but perform some
operation on the trace in order to render it compatible with Π-positions. Such an operation would
amount to type shifting an entity trace into a property denotation. This chapter argues that such a
rescue procedure does not happen and that traces cannot be type shifted, a principle which I call
the Trace Rigidity Principle (TRP) in (374) (see also Landman 2004). 1
(374)

Trace Rigidity Principle
Traces cannot be type shifted.

1

Landman (2004) independently proposes a similar constraint that variables of type σ cannot be type shifted into
⟨σ, t⟩. Unfortunately, his work on indefinites came to my attention too late to allow a genuine comparison. However,
we reach the same conclusion based on different data. I take this convergence to be encouraging.
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Without the TRP, the TIC would effectively be vacuous and unobservable because it could always
be circumvented under the surface. Because the TIC can in fact be observed, there is already reason
to believe that the TRP holds. Nevertheless, what this chapter will show is that there is a class of
expressions that cannot be type shifted into property denotations and this class of expressions
properly includes traces, thereby providing independent evidence for the TRP.
The discussion starts with the related concern that at first glance, the Π-position Restriction
in (375) from chapter 2 appears to undergenerate because it is in fact possible for seemingly type-e
elements to occur in Π-positions, as shown in (376). Note that the existential construction in (376a)
is a so-called list existential, where the Definiteness Restriction is relaxed, allowing the pivot to be
a definite description (see section 2.3.1 of chapter 2).
(375)

Π-position Restriction
*[ x ]Π-pos , where x is an element of type e

(376) Π -positions allow some definite descriptions
a.

Existential constructions
A: What food is left in the pantry?
B: Well, there is the potato.

b. Change-of-color verbs
Megan painted the house that hideous shade of purple.
c.

Naming verbs
Irene called the cat that dumb nickname.

d. Predicate nominals
Erika became the CEO.
Section 4.2 argues that DPs obtain a property denotation via nominal type shifting (in the sense of
Partee 1986), which explains why the sentences in (376) are grammatical. Thus, there is indeed an
operation available to coerce expressions into property denotations, namely type shifting. However,
type shifting must not be permitted to apply in the case of traces; otherwise, it would circumvent
the TIC and the Π-position asymmetry would not exist. This is the restriction encoded in the TRP.
To address this question, section 4.3 takes a deeper look into the kinds of definite descriptions
that can occur in Π-positions and shows that not all of them are allowed. In particular, anaphoric
definite descriptions are prohibited in Π-positions. I draw a connection between this generalization
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about definites and the scope generalization from chapter 2, arguing that the scope generalization
can be subsumed under this new definite generalization if we adopt Trace Conversion—or its multidominant analogue in the DP/QP-movement system of chapter 3. According to Trace Conversion,
the lower copies of a movement chain are interpreted at LF by converting them into anaphoric
definite descriptions (Engdahl 1980, 1986; Sauerland 1998, 2004; Fox 1999, 2002, 2003). Crucially,
then, traces are a proper subset of anaphoric definite descriptions. Accordingly, it is anaphoric
definite descriptions that cannot be type shifted, giving rise to both the restriction on definites and
the ban on scope-shifting movement. In section 4.4, I then develop a syntactic analysis of the TRP,
couched within Schwarz’s (2009) distinction between strong and weak definites. I propose that
type shifters are in complementary distribution syntactically with the strong-definite determiner,
the pivotal piece required to construct an anaphoric definite description. A derivation can use
either a strong-definite determiner with a DP to build an anaphoric definite description or a type
shifter on that DP to achieve a property denotations, but never both, thereby deriving the TRP.
Section 4.5 concludes by taking a step back and discussing the representation of properties in
natural language against the backdrop of the more complete analysis of Π-positions.

4.2

Type shifting to property

Partee (1986) argues that DPs have three types of denotations: individuals (type e), properties
(type ⟨e, t⟩), and generalized quantifiers (type ⟨et, t⟩). She proposes a set of semantic type shifters
that allow DPs to flexibly shift from one type to another. This theory of DP interpretation is
depicted in (377) in what is standardly called the Partee Triangle. The circles represent the
domains of the three types of nominal denotations, and the arrows represent the various type
shifters that map from one domain onto another.

199

Partee Triangle
lift
lower

e

⟨⟨e, t⟩, t⟩

e
pr
d

nt

ide

BE A T
HE

(377)

m
no
a
iot

⟨e, t⟩

The core set of type shifters is given in (378). They are closely connected with the type theory and
the algebraic structure of the nominal model-theoretic domains; see Partee (1986) for discussion.
(378) Core set of nominal type shifters

[Partee 1986]

a.

lift:

j → λP . P(j)

total; injective

b.

lower:

maps a principal ultrafilter on its generator

partial; surjective

c.

ident:

j → λx . x = j

total; injective

d. iota:

P → ιx[P(x)]

partial; surjective

e.

nom:

P→ P

almost total; injective

f.

pred:

x→ x

partial; surjective

∩

∪

The type shifters that are important for our purposes are ident (378c), pred (378f), and BE,
the last of which is one of the “natural” type shifters proposed by Partee (1986), which will be
given below. These two functors allow shifting into the property domain from the entity and
generalized-quantifier domains respectively.
The functor ident is a total function that maps any element onto its singleton set. The functor
pred maps the entity-correlate of a property onto the corresponding property (Chierchia 1984). For
example, pred maps ⟦goodness⟧ to ⟦good⟧ and ⟦green⟧ the noun to ⟦green⟧ the adjective. Not every
property has an entity correlate, and not every entity corresponds to a property. Therefore, pred is
a partial function and is of limited interest for our purposes, but worth mentioning nonetheless
because it could be used in some instances to get the right denotation, e.g. the color term of a
change-of-color verb. For entities that do not correspond to a property, they can still shift into the
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property domain by first using lift and then using BE. lift is a total function that shifts an entity
into a generalized quantifier by mapping it onto the principal ultrafilter that it generates (378a).
BE is a homomorphism between ⟨et, t⟩ and ⟨e, t⟩ viewed as Boolean structures (379). It is also
the unique homomorphism that makes the diagram in (380) commute, i.e. BE ○ lift = ident.
(379) a.

BE(P1 ∩ P2 ) = BE(P1 ) ∩ BE(P2 )

(380)

b. BE(P1 ∪ P2 ) = BE(P1 ) ∪ BE(P2 )
c.

e

⟨⟨e, t⟩, t⟩

lift

BE(¬P) = ¬BE(P)

h

nt
ide
⟨e, t⟩

BE applies to a generalized quantifier, finds all of the singleton sets therein, and collects the
elements of these singleton sets into a set (381). 2 This is shown in (381) both with Montague’s
(1970, 1973) Intensional Logic and partly with set notation. The commutativity of (380) thus follows
because lift applied to an entity x yields a generalized quantifier with only one singleton set, {x}.
(381) BE = λP⟨et,t ⟩ λx e . P([λy . y = x])

In Montague’s Intensional Logic

= λP⟨et,t ⟩ λx e . {x} ∈ P

In (partly) set notation

Not every generalized quantifier has singleton sets in its domain. 3 For such DPs, BE returns the
empty set, a result which is degenerate. BE yields nontrivial results for DPs denoting proper
principal filters (i.e. definite descriptions) and DPs classified by Keenan (1987) as existential. 4 To
illustrate, consider the model in (382).

2

BE is the denotation that Montague (1970, 1973) proposes for English be. For Montague, all DPs denote generalized
quantifiers, so such a denotation for be is required. However, as Partee emphasizes, BE and be are independent.
Analyzing be as meaning [λP⟨e,t ⟩ λx e . P(x)] and BE as deriving the property meaning (i) accounts for be with
adjectives and locatives and (ii) allows for BE to be used to give predicate readings for DPs in noncopular positions.

3

This restriction is what constrains, for instance, the DPs that can occur as the pivot of an existential construction
(McNally 1992, 1997, 1998); see section 2.3.1.2.

4

A determiner D is existential iff for every model and for every A, B ⊆ E, B ∈ D(A) iff “universal property”
∈ D(A ∩ B) (Keenan 1987) (the universal property is sometimes called “Mercy”). According to this definition, some is
existential (Some potatoes are on the counter. ⇔ Some potatoes which are on the counter exist.), but every is not
(Every potato is on the counter. ⇎ Every potato which is on the counter exists).
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(382) a.

E = {Snowball (s), Mittens (m), Nekochan (n), Odie (o)}

b. ⟦cat⟧ = {s,m, n}
⟦dog⟧ = {o}
Against the model in (382), the extensions of some quantificational DPs are given in (383), where
the singleton sets are boxed. For example, the extension of every cat is the set of sets of which
every cat is a member (383a), while the extension of some cat is the set of sets of which at least one
cat is a member (383d). (Thus, there are also sets in their extensions which contain the dog Odie.)
(383) a.

⟦every cat⟧ = {{s,m, n, o}, {s,m, n}}

b. ⟦every dog⟧ = { {o} , . . . }
c.

⟦the dog⟧ = { {o} , . . . }

d. ⟦some cat⟧ = {{s,m, n, o}, {s,m, n}, {s,m}, {s}, {m}, {n} , . . . }
e.

⟦two cats⟧ = {{s,m, n, o}, {s,m, n}, {s,m}, {s ⊕ m}, {m ⊕ n} , . . . }

f.

⟦most cats⟧ = {{s,m, n, o}, {s,m, n}, {s,m}, {s, n}, {m, n}, . . . }

Weak DPs like some cat and two cats have singletons in their domains (383d,e) and hence have
licit property denotations under BE. Note that for plurals, e.g. two cats, the singletons in their
domain will always be pluralities, thereby only licensing collective readings. Distributive readings
of plurals will not be singletons, and BE ignores them accordingly. Definite descriptions also have
a singleton in their domain (383c), namely their singleton generator, and thus have licit property
denotations under BE as well. 5 Strong DPs like every cat and most cats do not have singletons in
their domains (383a,f) and hence do not have licit property denotations under BE. An exception
to this fact is when the domain of entities only contains one entity of the restrictor set. In this
case, both every NP and most NPs will have a singleton in their domain (383b). However, in such a
situation, there is something illformed about using every NP and most NPs instead of the NP (see
Partee 1986:127). Whatever principle results in this illformedness—perhaps a presupposition that
5

Singular definites are an instance where treating properties extensionally leads to an unsatisfactory analysis, or
at least an oversimplification. For example, under this system of type shifting, BE(⟦the evening star⟧) returns the
same set as BE(⟦the morning star⟧), failing to capture that these two properties have different meanings (Frege’s
famous example). As with seemingly every domain in natural-language semantics, a fully satisfactory analysis
of type shifting ultimately must be intensional. The same problem extends to plural definites and mass nouns.
Nevertheless, I will continue to assume an extensional system because it greatly simplifies exposition; see section 4.5
for some discussion.
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the cardinality of the domain is greater than one—presumably also rules out these DPs having a
valid property denotation under BE.
I propose that DPs never start out denoting properties. A property denotation is always achieved
by type shifting from an individual denotation (e) or a generalized-quantifier denotation (⟨et, t⟩).
Consequently, Π-positions require a type shifter for the structure to semantically compose, as
schematized in (384). For the sake of simplicity, I will generally assume that the type shifter used is
BE, though nothing critical hinges on this. 6
(384) Π -positions require type shifters
a.

Existential constructions
There is [ BE(a potato) ] in the pantry.

⟨et, t⟩ → ⟨e, t⟩

b. Change-of-color verbs
Megan painted the house [ pred(magenta) ].
c.

e → ⟨e, t⟩

Naming verbs
Irene called the cat [ BE(Snowflake) ].

⟨et, t⟩ → ⟨e, t⟩

d. Predicate nominals
⟨et, t⟩ → ⟨e, t⟩

Erika became [ BE(a teacher) ].

Partee (1986) is agnostic about which type of nominal denotation—if any—is underlying, though
she does consider ⟨e, t⟩ to be “marked” and e and ⟨et, t⟩ to be “unmarked”. A similar stance is taken
in Zamparelli (1995, 2000). The intuition is that there is something special about property-type
DPs. However, neither Partee nor Zamparelli derives this marked status of ⟨e, t⟩. According to
my proposal, a property-type DP is marked because it is necessarily derived. Section 4.4 will also
show that property-type DPs being necessarily derived serves to limit their distribution, further
explaining their marked status.
The present proposal that property-type DPs are necessarily derived might be too strong.
First, there are existing proposals that indefinites are inherently type ⟨e, t⟩ (e.g. Landman 2004).
Second, Bittner and Hale (1995) argue that no type-shifting operation can create new associations of
semantic type with syntactic category. What they aim to explain is why cardinality expressions in
Warlpiri have definite readings, unlike their counterparts in other languages. Bittner and Hale argue
6

Barbara Partee (p.c.) points out to me that Erika became the one and only teacher in the new school is a good example
of where BE is more appropriate than the other possible type shifters because it seems to be non-presuppositional.
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that these expressions belong to the same syntactic category as common nouns and proper names
in Warlpiri: category N. Because proper names are basically of type e and are also of category N,
under their proposal, all category N expressions in Warlpiri can be type shifted to type e. The same
does not hold, e.g., in English because proper names are not of category N. Bittner and Hale’s (1995)
constraint would predict that to type shift a DP into ⟨e, t⟩, there would have to already be some
DPs in the language whose basic meaning is of type ⟨e, t⟩. This is at odds with the present proposal.
What I will propose in the rest of this chapter is compatible with a weaker proposal that only some
DPs, namely definite descriptions, are never born type ⟨e, t⟩ and must shift into property meanings.
However, it seems to me that the generality of the present proposal is preferable to maintaining
Bittner and Hale’s (1995) constraint because property DPs in English are marked and the present
proposal explains why. Moreover, because NPs are type ⟨e, t⟩, if there are DPs whose basic meaning
is of type ⟨e, t⟩, it would mean that there are some determiners in English, perhaps null, that are
semantically vacuous. Under the present proposal, there do not have to be semantically vacuous
determiners in English. 7
Let us take stock and look ahead. We now have an explanation for why seemingly type-e
(or ⟨et, t⟩) expressions can occur in Π-positions: they are type shifted into property meanings.
However, thus far, nothing prevents these same type shifters from applying to traces, an idea for
which there is precedent in Partee (1986). The next section (§4.3) introduces a third generalization
about Π-positions: they prohibit anaphoric definite descriptions. I argue that the ban on anaphoric
definite descriptions and the ban on scope-shifting movement are one and the same under Trace
Conversion, wherein traces are anaphoric definite descriptions. I then propose a syntactic account
of the complementarity of type shifting and anaphoric definite descriptions in section 4.4.

4.3

Π-positions prohibit anaphoric definites

While some type-e (and technically type-⟨et, t⟩) expressions can occur in Π-positions as a result of
property denotations being derived via type shifting, as discussed in the previous section (§4.2),
it is not the case that Π-positions permit all type-e expressions. As such, this means that not all

7

Thanks to Rajesh Bhatt (p.c.) for pointing this out to me.
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expressions can type shift into property denotations. This section observes that Π-positions prohibit
anaphoric definite descriptions, as summarized in (385). Thus, it must be the case that anaphoric
definites cannot be type shifted to type ⟨e, t⟩. 8 Following Schwarz’s (2009) terminology, I will call
anaphoric definite descriptions strong definites and nonanaphoric definite descriptions weak
definites. 9
(385) Definite generalization
Π-positions prohibit anaphoric (= strong) definite descriptions.
I will further argue that the ban on strong definites in Π-positions (385) extends to encompass
traces if we adopt Trace Conversion. This will make possible the analysis of the Trace Rigidity
Principle (TRP) in the next section.
Testing for the felicity of strong definites in Π-positions requires some amount of indirect
reasoning, which is worth spelling out explicitly. Examples like (386) show that definite descriptions
are in principle allowed in Π-positions, but they do not reveal what kinds of definite descriptions.
(386) Π -positions allow some definite descriptions
a.

(=376)

Existential constructions
A: What food is left in the pantry?
B: Well, there is the potato.

b. Change-of-color verbs
Megan painted the house that hideous shade of purple.
c.

Naming verbs
Irene called the cat that dumb nickname.

d. Predicate nominals
Erika became the CEO.
It is possible to create contexts where only a strong definite would be felicitous. There are two
properties that distinguish strong definites from weak definites, which can be used to create such
contexts: (i) strong definites must have an antecedent and (ii) they do not have to satisfy the

8

See section 5.3.3 of chapter 5 for possible evidence that anaphoric definites also cannot be type shifted to ⟨et, t⟩.

9

The literature on definites is extensive, and I do not do it justice here. The reader is referred to Schwarz (2009) and
the references therein.
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standard uniqueness requirement of (weak) definites (Schwarz 2009). We will see that when
these two conditions are satisfied and controlled for, definite descriptions become unacceptable in
Π-positions. Because definite descriptions can occur in Π-positions, but not in these contexts that
allow only strong definites, we can reason that it must be the case that the definite descriptions in
Π-positions are necessarily weak definites. With this logic in mind, I show three pieces of evidence
below that support the generalization in (385). To corroborate that the three diagnostics used are
genuine diagnostics for strong/weak definites, I include German examples for comparison. In
German, strong and weak definites display an overt morphosyntactic distinction: the determiner
in weak definites contracts with prepositions (387a) (contingent on case and gender), but not in
strong definites (387b) (Schwarz 2009).
(387) German strong/weak definite distinction
a.

Hans ging zum

Haus

Hans went to.theweak house
‘Hans went to the house’
b. Hans ging zu dem

Haus

Hans went to thestrong house
‘Hans went to the house’

[Schwarz 2009:7]

A note on judgements is in order: In the following English examples, definite descriptions in
Π-positions are less acceptable than definite descriptions in non-Π-position counterparts when in
contexts that only license strong definites. Many of the examples can be improved by replacing the
with that, which will be discussed in the next section.
First, a strong definite can refer to a previously mentioned indefinite. Starting with a German
baseline, (388) shows that the definite dem Mann can refer back to the indefinite einen Ornithologen,
but only if it is a strong definite, as reflected in the inability of the determiner to contract with the
preposition. The weak definite is disallowed because its uniqueness requirement is not guaranteed
to be satisfied, since there may be many men in the seminar under discussion. 10 Unlike the weak

10 In a scenario where there is only one man in the seminar, the weak definite is felicitous in (388), as its uniqueness
requirement is satisfied. The same reading exists for the cases in (389)–(392).
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definite, the strong definite is able to convey that the intended referent is the indefinite in the
preceding sentence, despite the descriptions of the two (i.e. the NPs) being different.
(388) German
Maria hat einen Ornithologen ins
Maria has an

Seminar eingeladen.

ornithologist to.the seminar invited

Ich halte {#vom

/ 3von dem

} Mann nicht sehr viel.

I hold
of.theweak
of thestrong man not very much
‘Maria has invited an ornithologist to the seminar. I don’t think very highly of the man.’
[Schwarz 2009:31]

Turning to English, in (389a), the definite the shade, or even the color, can refer back to the indefinite
a shade of red. In this context, there may be multiple shades or colors that Dorothy finds too
dark or other colors that Blanche picked out. Thus, it is not the case that the shade and the color
are conveying their referent based on uniqueness. As shown in (389b), a definite description in a
Π-position (here, a change-of-color verb) in the same context is infelicitous. What this infelicity
discloses is that the definite in (389b) must be a weak definite and its uniqueness requirement is
not being satisfied.
(389) Change-of-color verbs
Blanche picked out a shade of red for the living room.
a.

3

But Dorothy thought that the shade/color was too dark.

b. # And Dorothy painted the room [ the shade/color ]Π-pos .
(390)–(392) show that the same contrast holds for the other Π-positions as well. 11
(390) Existential constructions
Susan saw a congresswoman walk into the cabinet room.
a.

3

So, the congresswoman was at the cabinet meeting.

b. # So, in the cabinet meeting, there was (at least) [ the congresswoman ]Π-pos .

11 The examples in (390) and (395) are list existentials and thus already somewhat marked. It is possible though
to construct a parallel example to show that a definite in the list existential is in principle felicitous: Who was
in the cabinet meeting? Well, there was the congresswoman. This implies that the cabinet meeting had only one
congresswoman. A similar reading is available in (390). Thus, (390) is only infelicitous if the cabinet meeting is
presumed to have more than one congresswoman.
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(391) Naming verbs
My mother liked one of the names in the baby book.
a.

3

My grandmother had wanted to give the name to my uncle.

b. # My grandmother had wanted to call my uncle [ the name ]Π-pos .
(392) Predicate nominals
Anna decided on a type of doctor to become.
a.

3

The type made a lot of money.

b. # And she became [ the type ]Π-pos .
The second piece of evidence is that a strong definite can covary with an indefinite in a
quantificational sentence. For example, in (393a), the color or the shade can covary with a color,
even though the situations being quantified over, Irene picking out colors, presumably contain more
than one color and thus would not satisfy the uniqueness requirement. This kind of covariance
requires an anaphoric relationship with the quantifier, which a weak definite cannot achieve. As
shown in (393b), a definite description in a Π-position (here, a change-of-color verb) in the same
context is infelicitous. As above, this infelicity indicates that the definite in (393b) must be a weak
definite and its uniqueness requirement is not being satisfied. In an equivalent context, German
requires a strong definite (394).
(393) Change-of-color verbs
Every time Irene picks out a color for the bathroom, . . .
a.

3

Helen complains that the color/shade is too bright.

b. # Helen has to paint the room [ the color/shade ]Π-pos .
(394) German
In jeder Bibliothek, die ein Buch über
in every library
{#im

that a

/ 3in dem

Topinambur hat, sehe ich

book about topinambur has look I
} Buch nach, ob

man Topinambur grillen kann.

in.theweak
in thestrong book prt whether one topinambur grill can
‘In every library that has a book about topinambur, I check in the book whether one can
grill topinambur.’

[Schwarz 2009:33]

(395)–(397) show that the same contrast holds for the other Π-positions as well.
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(395) Existential constructions
In every hotel room with an ugly lamp, . . .
a.

3

the lamp is on the dresser.

b. # there is [ the lamp ]Π-pos on the dresser.
(396) Naming verbs
Every time that my mom found a new puppy name, . . .
a.

3

my dad vetoed the name.

b. # she nicknamed the family dog [ the name ]Π-pos .
(397) Predicate nominals
In every store with a rare type of plant, . . .
a.

3

my aunt bought the rare type.

b. # my aunt bought a plant that was [ the rare type ]Π-pos .
The third piece of evidence is that while the previous two sets of examples show that strong
definites are ungrammatical in Π-positions, the inverse can likewise be observed: weak definites
are grammatical in Π-positions. There are certain contexts that require a weak definite. One such
context is so-called bridging contexts where there is a part–whole relation between a definite
description and the individuals and events in the preceding discourse, which is sufficient to satisfy
the uniqueness requirement of the (weak) definite. A couple representative examples are given
in (398). In (398b), for instance, the definite the steering wheel is understood as the unique steering
wheel in the driving situation.
(398) Bridging uses of definites
a.

John bought a book today. The author is French.

b. John was driving down the street. The steering wheel was cold.

209

[Schwarz 2009:6]

The reader is referred to Schwarz (2009) for discussion of why these contexts require weak definites
and how the uniqueness requirement is satisfied in them. As shown in (399), bridging contexts in
German require a weak definite. 12
(399) German
Der Kühlschrank war so groß, dass der Kürbis
the fridge
{3im

was so big
/ #in dem

problemlos

that the pumpkin without.a.problem

} Gemüsefach untergebracht werden konnte.

in.theweak
in thestrong crisper
stowed
be
could
‘The fridge was so big that the pumpkin could easily be stowed in the crisper’
[Schwarz 2009:52]

(400) and (401) show that bridging contexts allow definite descriptions in existential constructions
and change-of-color verbs respectively. Constructing part–whole relations for names and predicate
nominals is less straightforward—and (401) with change-of-color verbs is already pushing it—,
so they are not tested. Nevertheless, not only is there evidence that Π-positions prohibit strong
definites, (400) and (401) provide direct evidence that Π-positions allow weak definites.
(400) Existential constructions
A: What did you like about the fridge?
B: Well, there was [ the spacious vegetable crisper ]Π-pos .
(401) Change-of-color verbs
(At the paint store, color palettes contain an accent color and several other matching colors.)
Rose went to the store and picked out the color palette for the bathroom. The next morning,
she painted the south-facing wall the accent color.

12 There is also a kind of bridging context that requires a strong definite, where instead of a part–whole relation, it is a
producer–product relation:
(i)

Das Theaterstück missfiel
dem Kritiker so sehr, dass er in seiner Besprechung kein gutes
the play
displeased the critic
so much that he in his
review
no good
Haar {#am
/ 3an dem
} Autor ließ.
hair
on.theweak
on thestrong author left
‘The play displeased the critic so much that he tore the author to pieces in his review.’

[Schwarz 2009:53]

A similar contrast holds in Π-positions as well, as demonstrated in (ii). I do not discuss these cases in the main
text because Schwarz’s (2009) analysis of why producer-product relations require a strong definite and part–whole
relations require a weak definite is too complicated for our purposes.
(ii)

A: What did the critic not like about the play?
B: #Well, there was the author who is a snob.
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We now have two generalizations about what is not allowed in Π-positions: the scope generalization (402a), which reduces to an incompatibility with type-e traces, the only type of trace available
according to the Trace Interpretation Constraint (TIC), and the definite generalization (402b).
(402) a.

Scope generalization
Movement that shifts scope cannot target Π-positions.

b. Definite generalization
Π-positions prohibit anaphoric (= strong) definite descriptions.
I propose that these two generalizations are one and the same because “traces” are in fact anaphoric
definite descriptions, i.e. strong definites. The idea that traces are related to anaphoric definite
descriptions is quite old; see Engdahl’s (1980, 1986) early work on the semantics of questions.
However, the idea is best known now as Trace Conversion, according to which downstairs copies
of moved DPs are rendered interpretable at LF by converting them into definite descriptions with a
variable (403) (Sauerland 1998, 2004; Fox 1999, 2002, 2003).
(403) a.

Standard traces
[ [ every cat ]1 λx [ a child adopted [ t x ]1 ] ]

b. Traces as anaphoric definites
[ [ every cat ]1 λx [ a child adopted [ the cat x ]1 ] ]
The technical apparatus performing this operation is a special LF rule that comprises two parts:
insertion of a variable (404a) and determiner replacement (404b). The inserted variable is bound
by the λ-abstraction introduced below the landing site of movement. The result is an anaphoric
definite description, i.e. a strong definite.
(404)

Trace Conversion
a.

Variable Insertion
(Det) Pred → (Det) [ [Pred] [ λy . y = д(n) ] ]
(where д is the assignment function)

b. Determiner Replacement
(Det) [ [Pred] [ λy . y = д(n) ] ] → the [ [Pred] [ λy . y = д(n) ] ]

[Fox 1999, 2002, 2003]

Trace Conversion was discussed more extensively in section 3.3.5 of chapter 3, where I also
argued that Trace Conversion should be integrated into the narrow syntax under a multidominant
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system of movement (following Johnson 2012, 2014). For our purposes here, the choice between
a copy-theoretic or multidominant conception of Trace Conversion is inconsequential, though
see section 3.3 in chapter 3 for arguments in favor of the multidominant one. Most important
here is that if traces are strong definites, the scope generalization is subsumed under the definite
generalization, more accurately characterizing the class of expressions prohibited in Π-positions.
Accordingly, the TRP can be revised to (405) to encompass this combined generalization.
(405)

Trace Rigidity Principle (revised)
Traces cannot be type shifted.
↝ Anaphoric definite descriptions cannot be type shifted.

4.4

Anaphoric definites and type shifting

Under the revised version of the Trace Rigidity Principle (TRP) from the previous section, the
question of why strong definites (including traces) are disallowed in Π-positions translates into the
question of why strong definites cannot be type shifted into property denotations. One possibility
that can be immediately set aside is linking the incompatibility directly to anaphoricity. As
mentioned above, many of the infelicitous examples of definite descriptions in Π-positions are
improved when the is replaced with that, as illustrated in (406) with a change-of-color verb.
(406) Blanche picked out a shade of red for the living room.
a. # But Dorothy thought that the shade/color was too dark.
b. 3 But Dorothy thought that that shade/color was too dark.
While a definite description the NP cannot establish an anaphoric relation in a Π-position (406a),
that NP can do so (406b). It is not entirely clear where that NP fits within the strong/weak definite
distinction, but (406) nevertheless shows that anaphoricity alone cannot be responsible for the
TRP. Rather, it must be something specific about definite descriptions with the determiner the that
underlies the TRP. In this section, I develop a syntactic analysis of the TRP, capitalizing on one
aspect that has been argued to differ between strong and weak definites: their determiners. That is,
strong and weak definites use different determiners, which in many languages, including English,
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have the same overt realization. In a nutshell, the proposal is that nominal type shifters, e.g. BE,
and the strong-definite determiner are in complementary distribution. This complementarity has
two crucial effects: (i) type-shifted definites are necessarily weak definites and (ii) a derivation
cannot apply both Trace Conversion and a type shifter to the same DP, thereby deriving the TRP
and its revised version.
Schwarz (2009) proposes that the strong/weak definite distinction results from having two
separate definite determiners (407). In (407), I provide Schwarz’s more standard denotations that
return an expression of type-e and also denotations that return a generalized quantifier. 13 Both
determiners are associated with uniqueness, represented by the ι-operator. However, the strongdefinite determiner also has an index (407). The anaphoricity of the strong-definite determiner
derives from the index, which can be bound or valued contextually in the same manner as a
pronoun, thereby picking out a particular referent rather than relying on uniqueness alone. 14
(407) Schwarz’s (2009) weak and strong definite determiners
a.

⟦theweak ⟧ = λP⟨e,t ⟩ . ιx[P(x)]
= λP⟨e,t ⟩ λQ⟨e,t ⟩ . Q(ιx[P(x)])

b. ⟦thestrong ⟧ = λye λP⟨e,t ⟩ . ιx[P(x) ∧ x = y]
= λye λP⟨e,t ⟩ λQ⟨e,t ⟩ . Q(ιx[P(x) ∧ x = y ])
°
±
index

index

In some languages, the weak-definite and strong-definite determiners have unique realizations
or are individually subject to special morphological operations. For example, as discussed in the
previous section, in German, the determiner in weak definites contracts with prepositions, but
not in strong definites (408). With two separate determiners, this morphological operation can
straightforwardly be implemented as the fusion rule in (409) that targets only the weak-definite

13 Schwarz’s (2009) denotations are intensional and include a situation variable. As we are working in an extensional
system, I have simplified the denotations.

14 Two problems with Schwarz’s (2009) analysis are that it allows strong definites without antecedents and it predicts
some incorrect overlap in the distribution of strong and weak definites. These areas of overgeneration stem from
the index of the strong-definite determiner being too permissive. Schwarz suggests that these problems might be
solved with a better notion of antecedent; see Schwarz (2009:276–286) for discussion. However, these problems do
not directly affect Π-positions because under the analysis being developed in this section, a strong definite is not
prohibited in a Π-position pragmatically, but rather syntactically. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that there
may be more to strong definites than simply having an index and that the analysis developed here does not preclude
such a possibility.
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determiner (ignoring gender and case, which regulate whether there is a contracted morphological
form). Without a separate determiner for weak definites, it is less clear how one would account for
the semantic conditioning on the contraction. 15
(408) German strong/weak definite distinction
In jeder Bibliothek, die ein Buch über
in every library
{#im

that a

(=394)
Topinambur hat, sehe ich

book about topinambur has look I

/ 3in dem

} Buch nach, ob

man Topinambur grillen kann.

in.theweak
in thestrong book prt whether one topinambur grill can
‘In every library that has a book about topinambur, I check in the book whether one can
grill topinambur.’

[Schwarz 2009:33]

(409) German contraction (fusion) rule
P [ Dweak . . . ] → [ P+Dweak . . .
(ignoring case and gender for simplicity)

Crucially, Trace Conversion requires the strong-definite determiner in order to establish a
connection between the upstairs moved DP and the downstairs definite description. Within the
strong/weak definite distinction, Trace Conversion, however, operates somewhat differently. Rather
than having two separate rules, one for inserting a variable and another for replacing the determiner,
there is only a single rule that replaces the determiner in the downstairs DP with the strong-definite
determiner, as this determiner contains the variable, i.e. the index. The index is what is then bound
by the λ-abstraction created by movement, as schematized in (410).
(410) Trace Conversion with the strong-definite determiner
[ DP1 λx . . . [ . . . [DP thexstrong NP ]1 . . . ] ]

This is roughly the implementation of Trace Conversion that I presented in section 3.3.5 of chapter 3.
Note that either the standard copy-theoretic conception or the multidominant conception of Trace

15 For instance, if the index y were encoded as an identity function [λx . x = y] that conjoins with the NP, as in the
standard version of Trace Conversion, the German contraction rule would have to look inside the complement of DP
to determine whether D can contract with P, which would be an atypical morphological rule.
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Conversion is compatible with the analysis being developed in this section; I present both versions
below for concreteness.
The syntactic analysis of the TRP breaks down into two pieces. First, I propose that the
weak-definite and strong-definite determiners occupy distinct syntactic positions in the functional
structure of a nominal. The strong-definite determiner occupies D0 (411), and the weak-definite
determiner occupies some lower functional head, which I label n0 for convenience (412). 16 , 17 In
English, n0 raises to D0 to form a complex head, which spells out as the regardless of whether n0 or
D0 is the head that contains the determiner (413).
(411) Strong definite

(412) Weak definite

DP

DP
nP

D
thestrong
n

D

nP
n
NP
theweak

NP

(413) English Vocabulary Items
√
a. [D + theweak ] ↔ /the/
√
b. [ thestrong + n] ↔ /the/
The denotations of the definite determiners in (407) do not permit an nP headed by theweak to serve
as the semantic argument of thestrong . Therefore, a given DP can only contain one of the definite
determiners. A possibility that this nominal structure raises, however, is that a strong definite is
formed on top of a weak definite, a possibility that I will comment on at the end of this section.
Independent evidence for there being two syntactic positions for determiners comes from the
Mainland Scandinavian languages, where there are two definite determiners which can sometimes
cooccur. To illustrate, consider the Swedish paradigm in (414). A definite description is standardly
formed with the definite suffix (414b), but if the definite description contains an adjective, it must
occur with both the definite suffix and a separate definite article (414d). Thus, a definite description
16 The determiner that might also be in n0 , explaining why that NP can occur in Π-positions in anaphoric contexts.
17 The structures in (411) and (412) might fit into a more articulated nominal structure like that of Zamparelli (1995,
2000). For similar proposals that the strong/weak definite distinction is syntactically encoded, see Patel-Grosz and
Grosz (2017) and Cheng et al. (2017).
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modified by an adjective bears “double definiteness” (dubbel bestämdhet). Norwegian exhibits the
same pattern as Swedish. Danish lacks the double definite, though in the same contexts, it uses the
definite article rather than the definite suffix and thus still has both determiners.
(414) Swedish double definite
a.

en sjuksköterska
a

nurse

b. sjuksköterska-n
nurse-def
c.

en sjösjuk sjuksköterska
a

seasick nurse

d. den sjösjuka sjuksköterska-n
def seasick nurse-def
It has been noted in the literature that the two markers of definiteness in Mainland Scandinavian
correspond to different properties associated with definiteness: the suffix corresponds to uniqueness
and the article to roughly anaphoricity (Julien 2005; LaCara 2011; Goodwin Davies 2016). 18 The
arguments for these correlations are based on cases more complicated than the paradigm in (414),
wherein the definite description occurs with a modifier and only one of the definite markers,
e.g. svenska språk-et ‘the Swedish language’ and det språk som talas i Sverige ‘the language that
is spoken in Sweden’. I interpret these correlations as an analogue of the strong/weak definite
distinction, though one not yet fully understood, in part because of the adjective’s role in establishing
uniqueness (though see Goodwin Davies 2016). 19 For our purposes here, the double definite indicates
the necessity for two separate heads for determiners.
The second piece of the proposal is that nominal type shifters also occupy D0 , competing
with the strong-definite determiner for the same syntactic slot. As such, a DP can either include
the strong-definite determiner or a nominal type shifter, but never both. This complementary
18 In the Scandinavian literature, the definite suffix is considered to correspond to “specificity” and the definite article
to “uniqueness”, but these terms have different meanings from the literature on definites.

19 Goodwin Davies (2016) argues that the definite morphology in Swedish does not correspond to the strong/weak
definite distinction. However, her argument is based on the two types of bridging contexts in Schwarz (2009).
Because we still do not understand why the different bridging contexts require a strong or weak definite, I do not
consider them a good test case and thus do not rule out the possibility that the definite morphology in Swedish does
correspond to the strong/weak definite distinction.
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distribution has two crucial consequences. First, a definite description that has been type shifted is
necessarily a weak definite because the only definite determiner that can occur alongside a type
shifter is theweak , as schematized in (415). 20 This accounts for the observation from section 4.3 that
definite descriptions in Π-positions are infelicitous in contexts that only license strong definites
and hence are necessarily weak definites.
(415) Type-shifted definites are always weak definites
a.

[DP (shifter) [nP theweak NP ] ]

b. [DP thestrong [nP n0

↝ Weak definite; Type shifting possible

NP ] ]

↝ Strong definite; Type shifting impossible

This articulated nominal structure also accounts for the difference in behavior of it-pronouns (weak
pronouns) and that-pronouns (strong pronouns) in Π-positions. Recall from chapter 2 that weak
pronouns like it cannot occur in Π-positions, but strong pronouns like that can. Note that the
terminology here is confusing because the two strong/weak distinctions do not match up, the
pronominal distinction being based on the ability to bear stress. Nevertheless, the pronominal
distinction can be accounted for by assuming that pronouns are definite descriptions (Elbourne
2005), it-pronouns are strong definites (i.e. it is a D0 ), and that-pronouns are weak definites (i.e. that
is an n0 ). Thus, only that-pronouns can be type shifted. 21
Second, Trace Conversion and type shifting cannot apply to one and the same DP. In a Π-position, it is a lose-lose situation. On one hand, if the converted trace contains a type shifter, e.g. BE, to
achieve the required property denotation, the only definite determiner available is theweak , which
has no variable for the λ-abstraction to bind (416). The result is vacuous quantification and thus
ungrammaticality. On the other hand, if the converted trace contains the strong-definite determiner,
there is a variable for the λ-abstraction to bind, but the DP does not denote a property and runs
afoul of the property requirement of Π-positions (417). Consequently, because either option results
in ungrammaticality, the only option left for movement targeting a Π-position is to reconstruct.

20 To use BE for weak definites requires that theweak return a generalized quantifier or that D0 can be BE ○ lift.
(407a) provided a denotation for theweak that returns a generalized quantifier.

21 This is similar to Patel-Grosz and Grosz’s (2017) proposal that the personal/demonstrative pronoun distinction in
German reduces to the weak/strong definite distinction. Their analysis might extend to English, keeping in mind
that “weak” and “strong” in reference to English pronouns are backwards from the weak/strong definite distinction.

217

3 Property
7 Quantification

(416) * [ DP1 λx . . . [ [DP BE [nP theweak NP ] ]1 ]Π-pos ]
?? no variable to bind

7 Property
3 Quantification

(417) * [ DP1 λx . . . [ [DP thexstrong [nP n0 NP ]]1 ]Π-pos ]

This analysis manages to derive both the definite generalization and the scope generalization from
one stipulation, namely the complementary distribution of the strong-definite determiner and
nominal type shifters. There are several ways to implement this complementarity; I will describe
the two extremes. Under the copy-theoretic conception of Trace Conversion, Trace Conversion
and type shifting could be viewed as LF operations that replace the downstairs determiner in
D0 . Applying them in succession would erase the output of whichever applied first, both orders
being ungrammatical. Under the multidominant conception of Trace Conversion from section 3.3.5
of chapter 3, the complementarity is simple syntactic complementarity, as schematized in (418)
and (419); neither Trace Conversion nor nominal type shifting would be LF operations.
(418) Vacuous quantification (=416)

(419) No property denotation (=417)

CP

*
CP

DP
λ1

⋮

CP

D

D
BE

D

n
NP
theweak

D

DP Π -pos

⋮

nP

DP
λ1

⋮

DP Π -pos

⋮

CP

*

thestrong 1 n

nP
NP

Partee (1986) is agnostic about where type shifters live in the grammar. According to (418)–(419), at
least some type shifters exist in the narrow syntax because they are in complementary distribution
with the strong-definite determiner. However, this does not entail that all type shifters exist in the
syntax. Because they are just functors from one domain to another, it is within reason that the
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grammar instantiates them in different and multiple domains. What this analysis shows is that
placing some type shifters in the narrow syntax allows us to straightforwardly derive (i) some of
the distributional properties of property-denoting DPs and (ii) the TRP.
One might wonder whether there is any independent reason to believe that the strong-definite
determiner and nominal type shifters are in complementary distribution. An idea that floats around
in the literature is that English the is an overt type shifter, e.g. a overt ι-operator or an overt
encoding of the “natural” type shifter T HE (e.g. Partee 1986; Chierchia 1998). If this were to hold
of the strong-definite determiner, then it would compete with the property-yielding type shifters
for the D0 slot because it is itself a type shifter. Such an analysis might additionally allow for a
decomposition of strong and weak definites. For instance, the weak-definite determiner might
yield a Russellian definite that maps any singleton to itself and any nonsingleton to the empty set
(see Winter 2001). The strong-definite determiner would then apply to this definite, adding the
index and perhaps shifting it from type ⟨et, t⟩ to type e (see Winter 2000 for a proposal along these
lines). I leave exploring this idea for future research.

4.5

Representing properties in natural language

Throughout this dissertation, I have treated properties in purely extensional terms as type ⟨e, t⟩,
which reduces them to sets of entities. Properties are, however, intensional objects. In the tradition
of Montague (1970, 1973), they should minimally be modelled as denoting intensions: functions
from possible worlds to sets of entities, i.e. type ⟨s, ⟨e, t⟩⟩ (where s is the type of possible worlds).
Thus, for example, rather than denoting the set of entities that are green, the property green
denotes a function that maps each possible world to the set of entities in that world that are
green. Whether properties are modelled as ⟨e, t⟩ or ⟨s, ⟨e, t⟩⟩ does not have a significant bearing
on the proposals in this dissertation. The Trace Interpretation Constraint will prohibit traces of
either type, and the nominal type shifters could be modified to work with intensions, rather than
extensions. Moreover, under a fairly standard world-variable approach to intensionality where the
world argument is locally saturated by a world variable, traces in property positions would always
have the possibility of being extensional. An analysis of the Π-position asymmetry based on a
fully intensional treatment of properties would thus still need to take into account the extensions
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of properties; in other words, have an analysis comparable to the one developed here. In short,
treating properties in purely extensional terms has made the exposition throughout this dissertation
much simpler without sacrificing too much.
However, treating properties as denoting Montegovian intentions, i.e. functions from possible
worlds, inherits a well-known problem with the logical equivalency of intensions licensing invalid
inferences under attitude predicates. Consider the classical contrast between circle and locus of
points equidistant from a point. These two properties will always pick out the same set of entities
in any given world. Thus, the propositions containing them in (420a) and (420b) respectively are
logically equivalent.
(420) a.

⟦this shape is a circle⟧ = {w ∶ this shape is a circle in w}

b. ⟦this shape is a locus of points equidistant from a point⟧ =
{w ∶ this shape is a locus of points equidistant from a point in w}
If attitude predicates involve relations between individuals and propositions, then believing (420a)
should entail believing (420b) because the two propositions are logically equivalent. However, as
shown by the acceptability of (421), believing (420a) and at the same time not believing (420b) is
noncontradictory.
(421) Rose believes that the shape is a circle, but she does not believe that the shape is a locus of
points equidistant from a point.
Although the problem of logical equivalency and attitude predicates is fundamentally rooted in
modelling intensions in terms of possible worlds, it is also more directly related to properties given
that (i) the equivalency of (420a) and (420b) stems from the logical equivalency of the properties
circle and locus of points equidistant from a point and that (ii) propositions can be construed as
0-place properties. 22 There are various solutions to this problem, which individuate propositions
more finely (e.g. Barwise and Perry 1983; Lewis 1972; Cresswell and von Stechow 1982; Cresswell
1985), though they are complicated and nuanced. For most aspects of natural-language semantics,

22 Chierchia (1984:24–37) discusses some other problems with properties and Montegovian intentions, though they are
about VPs. I suspect that some of these arguments do not hold as much weight under an event semantics.
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propositions construed as sets of possible worlds (or perhaps situations) provides a sufficient level
of abstraction. Thus, I do not see too much harm in modelling properties as type ⟨s, ⟨e, t⟩⟩. 23

23 An alternative to treating properties as denoting intensions that is worth briefly mentioning is the Property Theory
developed in Chierchia (1984) and Chierchia and Turner (1988). The two core tenets of Property Theory are that
(i) properties come in unsaturated and saturated guises and (ii) saturated properties form part of the entity domain.
If we follow the “Fregean” approach in Chierchia and Turner (1988) wherein properties are unsaturated when they
are predicated of entities, as in Π-positions, then the proposals so far do not change significantly. We might equate
the clash between the strong-definite determiner and type shifters argued for in this chapter to instead be a clash
between the strong-definite determiner and whatever makes predicates out of nominalized properties.
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chapter 5
nature of the trace interpretation
constraint and its consequences
5.1

Introduction

The previous chapters argued for two constraints on the interpretation of movement: the Trace
Interpretation Constraint (TIC) in (422), according to which traces only range over individual
semantic types, like entities (e) and degrees (d), and the Trace Rigidity Principle (TRP) in (423),
according to which traces cannot be type shifted. The TRP is effectively a subcomponent of the
TIC because if the TRP were not to hold, then the TIC could be circumvented by type shifting an
individual-type trace into a higher type, thereby rendering the TIC unobservable and superfluous.
Thus, in what follows in this chapter, I will assume that the TIC encompasses the TRP.
(422)

Trace Interpretation Constraint
* [ DP1 λf σ . . . [ . . . [ f σ ]1 . . . ] ], where σ is not an individual type

(423)

Trace Rigidity Principle
Traces cannot be type shifted.

The picture to emerge is that movement is tightly restricted in how it can be semantically interpreted.
In particular, according to the TIC and the TRP, movement only has two possible representations:
mapping onto a trace ranging over an individual semantic type (424) or reconstructing the moved
expression back into its launching site (425). All other representations are ill-formed. I argued in
chapter 3 that the choice between leaving a trace and reconstructing is deterministic and reduces
to the category of the moving expression: DP in (424) and QP (question-particle phrase) in (425).
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(424) Mapping onto a trace

(425) Reconstruction

[ DP1 λx e . . . [ . . . [ x e ]1 . . . ] ]

[

1

. . . [ . . . [ DP ]1 . . . ] ]
reconstruct

While the claim that the TIC is a universal constraint on the interpretation of movement dependencies successfully derives the range of facts presented in this dissertation, we might nevertheless
ask about the nature of such a constraint and why it holds in the first place. This final chapter
takes up this topic. Due to the metatheoretical nature of this question, it is not possible to answer
it conclusively on the basis of empirical evidence alone, but it warrants consideration because it
helps us to sharpen our understanding of the TIC.
I start out in section 5.2 by discussing the scope of the TIC, in particular whether it stands alone
or belongs to a broader constraint on variables in natural language, as claimed in its predecessors,
Chierchia (1984) and Landman (2006). I argue that because traces are more than just variables—they
are anaphoric definite descriptions—the TIC cannot be directly subsumed under a general constraint
on variables. In section 5.3, I then present two possible hypotheses about why the TIC holds. The
first hypothesis is that the TIC is a reflex of economy at the syntax–semantics interface, wherein
the path of least effort is to always map movement to the same kind of trace. The second hypothesis
is that the TIC is an artefact of the syntax and semantics of DPs, namely that of anaphoric definite
descriptions, which includes traces. This second hypothesis rests on the analysis of type shifting
developed in chapter 4, with a few additional assumptions. Section 5.4 ends the dissertation by
discussing some of the open questions about Π-positions and about the particular worldview of
possible traces developed in this dissertation. These questions serve as avenues for future research.

5.2

Scope of the Trace Interpretation Constraint

The Trace Interpretation Constraint (TIC) is stated narrowly as a constraint on possible traces. At
first glance, it might be considered a constraint on bound variables in the context of movement,
which raises the question of whether the TIC stands alone as its own constraint or belongs to a
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more general constraint on possible variables. 1 There are two similar proposals to the TIC in the
literature (its predecessors, if you will), Chierchia (1984) and Landman (2006), which are stated
in terms of possible variables. In this section, I review these two proposals and argue that the
TIC cannot be subsumed under either proposal because traces are not just variables, but rather
anaphoric definite descriptions.
Chierchia (1984) develops an interpretive system in which there are variables over entities (e)
and properties (⟨e, t⟩), but not over semantic types higher than properties. What he proposes is
that there are “no functor anaphora” (426).
(426)

No Functor Anaphora
There are no anaphora over functors.

[Chierchia 1984]

Let us unpack this claim, which first requires understanding some of the motivation behind Chierchia’s (1984) system. The overarching goal of his interpretive system is to handle nominalizations,
whereby properties are represented as nominal expressions, rather than as their canonical predicative verbal forms. For example, consider is nice and its gerundive counterpart being nice in (427).
Both is nice and being nice are representations of the property niceness, and both can serve as
the predicate in an act of predication, as shown in (427a) and (427b) respectively. Under standard
assumptions, both would therefore be of a verbal category, e.g. VP, and denote an expression of
type ⟨e, t⟩. However, as shown in (427c) and (427d), being nice can also serve as the subject of an
act of predication, including self-predication in the case of (427d).
(427) a.

Mary is nice.

b. Sue accused Mary of being nice.
c.

{ Being nice / *is nice } is a quality.

d. { Being nice / *is nice } is nice.
If being nice is type ⟨e, t⟩, as (427b) suggests, then predicates would have to be ambiguous between
⟨e, t⟩ and ⟨et, t⟩ functions in order to allow both Mary and being nice to be the subject of a predication.

1

I use the term “variable” here to refer exclusively to variables in LFs, therefore not including variables in the
denotations of individual expressions.
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Moreover, because type theory bans self-predication as meaningless, the grammaticality of (427d)
with the gerundive being nice is unexpected and unaccounted for.
At its core, Chierchia’s (1984) solution to the problem of nominalizations is to enrich the semantic
ontology. 2 In Montague (1970, 1973), three basic domains (or categories) are assumed: entities,
world-time pairs, and truth values. Meaningful expressions in the model are defined in terms of
these three domains. Chierchia proposes adding properties as one of the basic domains so that
there are the set of entities E, the set of properties P, and a map f from P into E. Under this theory,
properties have entity correlates, which a gerundive roughly corresponds to. For example,
⟦is nice⟧ ∈ P, ⟦being nice⟧ ∈ E, and f (⟦is nice⟧) = ⟦being nice⟧. Functors are mappings between
the basic domains, so a constraint against functor anaphora, as Chierchia proposes, amounts to
only permitting variables that range over the basic domains, which includes entities and properties
in Chierchia’s system. The crucial difference then between Montague (1970, 1973) and Chierchia
(1984) is that under Chierchia’s system, properties are not functors. There are independent reasons
in support of Chierchia’s system—or something like it, e.g. Chierchia and Turner (1988)—which
I will not review here; the reader is referred to Chierchia (1984) for discussion. Prima facie, the No
Functor Anaphora constraint (426) seems to be on the right track empirically. There are pro-forms
that appear to have APs (428a) and VPs (428b) as antecedents and deletion processes that target
VPs (428c) and NPs (428d)—all of which can be broadly construed as “anaphora” and thus denoting
or involving variables.
(428) Candidates for higher-type anaphora
a.

AP pro-form
Those little1 cars look good, but few such1 cars are safe.

[Landman 2006:33]

b. VP pro-form
Whenever Sophie starts laughing1 , Bill does so1 too.
c.

[Landman 2006:33]

VP ellipsis
Whenever Sophie starts laughing1 , Bill does ∆1 too.

d. NP ellipsis
Susan stole Mary’s hat1 , but not Bill’s ∆1 .

2

What I present here is very much an oversimplification, but it captures the fact that Chierchia’s (1984) No Functor
Anaphora constraint (426) is more than just a stipulation prohibiting higher-type variables.
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At the same time, there do not seem to be anaphora for expressions like prepositions, complementizers, and determiners, which is precisely what No Functor Anaphora predicts. 3
Landman (2006) argues for a stricter version of Chierchia’s (1984) No Functor Anaphora constraint. The constraint that she proposes, the No Higher-Type Variables Constraint (NHTV)
in (429), only allows individual variables of type e. Note that for Landman, the individual domain
is partitioned into different sorts for entities, degrees, situations, etc., rather than having separate
semantic types for these categories, but this is for the most part logically indiscernible from having
separate semantic types.
(429)

No Higher-Type Variables Constraint
Variables in the LFs of natural language are of type e.

[Landman 2006]

The crucial arguments for the NHTV come from subjecting to closer scrutiny putative cases of
higher-type variables in the domains of pro-forms and ellipsis, like those in (428). Landman shows
that these cases can be recast either as variables over specialized individuals, namely kinds, or as
deletion of fully articulated syntactic structure. 4 Discussing her arguments in full would take us
too far afield, but I will briefly review her analysis of the pro-form such in order to illustrate the
general shape of her arguments.
At first glance, such is a good candidate for a property pro-form. For example, in (430), such
is anteceded by the boldfaced NPs, which could feasibly denote properties. Evidence that such is
anteceded by NPs and not adjectives comes from examples like (431b). In (431b), such can only be
anteceded by the NP tall men, which results in infelicity because women are not in the set of tall
men. 5 This infelicity would not occur if such could be anteceded by the adjective tall.

3

Chierchia (1984) observes that certain adverbs are problematic for the No Functor Anaphora constraint. These
adverbs are manner adverbs, locatives, and temporal modifiers, which, for instance, have pro-forms: thus, there, and
then. Landman (2006) analyses these types of adverbs as referring to specialized individuals: event-kinds, locations,
and times respectively (building on Landman and Morzycki 2003). Therefore, thus, there, and then denote variables
over individuals, not functors.

4

Landman (2006) looks briefly at movement, where her main point is that movement of VPs and APs reconstructs. This
is a well-known fact; see section 3.4.4 of chapter 3. She does, however, observe one problematic case in the domain
of movement: as-parentheticals. Potts (2002a,b) argues that as-parentheticals involve a null VP-operator that must
move and leave a higher-type trace. However, LaCara (2016a,b) argues against Potts’s analysis of as-parentheticals,
crucially on independent grounds, and develops an analysis that does not make use of higher-type variables. See
section 5.4.1.2 for some discussion.

5

Siegel (1994) marks (431b) as ungrammatical, but it is not ungrammatical per se, just infelicitous or necessarily false.
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(430) a.

Old ladies . . . such ladies . . .

b. People owning dogs . . . such dogs . . .
c.
(431) a.

Cats without tails . . . such cats . . .

[Carlson 1977:370f.]

All tall men believe that employers prefer such people.

b. # All tall men believe that employers prefer such women.

[Siegel 1994:488]

Landman points out, based on an observation from Carlson (1977), that such cannot be anteceded
by NPs that do not easily correspond to kinds. Thus, the sentences in (432) are infelicitous when
uttered out of the blue. 6 The difference between the bare plurals in (430) and those in (432) is that
the latter do not correspond to kinds, but rather pick out finite objects in the world.
(432) a.

People in the next room . . . ??such people (are obnoxious) . . .

b. Elephants that are standing there . . . ??such elephants . . .
c.

Men that Jan fired this morning . . . ??such men . . .

[Carlson 1977:373]

In sum, Landman’s (2006) analysis is that while such might appear to be a property pro-form on
the surface, it actually refers to kinds, or entity correlates of properties (following Chierchia 1984,
1998; Chierchia and Turner 1988). The pattern in (432) crucially follows directly from the NHTV,
but not the No Functor Anaphora constraint. Moreover, in the absence of the NHTV, we would
expect to find pro-forms that are necessarily anteceded by properties and never by kinds, i.e. the
inverse of such, but as far as we know, there are no such pro-forms. This is the kind of reasoning
and inquiry that underlies Landman’s (2006) argumentation for the NHTV.
The constraints posited by Chierchia (1984) and Landman (2006) both restrict the range of
possible variables in LFs, whereas I have posited a constraint strictly about possible traces and
motivated it using solely movement dependencies. The question then is whether traces are variables
in the same sense as anaphors. In other words, should traces be modelled as simple assignmentdependent expressions like such, as illustrated in (433)? 7 If so, then traces would fall under the
purview of Chierchia’s and Landman’s constraints.

6

The sentences in (432) are acceptable in contexts that make salient the relevant kind; see Landman (2006:48f).

7

Landman (2006) analyzes such as being decomposed into so and like, where like enforces the sortal restriction of
kinds. I have collapsed the two in (433) for the sake of illustration.
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(433) Anaphors are variables
⟦suchi ⟧д = д(i), where д(i) is a kind
However, we saw in chapters 3 and 4 that traces are more than just variables. Rather, traces are
anaphoric definite descriptions that are created by applying Trace Conversion to the lower copy of a
movement chain—or its multidominant analogue in the DP/QP-movement system developed in
chapter 3. This is illustrated in (434).
(434) Trace Conversion
[ DP1 . . . [ . . . DP1 . . . ] ] ↝LF [ [DP D NP ]1 λx e . . . [ . . . [DP the [λy . y = x] NP ]1 . . . ] ]
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¸ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¶
Trace Conversion

Consequently, the TIC cannot be subsumed under a constraint on possible variables, like Landman’s
(2006) NHTV. Be that as it may, there are of course similarities between the TIC and the NHTV.
The fact that these two constraints are similar but motivated based on different empirical domains,
I take as strongly suggesting that there is some shared generalization between the two. One possible
path to pursue is treating anaphors as definite descriptions, akin to traces. Such a proposal already
exists for pronouns (Elbourne 2005), but its tenability for present purposes rests on whether it can
extend to nonnominal anaphors like such and so. I leave this question for future research. Unless
such a deduction can be made about anaphors, the TIC stands alone as its own constraint.

5.3

Why the Trace Interpretation Constraint?

While the Trace Interpretation Constraint (TIC), repeated in (435), as a constraint on interpreting
movement derives the range of facts presented in this dissertation, fully understanding the TIC
involves understanding why it holds in the first place. Due to the metatheoretical nature of this
question, it is not possible to answer it conclusively on the basis of empirical evidence alone, but it
nevertheless warrants consideration because it helps us to sharpen our understanding of the TIC.
(435)

Trace Interpretation Constraint
* [ DP1 λf σ . . . [ . . . [ f σ ]1 . . . ] ], where σ is not an individual type

Section 5.3.1 discusses why two proposals about possible traces briefly suggested in Fox (1999) do
not explain the TIC, one of the proposals crucially being incompatible with Π-positions. I then turn
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to proposing two new hypotheses about why the TIC holds. The first hypothesis, in section 5.3.2,
is that the TIC is a reflex of economy at the syntax–semantics interface. The second hypothesis,
in section 5.3.3, is that the TIC is an artefact of the syntax and semantics of DPs, namely that of
anaphoric definite descriptions. It is too early to adjudicate between the two hypotheses, but I will
highlight the merits and downsides of each of them in order to lay the groundwork for future
investigation. For the sake of simplicity, I set aside reconstruction in the discussion that follows;
for the interplay between the TIC and reconstruction, see section 3.3 of chapter 3.

5.3.1

Against Fox’s (1999) proposals

Recall from section 3.2.2 of chapter 3 that Fox (1999) argues against the semantic theory of reconstruction (Cresti 1995; Rullmann 1995) wherein movement may leave a generalized-quantifier (GQ)
trace (⟨et, t⟩), thereby deriving the effect of reconstructed scope. His argument is based on the
Scope–Condition C Correlation: the reconstructed scope of a moved element determines its Condition C connectivity (see also Romero 1998). Semantic reconstruction is unable to account for
this correlation without additional stipulations. Because semantic reconstruction amounts to the
existence of GQ-traces, this correlation in turn shows that GQ-traces do not exist. Fox concludes
that a moved DP may only leave a trace of type e, which is in effect the Trace Interpretation
Constraint (TIC). He briefly suggests two possible reasons why this restriction might hold. 8
5.3.1.1

All pro-forms range over individuals

The first possible reason that Fox suggests is that “traces, like pronouns, are always interpreted as
variables that range over individuals” (Fox 1999:180), an idea that fits within Landman’s (2006) No
Higher-Type Variables Constraint. As discussed in section 5.2, the TIC cannot be subsumed under
a constraint on variables because traces are not just variables, but anaphoric definite descriptions.
This proposal inherits the same problem. It is also worth noting that it is not a trivial assumption
that all pronouns, or more generally pro-forms, are interpreted as variables ranging over individuals.

8

Fox (1999) suggests these two possible explanations in a footnote. Thus, I have had to extrapolate what it would take
to implement them.
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Some instances of anaphora that superficially appear to reference higher-type expressions are
given in (436) (from Landman 2006).
(436) Candidates for higher-type anaphora
a.

Adjective phrase
Those little1 cars look good, but few such1 cars are safe.

b. Adverb phrase
You have to dance this dance [ with a definite sense of pride and haughtiness ]1 ,
and if danced thus1 /so1 , the dance will be beautiful.
c.

Verb phrase
Whenever Sophie starts laughing1 , Bill does so1 too.

d. Adjective phrase
I thought she would be happy1 , but she certainly doesn’t seem so1 .

[Landman 2006:33]

Although Landman (2006) argues compellingly against analyzing the cases in (436) as involving
higher-type variables and proposes instead that they involve reference to kinds (see section 5.2),
my point here is that asserting that pro-forms always range over individuals requires buying into a
particular analysis of cases like (436) and thus is a nontrivial assumption.
Regardless, even if pro-forms did always refer to individuals, it would still need to be explained
why. There is nothing logically prohibiting higher-type variables in our semantic metalanguage.
For instance, higher-type variables are independently needed in the denotations of many lexical
items, including quantifiers (437).
(437) Lexical denotations still involve higher-type variables
⟦every⟧ = λP⟨e,t ⟩ λQ⟨e,t ⟩ . ∀x[P(x) → Q(x)]
Therefore, Fox’s (1999) first suggested proposal in and of itself is an incomplete answer to why the
TIC holds, though it is worth pointing out that the two hypotheses that I present in sections 5.3.2
and 5.3.3 could be seen as encompassing this proposal.
5.3.1.2

Lowest compatible type

The second possible reason suggested by Fox is that “the semantic type of a trace is determined
to be the lowest type compatible with the syntactic environment” (Fox 1999:180), an idea that he
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attributes to Beck (1996). According to this idea, GQ-traces are blocked because argument positions
are compatible with expressions of type e, which is a lower type than ⟨et, t⟩. Let us formulate this
constraint in a more general manner as the Lowest Type Constraint in (438).
(438)

Lowest Type Constraint
Map an expression to the lowest type compatible with the position.

The appeal of this idea is that it reduces the TIC to external factors. However, it faces two rather
substantial problems. The first problem is that the Lowest Type Constraint cannot account for
Π-positions. A Π-position requires an expression denoting a property. According to the Lowest
Type Constraint, a property trace should therefore be possible in a Π-position because it is of the
lowest semantic type compatible with the property requirement. Chapter 2 showed, however, that
the readings that a property trace would allow are unavailable in Π-positions.
The second problem is that GQ-traces do not necessarily have to occupy argument positions to
derive reconstructed scope readings. They can also occupy intermediate positions—and, in fact,
under Cresti’s (1995) analysis, they must do so. 9 These intermediate positions are also positions
where ordinary GQs can QR to. For example, in (439), how many books first moves to an intermediate
position and then moves to the criterial wh-position in [Spec, CP]. The lower trace from the first
step of movement is type e (‘small’ t), and the intermediate trace from the second step of movement
is type ⟨et, t⟩ (‘big’ T). Because the intermediate GQ-trace is below the modal should, how many
books takes scope below should as well; see section 3.2.1 for a detailed derivation.
(439) GQ-traces in intermediate positions
[ [ how many books ]1 λ1 [ should [ T1 λ2 [ Nina read t 2 ] ] ] ]

should ≫ how many

Because the GQ-trace is introduced in the intermediate position, the compatibility conditions of
the object position are no longer applicable to it. Rather, it would have to be the compatibility
conditions on the intermediate position that matter, which presents some complications. First, the
Lowest Type Constraint would have to apply to the GQ-trace even though it serves as the function

9

In Rullmann’s (1995) analysis, verbs directly take arguments that are generalized quantifiers, rather than entities.
This in turn requires that type-e traces be type shifted into generalized-quantifier types. The Lowest Type Constraint
does not derive the TIC under this kind of analysis, which shows how tenuous such a constraint is in the first place.
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and its sibling as the argument. It would be more intuitive for the Lowest Type Constraint to
take into account the demands of the function, not the argument. If the constraint could force
functions to be lower types, it is unclear why it would not apply to all functions and do something
disastrous like force them to take only one argument. Second, the compatibility conditions on the
intermediate position would have to be defined without jeopardizing ordinary GQs in the same
configuration. For instance, the availability of type-e subjects should not preclude GQ-subjects,
e.g. Every girl left should not be ungrammatical because Mary left is a possible sentence. To solve
these complications, the Lowest Type Constraint would have to single out traces/variables in a
way antithetical to the standard semantic composition rules. For example, according to the rule
of Function Application (440), neither the order of the expressions nor their identities matter.
Function Application blindly applies in whichever way the types work out.
(440)

Function Application
If α is a branching node, {β, γ} is the set of α’s children, and ⟦β⟧ is a function whose domain
contains ⟦γ⟧, then ⟦α⟧ = ⟦β⟧ (⟦γ⟧).

[Heim and Kratzer 1998:44]

Given that the semantic type of a trace’s sibling is only available with respect to the trace in
the composition rule for their shared parent node, the Lowest Type Constraint would have to
be implemented in these such rules. 10 Modifying Function Application, and rules like it, so that
the function cannot be a trace/variable amounts to little more than restating that traces cannot
be higher types, i.e. restating the TIC. It would also raise the question of whether the semantic
composition rules should care about the identity of the expressions involved in the rule—clearly an
ad hoc and, as far as I can tell, not independently motivated conjecture. Thus, Fox’s (1999) second
suggested proposal about the TIC is also not a possible explanation for why it holds.

5.3.2

Hypothesis One: Economy

The first hypothesis that I explore here is that the Trace Interpretation Constraint (TIC) arises
because it is the most economical option that natural language could manifest to link together

10 An alternative is to implement the Lowest Type Constraint as a transderivational constraint over derivations, but
this is problematic on independent grounds. For one, it would require a fairly different conception of the relation
between syntax and semantics if we are to maintain that this relation is a homomorphism.
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syntax and semantics. In particular, there is an interdependence between the necessity that syntax
interface with semantics and the economy of said interface. It is this interdependence that ultimately
begets the TIC. Under this proposal, the TIC is merely a reflex of a deeper level of economy in the
grammatical architecture.
Metatheoretical considerations have played and continue to play a significant role in the
development of the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1993, et seq), and the question of why the TIC
holds can be meaningfully addressed against the background of such considerations. Before the
Minimalist Program, linguistic inquiry sought to answer two broad questions: (i) What does a
speaker know when she knows her native language? (ii) What is the capacity that facilitates a
speaker’s acquisition of her native language? Underpinning the answers to these two questions
is what we call Universal Grammar (UG) (Chomsky 1965), the ‘cognitive organ’ that maps
auditory or visual input to an internalized grammar. This period of research can be characterized
as attributing the totality of linguistic properties to UG. The Minimalist Program shifted the focus
of linguistic theory to considering language in the broader context of cognition and (more recently)
evolution, 11 giving prominence to a third question: Why does UG have the properties that it has?
Implicit in this question are knowing what properties UG has, which of these properties can and
cannot be deduced from extralinguistic cognitive principles (i.e. are not part of UG), and how these
properties arose in the human species. It is against this third (set of) question(s) that I situate the
first hypothesis about why the TIC holds.
The approach to answering the third question within the Minimalist Program is one of reduction,
namely reducing phenomena down to more basic conditions. The motive is that the simpler the
assumptions, the deeper their explanatory force. Embodied in this approach is the Strong Minimalist
Thesis, the hypothesis that language is the ‘optimal solution’ to interface conditions. What does
not contribute to the satisfaction of the interfaces is deemed (prima facie) unnecessary, which
resulted in the reassessment of many of the rich structures proprietary to language posited in
Government and Binding Theory and its sibling theories. This reductionist approach to linguistic
inquiry leads to two major pillars of the Minimalist Program: economy and considerations of

11 See Chomsky (2004, 2005, 2007).
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virtual conceptual necessity. 12 Economy refers to the general principle of ‘least effort’
(Chomsky and Lasnik 1993). Classical principles like the Minimal Link Condition and the A-over-A
condition are reflexes of economy. ‘Virtual conceptual necessity’, on the other hand, is admittedly
a somewhat bloated term, but it simply refers to a domain that, to the extent that it is true, must be
captured by linguistic theory. The ‘virtual’ underscores that it appears to be necessary given our
current level of understanding, but it might very well be falsified as our understanding of language
deepens. Moreover, while a virtual conceptual necessity bears less burden of proof, because we
cannot imagine language without it, it does leave the door open for how to analyze it.
Let us consider a concrete example of these two concepts and their interplay before turning to
movement. It is a fact that sentences comprise a potentially infinite number of distinct smaller pieces.
To account for this fact, the grammar must include some procedure for putting together smaller units,
and this procedure must be recursive. Therefore, this procedure is a virtual conceptual necessity.
In minimalist syntax, this procedure is the operation Merge (Chomsky 1995a). That is, Merge
fulfils the virtual conceptual necessity of a recursive structure-building operation. Furthermore,
Merge is argued to be an economical operation in that it is binary and symmetric. The binarity of
Merge in particular exemplifies the interplay between economy and virtual conceptual necessity
in minimalist reasoning. It is a virtual conceptual necessity that Merge apply to at least two
objects; otherwise, it would not be able to build larger structures. However, it is not conceptually
necessary for Merge to be able to apply to more than two objects and hence an n-ary Merge
bears the burden of proof. According to minimalist reasoning, because Merge must apply to at
least two objects, it hence must apply to at most two objects. Chomsky (2005) bolsters this claim
by suggesting that binary Merge is also computationally economical. Granted, these particular
hypotheses about Merge might turn out to be incorrect, but the logic that gives rise to them
provides a good demonstrations of the intertwined roles that economy and virtual conceptual
necessity play in the Minimalist Program.
Now consider movement. If movement dependencies could map onto traces of more than
one semantic type, a movement dependency could in principle have multiple possible LFs, as
schematized in (441). The multiplicity of possible LFs would be uneconomical. The problem is

12 For more extensive discussion of these concepts, see Boeckx (2006).
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exacerbated by the fact that given the standard recursive definition of semantic types, it is unclear
how n-many possible LFs would not escalate to n + 1-many possible LFs and so forth. It would be
necessary to stipulate an upper bound.
(441) Movement without the TIC
[ DP1 λx e
[ DP1 . . . [ . . . DP1 . . . ] ]

. . . [ . . . xe

... ]]

[ DP1 λx ⟨e,t ⟩ . . . [ . . . x ⟨e,t ⟩ . . . ] ]
[ DP1 λx ⟨et,t ⟩ . . . [ . . . x ⟨et,t ⟩ . . . ] ]

However, according to the TIC, this overabundance of LFs for movement does not exist. Movement
dependencies map onto one and only one LF: a trace ranging over type e, as schematized in (442). 13 , 14
Thus, the TIC is an economy constraint. When the grammar maps syntax to semantics, the path of
least effort is to always map movement to the same kind of trace.
(442) Movement with the TIC
[ DP1 . . . [ . . . DP1 . . . ] ]

[ DP1 λx e . . . [ . . . x e . . . ] ]

There is another way of reasoning towards the same conclusion: We independently know that
movement must be able to map onto traces over type e; thus, it is a virtual conceptual necessity. By
deduction, the simplest system then is one in which movement only maps onto traces over type e
and no others. The TIC provides the empirical support for this hypothesis.
The TIC being an economy constraint does not necessarily explain why it holds, other than
that economy constraints seem to be an inherent part of natural language. Thus, we can still
speculate further about the TIC’s origins. Here, I suggest that we consider the necessity of LF.
Because sentences are pairings of sound and meaning, the grammar must interface with sound and
meaning. These interfaces—what we call PF and LF—are thus virtual conceptual necessities. We

13 As mentioned at the outset of this section, I am setting aside the possibility of reconstruction.
14 I have simplified the above discussion by only considering entities, but “type e” should be understood as “an individual
type”. Knowing the relevant individual type is its own separate problem. I am sympathetic to the idea that there are
not different semantic types per se, just sorts on a general semantic type like situations (in the sense of Kratzer
1989); see fn. 13 in chapter 3. This is the approach advocated for by Landman (2006), though she reduces everything
to entities; see section 5.2. Under this approach, the semantics of individual expressions would care about sorts, but
the syntax and the syntax–semantics interface would not. As I focus primarily on the entity domain throughout this
dissertation, I leave exploring this problem and solution to future research.
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now have two independently well-reasoned claims: (i) the TIC belongs to the class of economy
constraints and (ii) the LF-interface is a virtual conceptual necessity. I propose that these two
claims are two sides of the same coin; they are interconnected in the same way that economy and
virtual conceptual necessity are interconnected for Merge. On one hand, the grammar is forced
to instantiate a mapping from syntax to semantics for movement dependencies, and on the other
hand, it just happens to produce the most economical option—this is not a coincidence. If a virtual
conceptual necessity is some isolatable component that must have arisen in the course of human
evolution to endow us with natural language—a reasonable stance—, then the pattern to emerge is
that these virtual conceptual necessities trend towards the economical options. We saw this trend
with Merge, and now we see it with the semantics of movement. Under this proposal, the TIC
arises from the need to link syntax with semantics, i.e. structure with meaning, because this link is
necessarily an economical link and the TIC is the most economical option.
This first hypothesis is of course speculative. However, it is just one way of conceiving of
why it is the TIC that holds of natural language and not something else. In particular, it is a way
consistent with the goals and assumptions of the Minimalist Program. It is also a very strong
hypothesis in that it predicts no crosslinguistic variation in possible traces, which may or may not
stand the test of time. That said, I think that it provides the most interesting answer and follow-up
questions, and hence deserves consideration.

5.3.3

Hypothesis Two: Syntax and semantics of DPs

The second hypothesis about why the Trace Interpretation Constraint (TIC) holds is that it is an
artefact of the syntax and semantics of DPs. More specifically, anaphoric definite descriptions,
what I will call strong definites in contrast to nonanaphoric weak definites (following
Schwarz 2009), are necessarily of semantic type e as a result of this particular syntax and semantics.
Because traces are strong definites (see section 4.3 of chapter 4), traces are therefore never of higher
semantic types either.
This hypothesis builds on the analysis of nominal type shifting developed in chapter 4. In chapter 4, I proposed that nominal type shifters and the strong-definite determiner are in complementary

236

distribution syntactically; they both occupy D0 . 15 This complementarity has two crucial effects.
First, type-shifted definites are necessarily weak definites because the only definite determiner that
can cooccur with a type shifter is the weak one (443).
(443) Type-shifted definites are always weak definites
a.

[DP (shifter) [nP theweak NP ] ]

b. [DP thestrong [nP n0

↝ Weak definite; Type shifting possible

NP ] ]

↝ Strong definite; Type shifting impossible

Second, a derivation cannot apply both Trace Conversion and a type shifter to one and the same DP
because Trace Conversion requires the strong-definite determiner, which competes for the same
syntactic slot as type shifters. Thus, in an environment that requires a type-shifted denotation,
such as Π-positions, traces are ungrammatical (444).
(444) Traces cannot be type shifted to properties
*[ DP1 λx . . . [ [DP thexstrong [nP n0 NP ]]1 ]Π-pos ]

The other important piece of the analysis in chapter 4 is the proposal that property-type DPs are
necessarily derived. In other words, DPs never start out denoting properties. Rather, a property
denotation is always achieved by type shifting from an entity denotation (e) or a generalizedquantifier denotation (⟨et, t⟩). Because strong definites cannot be type shifted (443b)—traces
included (444)—, they can never have property denotations.
If the TIC is broken down into a ban on property traces and a ban on generalized-quantifier
traces, then the analysis of type shifting and property denotations in chapter 4 derives one half
of the TIC, namely the ban on property traces. We can account for the other half of the TIC by
assuming that strong definites are never born as generalized quantifiers, only as type-e expressions.
Since strong definites cannot be type shifted, there is in turn no means for them to obtain a
generalized-quantifier denotation, thereby preventing generalized-quantifier traces. Note that
extending this claim about generalized-quantifier denotations to all DPs would be too strong, as

15 For the sake of simplicity, I only present the copy-theoretic version of the type-shifting analysis. See section 4.3 of
chapter 4 for the multidominant version.
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there are DPs that are clearly born as generalized quantifiers, e.g. most NPs. As such, the claim
must be limited to strong definites.
Additionally, the proposal that strong definites are only type-e should be independently observable in nonmovement contexts. Although this prediction is somewhat difficult to test, one
possible test case is conjunction with expressions that are bona fide generalized quantifiers. To
conjoin with generalized quantifiers, type-e expressions need to be lifted into ⟨et, t⟩ meanings
(Partee and Rooth 1983). The prediction is that only weak definites may conjoin with generalized
quantifiers because only weak definites can be type shifted. We can use the same indirect reasoning
from section 4.3 of chapter 4 to test this prediction. In a context requiring a strong definite, a
definite description conjoined with a generalized quantifier should be infelicitous because the
conjunction forces it to be a weak definite, whose uniqueness requirement is not satisfied in the
context. (445a) executes this test using covariance with an indefinite in a quantificational sentence,
one of the environments identified by Schwarz (2009) to require a strong definite. The judgement
is somewhat difficult, and I can only report my own judgement, which is that (445a) is degraded
when it includes and every encyclopedia. The sentence becomes acceptable again when the book is
replaced with that book (445b), which is also predicted under the analysis developed in chapter 4.
(445) Strong definites cannot conjoin with generalized quantifiers
a.

In every library with a book about topinambur, I look in the book (??and every
encyclopedia) to see whether one can grill topinambur.

b. In every library with a book about topinambur, I look in that book (and every encyclopedia) to see whether one can grill topinambur.
Conversely, in contexts where the uniqueness requirement of a weak definite is satisfied, such as
part–whole bridging contexts (Schwarz 2009), a definite description should be able to conjoin with
a generalized quantifier because weak definites can be type shifted, unlike strong definites. 16 This
prediction is borne out, as shown in (446).

16 Another possibility is that weak definites can be born as generalized quantifiers, unlike their strong definite
counterparts, though this does not change the predictions.
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(446) Weak definites can conjoin with generalized quantifiers
The town was so big that the church (and every municipal building) was impossible to
find.
If the judgements in (445) and (446) generalize to other English speakers, then this second hypothesis
about the TIC has a strong piece of evidence in its favor.
There are two potential downsides to this second hypothesis. The first is that in some sense,
the TIC would be an accidental property of strong definites. It is missing the “deeper” explanation
of the first hypothesis in section 5.3.2. 17 However, this downside might turn out to be an advantage
as we learn more about reconstruction and the semantics of movement in languages other than
English, which is currently an open question; see section 5.4.5. Tying the explanation of the TIC to
the syntax and semantics of DPs means that any crosslinguistic variation in possible traces might
be accounted for in terms of variation in what kinds of DPs can be constructed in the language. The
second potential downside is that this hypothesis does not automatically extend to domains other
than entities, such as degrees and situations. While these domains have not featured prominently
in this dissertation, we would lose the straightforward explanation that the TIC provides about
why VPs and APs obligatorily reconstruct; see section 3.4.4 of chapter 3.

5.4

Open questions

This section discusses some of the open questions about Π-positions and about the particular
worldview of possible traces developed in this dissertation. These questions serve as avenues for
future research.

5.4.1

Moving verbs and verb phrases

It is not difficult to develop analyses that involve higher-type traces, but the question is whether
such traces are absolutely necessary. Various proposals exist in the literature that employ higher-

17 One line of reasoning to link together the two hypotheses in sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 is that economy forces only
individual-type traces, which in turn causes strong definites to only be type e. A similar line of reasoning can be
found in phonological theory before the advent of Optimality Theory. It was known that languages have phonological
constraints, but under a rule-based phonology, it was a rule that repaired the constraint violation. It was hypothesized
that the constraint is what gives rise to the rule. However, this line of thinking only goes so far.
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type traces over verbs or verb phrases, e.g. types ⟨e, t⟩ or ⟨e, ⟨e, t⟩⟩, three of which I list in this
section: head movement in the German long passive, as-parentheticals, and sloppy VPs under
ellipsis. In the cases of as-parentheticals and sloppy VPs under ellipsis, there are already arguments
in the literature against the particular analyses involving higher-type traces, crucially for reasons
independent of possible traces.
5.4.1.1

Head movement and verb clusters

Traditionally, head movement is believed to have no semantic effects. However, Keine and Bhatt
(2016) argue that the long passive in German involves semantically-contentful head movement.
The long passive is a construction in which the matrix verb is passivised and the embedded
object receives nominative case (447a), in contrast to the local passive, where the object retains
accusative case (447b). Keine and Bhatt (2016) crucially observe that in the long passive, the matrix
verb obligatorily takes scope in the position of the embedded verb. As such, all elements in the
embedded nonfinite clause take scope above the matrix verb. For example, in (447a), nur einem
einzigen Studenten ‘only one student’ takes scope above vergessen ‘forgotten’, even though it is not
the DP that gets promoted to nominative case.
(447) a.

Long passive
Erst gestern

wieder wurde der Fritz

just yesterday again

was

nur einem einzigen Studenten

the Fritz.nom only a

single

student.dat

vorzustellen vergessen.
to.introduce forgotten
‘Just yesterday it was forgotten to introduce Fritz to only one student’
*forget ≫ only; 3only ≫ forget
b. Local passive
Erst gestern

wieder wurde den Fritz

just yesterday again

was

nur einem einzigen Studenten

the Fritz.acc only a

single

student.dat

vorzustellen vergessen.
to.introduce forgotten
‘Just yesterday it was forgotten to introduce Fritz to only one student’
3

forget ≫ only; *only ≫ forget

[Keine and Bhatt 2016:1456]

Keine and Bhatt (2016) propose that the German long passive involves the embedded verb headraising to the matrix verb, forming a verb cluster. The resulting verb cluster is interpreted via
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function composition. The movement of the embedded verb leaves a verbal trace, whose λ-binder
immediately sits below the verb cluster. The verb cluster saturates this λ-abstraction, the result of
which is the entire verb cluster, including the matrix verb, taking scope below everything in the
embedded nonfinite clause.
(448) Keine and Bhatt’s (2016) proposal
VP1
V01

VP2
λQ

VP2
DP

V02

V01

Q

They hypothesize that verb-cluster formation happens in order to avoid violating Distinctness (in
the sense of Richards 2010), in particular having more than one maximal head of the same type in
a given Spell-out domain. There are two points worth mentioning: First, the trace left behind by
the embedded verb is not a copy, and it is unclear whether it could be a copy and also derive the
intended semantic effects. Second, the semantic effects can equally be achieved by lowering the
matrix verb to the embedded verb. This would still avoid violating Distinctness and would violate
the Extension Condition no more than ordinary head movement does.
5.4.1.2 As-parentheticals
Potts (2002a,b) argues that as-parentheticals, like in (449), involve a null VP-operator that moves to
the clause edge, leaving a verbal trace, as schematized in (450). The motivation behind this analysis
is that as-parentheticals do not display the properties of VP ellipsis, but do show properties of
movement, e.g. they are island sensitive. This is a puzzle that Landman (2006) acknowledges as
challenging for a constraint against higher-type variables/traces, but does not solve.
(449) Mary kissed a pig, as John also will ∆.

[LaCara 2016a:1]
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(450) Potts’ (2002a,b) analysis of as-parentheticals
[ as [CP OpVP [ John also will t VP ] ] ]

However, for reasons independent of possible traces, LaCara (2016a,b) recently argues against
Potts’s analysis of as-parentheticals and in defense of an analysis involving VP ellipsis. Under his
analysis, the island sensitivity is still due to movement of a null operator, but this operator instead
ranges over kinds. Crucially, there is no higher-type trace in LaCara’s (2016a,b) analysis.
5.4.1.3

Sloppy VPs under ellipsis

Hardt (1999) and Schwarz (2000) observe what appear to be sloppy readings of VPs under ellipsis,
which have been argued to support the pro-form analysis of ellipsis. Consider the example in (451),
where the elided VP may be interpreted as “want to clean” even though there is no antecedent of
“want to clean”, only “want to cook” and “clean”.
(451) When John had to cook, he didn’t want to ∆. When he had to clean, he didn’t ∆, either.
[Schwarz 2000]

Schwarz likens such cases to sloppy readings of pronouns in ellipsis sites. He analyzes (451) as the
VP being a variable that is bound by an overt VP that fronts at LF, as schematized in (452).
(452) a.

[VP cook ]1 λ1 [ when he had to t 1 , he didn’t want to t 1 ]

b. [VP clean ]1 λ1 [ when he had to t 1 , he didn’t ⟨want to t 1 ⟩ ]
There are a number of problems with this analysis that have been documented in the literature
(see e.g. Schwarz 2000; Sauerland 2004; Tomioka 2008), which I do not review here. The reader
is referred to Tomioka (2008) for an alternative analysis involving deletion of fully articulated
syntactic structure.

5.4.2

Functional questions

As discussed in section 3.3.4 of chapter 3, there are constituent questions where the answer can
be a function (Engdahl 1980, 1986; Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984). These are called functional
qestions. Consider the question in (453a) with the quantificational phrase no woman. It is possible
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to answer (453a) with a phrase representing a function like her first picture, which when given a
woman, returns her first picture. Under the choice-function semantics of constituent questions,
functional readings can be easily accommodated by Skolemizing the choice function (453c), in
effect passing it a variable that is bound by the quantifier that yields the functional reading.
(453) Functional questions
a.

[ Which picture (of herself2 ) ]1 does no woman2 like

1?

b. her first picture, her prom picture, . . .
c.

Skolemized choice functions
λw 0 p⟨s,t ⟩ . ∃f cf [p = λw . ¬∃x[womanw (x) ∧ likew (f x (picture))(x)]]

I claimed in section 3.3.4 of chapter 3 that functional questions require reconstruction of the
wh-phrase so that a variable inside the wh-phrase can be bound by the quantifier (454).
(454) Functional questions require reconstruction
[ Q no woman λx [ x like [ which picture of x ] ]
Sauerland (1998, 2004) presents an alternative analysis in which movement of the wh-phrase to
[Spec, CP] introduces a λ-abstraction over choice functions. This λ-abstraction binds a choicefunction variable in the lower copy, which is itself converted into a definite description via Trace
Conversion (455). This choice function can be Skolemized, thereby allowing for functional questions
like (453a).
(455) Sauerland’s (1998, 2004) choice-function analysis
[ [DP which picture ]1 λf [ no woman λx [ x like [DP the picture f (x) ]1 ] ] ]

Under Sauerland’s (1998, 2004) analysis, the question is whether this λ-abstraction over choice
functions counts as a “trace” for the Trace Interpretation Constraint. The answer is unclear because
the lower copy of the wh-phrase is itself still type e. While I do not have an answer for this question,
I would like to highlight that a pure reconstruction analysis as in (454) with a Q-particle is a viable
alternative to abstraction over choice functions, and the question does not arise.
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5.4.3

Antecedent Contained Deletion

Antecedent Contained Deletion (ACD) is a class of ellipsis constructions in which the elided material
is contained within its antecedent. A representative example is given in (456).
elided VP

³¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ·¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ µ
(456) Katia read every book that Sakshi did ⟨read t⟩.
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¸ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹¶
antecedent VP

If the DP every book that Sakshi did were interpreted in its base position in (456), there would be
no suitable antecedent to license ellipsis. The antecedent VP would both not be parallel to the
elided VP and run into the problem of infinite regress. The standard approach to this problem is
for the DP hosting the ellipsis site (henceforth the source DP) to evacuate the VP. I will assume
the analysis of ACD in Fox (2002): the source DP evacuates to a VP-external position via QR (457a),
after which the relative clause containing the ellipsis site is late-merged onto the source DP (457b).
(457) ACD derivation
a.

Step 1: Move DP out of the VP
[ Subj [VP V DP1 ] DP1 ]
qr

b. Step 2: Late-merge relative clause
[ Subj [VP V DP1 ] [DP NP [RC . . . ⟨V DP⟩ ] ]1 ]
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¸¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¶
Late Merge
antecedent VP
The result of the source DP evacuating the VP is a suitable antecedent for ellipsis. This movement
is covert and therefore typically assumed to be QR. Evidence in favor of this view comes from
the observation by Sag (1976) and Larson and May (1990) that the source DP obligatorily takes
scope above the VP; this evidence was also discussed in section 3.2.4 of chapter 3. Consider the
paradigm in (458). In the baseline sentence in (458a), every painting that Sakshi painted can scope
above or below the intensional verb want. On the narrow-scope reading, Katia is an admirer of
Sakshi’s and has the de dicto desire to own any painting that Sakshi has painted. On the wide-scope
reading, Katia wants a certain set of paintings, which happen to all be painted by Sakshi, possibly
unbeknownst to Katia. The equivalent narrow-scope reading disappears in the ACD example
in (458b). Only a wide-scope reading survives, where Katia wants a certain set of paintings, all of
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which Sakshi also wants. In the absence of ellipsis, the narrow-scope reading reappears. Thus,
(458c) has a reading where Katia has the de dicto desire to have any painting that Sakshi also wants.
(458) ACD forces scope shifting
a.

(=240)

Baseline
Katia wanted every painting that Sakshi painted.

3

want ≫ every; 3every ≫ want

b. ACD
Katia wanted every painting that Sakshi did ∆.
c.

*want ≫ every; 3every ≫ want

No VPE
Katia wanted every painting that Sakshi wanted.

3

want ≫ every; 3every ≫ want

This scope pattern follows if the movement of the source DP to a VP-external position leaves a
trace of type e, or, in other words, if the movement is QR.
ACD is the poster child of QR. Unlike other duties ascribed to QR, such as allowing quantifiers
to take scope covertly, it is very difficult to satisfy the parallelism requirements of ellipsis and
avoid the infinite-regress problem without some QR-like movement of the source DP out of the
antecedent VP (though see Cormack 1984; Jacobson 1992). Turning to Π-positions, the problem is
that DPs in Π-positions can host an ellipsis site in an ACD configuration. This is illustrated in (459)
for change-of-color verbs (459a), naming verbs (459b), and predicate nominals (459c). 18
(459) ACD with Π -positions
a.

Megan painted the house the (same) color that Jyoti did ∆.

b. Irene called the cat the (same) nickname that Helen did ∆.
c.

Erika became the (same) kind of teacher that Gloria did ∆.

The availability of ACD with Π-positions is at odds with (i) the extensive arguments from chapter 2
that QR cannot target Π-positions and (ii) what we know about ACD involving QR. While I do not
have a solution to this problem, I can make an interesting observation about ACD in Π-positions
that suggests that something more complicated is happening. The observation concerns the scope

18 It is unclear what ACD with an existential construction would look like. The sentence in (i) is my best attempt to
construct an example, which is ungrammatical.
(i) *There should be those kinds of books on the table that there should ⟨be those kinds of books⟩ in the cabinet.
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of the object (e.g. the house in (459a)) when the source DP is a Π-position: the object must scope
above the VP along with the Π-position. This suggests an analysis where what moves is something
properly containing the Π-position and the object. A candidate is the small clause containing them,
so I will refer to this as the small-clause analysis. However, I leave working out the details to
future research. Similar analyses have been pursued by Wold (1995) for ACD with comparatives
(also Bhatt and Pancheva 2007) and by Landman (2006) for ACD with such-as relatives.
Judging the scope of two DPs with respect to an intensional verb in an ACD configuration
is challenging. To alleviate this difficulty and make the judgements sharper, I make use of NPI
licensing, which has a scope-trapping effect with ACD resolution. 19 The diagnostic works as
follows: (i) For the NPI to be licensed at LF, the source DP cannot move out of the scope of the
licensor. (ii) When the source DP is embedded inside a nonfinite clause, either the embedded
or matrix VP can in principle serve as the antecedent provided that the source DP evacuates it.
(iii) Embedding the NPI licensor forces the ACD to resolve to the embedded VP. Consider the
sentences in (460), where the source DP—a Π-position—is headed by the NPI any, whose licensor
is in the matrix clause. As expected, the ellipsis in (460) can resolve either to the embedded VP
(‘low resolution’) or the matrix VP (‘high resolution’) because the negation is above both of them.
Tense matching can be used to bias towards one of the resolutions: present tense in the relative
clause biases towards low resolution (460a) and past tense biases towards high resolution (460b).
I will mark tense mismatches as being ungrammatical to streamline the paradigms.
(460) High negation
a.

Tense bias: Low
John didn’t want to paint the house any shade of red that Mary does ∆.
∆ = paint the house

3

* ∆ = want to paint the house (tense mismatch)
b. Tense bias: High
John didn’t want to paint the house any shade of red that Mary did ∆.
* ∆ = paint the house (tense mismatch)
3
∆ = want to paint the house

19 Many thanks to Kyle Johnson (p.c.) for drawing my attention to this diagnostic.
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Moving the negation from the matrix clause to the embedded clause constrains the range of
positions to which the source DP can move and still have the NPI licensed. Thus, in (461), the ACD
is forced to resolve to the embedded VP so that the NPI remains in the scope of negation.
(461) Low negation
a.

Tense bias: Low
John wanted to not paint the house any shade of red that Mary does ∆.
∆ = paint the house

3

* ∆ = want to not paint the house
b. Tense bias: High
* John wanted to not paint the house any shade of red that Mary did ∆.
* ∆ = paint the house (tense mismatch)
* ∆ = want to not paint the house
(460) and (461) show that the diagnostic works as intended for ACD with Π-positions. However,
they do not discern between the small-clause analysis and the analysis where QR targets the
Π-position because the NPI is located in the Π-position. Both analyses thus predict that the NPI
licensor being in the embedded clause blocks the high resolution of the ACD.
The surprising observation arises when the NPI is not in the Π-position, but the object. The
small-clause analysis predicts that because the scope of the object and the Π-position covary, the
NPI should continue to constrain ACD resolution as it does in (461). The alternative analysis where
QR targets the Π-position, on the other hand, predicts that an NPI in the object should have no
effect on ACD resolution. Let us start with the baseline in (462), where the negation is located in
the higher clause. As both analyses predict, low and high ellipsis resolutions are possible in (462),
modulo tense matching.
(462) High negation
a.

Tense bias: Low
John didn’t want to paint [ any houses ] [ the shade of red that Mary does ∆ ].
∆ = paint some houses

3

* ∆ = want to paint some houses (tense mismatch)
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b. Tense bias: High
John didn’t want to paint [ any houses ] [ the shade of red that Mary did ∆ ].
* ∆ = paint some houses (tense mismatch)
3
∆ = want to paint some houses
Against this backdrop, the target sentence is given in (463), where the negation has been moved
to the embedded clause. Crucially, only the low resolution is possible in (463); the ellipsis in the
relative clause cannot resolve to the matrix VP. This is what the small-clause analysis predicts.
(463) Low negation
a.

Tense bias: Low
John wanted to not paint [ any houses ] [ the shade of red that Mary does ∆ ].
∆ = paint some houses

3

* ∆ = want to not paint any houses
b. Tense bias: High
* John wanted to not paint [ any houses ] [ the shade of red that Mary did ∆ ].
* ∆ = paint some houses (tense mismatch)
* ∆ = want to not paint any houses
The high resolution of ACD being blocked in (463) is unexpected under an analysis where the
Π-position QRs to resolve ACD. However, it follows directly from the small-clause analysis: in
order to achieve the high resolution, the entire small clause would have to move to a position above
the matrix VP, which would place the NPI in the object outside the scope of its licensor in the
embedded clause. I take this result as compelling evidence in favor of the small-clause analysis. 20
(464) and (465) show that the same ACD-resolution pattern found for change-of-color verbs
extends to naming verbs and predicate nominals respectively. For predicate nominals, I have used
make X into Y . The small-clause analysis applies to verbs like become—the small clause contains
the subject and the predicate nominal—but these cases cannot be tested along the same lines as
change-of-color verbs.

20 A question that I have not explored is whether small-clause movement would allow Π-positions to covertly take
scope, in contradiction with the arguments in section 2.2 of chapter 2. A relevant judgement is whether (i.a) has the
de dicto desire reading that (i.b) does. My judgements are not so clear, and neither are anyone’s who I have asked.
(i)

a.

John wanted to paint the house every color that Mary did ∆.

b.

John wanted to paint the house every color that Mary wanted to paint the house.
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(464) Naming verbs
a.

Negation: high; Tense bias: high
John didn’t want to call [ any cats ] [ the nicknames that Mary did ∆ ].
* ∆ = call some cats (tense mismatch)
3
∆ = want to call some cats

b. Negation: low; Tense bias: high
* John wanted to not call [ any cats ] [ the nicknames that Mary did ∆ ].
* ∆ = call some cats (tense mismatch)
* ∆ = want to not call any cats
c.

Negation: low; Tense bias: low
John wanted to not call [ any cats ] [ the nicknames that Mary does ∆ ].
∆ = call some cats

3

* ∆ = want to not call any cats
(465) Predicate nominals
a.

Negation: high; Tense bias: high
John didn’t want to make the same kind of teacher out of [ any students ] [ that Mary
did ∆ ].
* ∆ = make out of some students (tense mismatch)
3
∆ = want to make out of some students

b. Negation: low; Tense bias: high
*John wanted to not make the same kind of teacher out of [ any student ] [ that Mary
did ∆ ].
* ∆ = make out of some students (tense mismatch)
* ∆ = want to not make out of any students
c.

Negation: low; Tense bias: low
John wanted to not make the same kind of teacher out of [ any students ] [ that Mary
does ∆ ].
∆ = make out of some students

3

* ∆ = want to not make out of any students
This scope pattern of the object when the source DP is a Π-position does not follow from the
simple QR analysis. Rather, it suggests a more complicated analysis where what moves to resolve
the ellipsis is a larger constituent that properly contains the Π-position and the object, e.g. the
small clause. I leave pursuing this question and this analysis to future research.
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5.4.4

A-movement

A topic that has been left unmentioned in this dissertation is A-movement. First, the DP/QPmovement system of chapter 3 inherits from Johnson (2012, 2014) the problem of not having an
analysis of A-movement. Thus, A-movement is an open problem for the DP/QP-movement system;
see Johnson (2014) for some discussion.
Second, can A-movement target Π-positions? Since A-movement can reconstruct, the prediction
is that it should be able to target Π-positions. However, this prediction cannot be tested in
English because there are no A-movement types that could even in principle target them. On one
hand, A-raising verbs like seem and appear only target the subject, or in the case of existential
constructions, the expletive there. On the other hand, passivisation always targets the object (466a).
Because English passives are asymmetric, no conclusions about Π-positions can be drawn from the
ungrammaticality of (466b).
(466) Passivisation and Π -positions
a.

[ The house ]1 was painted

1

magenta.

b. * Magenta1 was painted the house

1.

These limitations stem from A-movement in English being fairly limited in that it cannot skip over
intervening arguments. Testing the prediction about Π-positions and A-movement would require
something akin to A-scrambling, which English does not have.

5.4.5

Reconstruction and Π-positions crosslinguistically

The proposals in this dissertation have been motivated primarily based on English. The existing
reconstruction literature is larger focused on English as well. It is an open question whether the
proposals in this dissertation withstand crosslinguistic scrutiny.
As far as I know, no one has observed anything similar to the Π-position asymmetry in another
language, and my cursory look at a few languages turned up nothing. 21 It may be that English
is special in this regard, but not enough crosslinguistic work has been done yet to draw this

21 Many thanks to Rodica Ivan, Stefan Keine, and Ekaterina Vostrikova for discussing Romanian, German, and Russian
respectively with me at various points.

250

conclusion. From the perspective of Postal (1994) and Stanton (2016), one might think to look
for environments that are incompatible with pronouns and then work backwards to check for
a movement asymmetry. Such an approach would work insofar as pronouns and movement
types behave in the given language identically to their English counterparts. I suspect that this
is very rarely the case. Chapter 2 showed that it is a constellation of independent properties
about English that give rise to the Π-position asymmetry: (i) having positions where DPs must
denote properties, (ii) having movement types for which reconstruction is optional or prohibited,
and (iii) having pronouns that cannot denote properties. Properties (i) and (ii) are necessary and
sufficient to have the Π-position asymmetry, whereas the absence of (iii) would only change
the empirical signature. Regarding (i), the promising candidates for property-denoting positions
crosslinguistically are predicate nominals and resultatives. Regarding (ii), the promising candidates
for nonreconstructing movement types are wh-movement, which presumably can but does not
have to reconstruct, and appositive RCs. The analogues of other English movement types are likely
to reconstruct, e.g. movement types called “topicalization”, or have different underlying structures,
e.g. tough-constructions. As for antipronominality, there are many reasons why an environment
could reject a pronoun, e.g. prosody. I would therefore caution against drawing any conclusions in
a given language based on antipronominality alone. The Π-position asymmetry is fundamentally a
movement asymmetry, and thus (i) and (ii) are the cornerstones.
Moreover, regarding generalized-quantifier traces, Lechner (1998) argues based on German
that they must exist alongside syntactic reconstruction, which is at odds with the English facts
(see section 3.2 of chapter 3). Therefore, in addition to Π-positions, the existence of generalizedquantifier traces needs tested in other languages as well.
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